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CPG Statement: Flawed in Principle and Practice — Why Canada Must Say No to ‘Golden Dome’

Flawed in Principle and Practice: Why Canada Must Say No to ‘Golden Dome’

A Statement from the Canadian Pugwash Group – June 2025

As Canada’s new government takes office amid growing global instability, an early and consequential test of its approach to continental defence will be how it responds to the United States’ proposed “Golden Dome.” Announced in January by President Donald Trump, this sweeping missile defence initiative envisions a $175 billion shield over U.S. territory, with Canada invited to participate for $61 billion. Canada should decline involvement in this flawed and destabilizing scheme.

Canada’s proud tradition of supporting arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament has earned it global respect. That reputation would be placed at risk by participation in a project that emphasizes unilateral technological dominance over diplomatic restraint. Rather than entangle its defence policy in an unproven and provocative system, Canada should focus on practical investments that reinforce continental cooperation, security, and credibility.

Existing plans to modernize NORAD – upgrading early warning systems and strengthening surveillance of cruise and hypersonic missiles – offer a credible, cooperative path forward. This approach supports Canadian sovereignty and security while remaining consistent with long-standing international commitments and the mutually agreed framework of NORAD’s mission.

A Deeply Problematic Proposal

The “Golden Dome” proposal is not merely expensive; it is strategically unsound and technically unreliable. As with earlier U.S. missile defence efforts, including President Reagan’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” of the 1980s, this latest version suffers from three fatal flaws:

  • False Sense of Security

Despite decades of development and hundreds of billions of dollars invested, U.S. missile defence systems have demonstrated only limited effectiveness. Current ground-based interceptors have a success rate of roughly 50% – and only under highly scripted test conditions. These trials do not simulate real-world scenarios involving decoys or other countermeasures that would likely be used in an actual nuclear strike.

Proposals for space-based sensors or interceptors – hallmarks of Golden Dome – face severe technical and logistical obstacles. They also assume adversaries would not respond with countermeasures, an assumption both unrealistic and dangerous. A system that offers the illusion of security while failing in practice would do more harm than good.

Contrary to the implications of its name, the so-called Golden Dome bears little resemblance to Israel’s Iron Dome. It is designed not for short-range projectiles but for long-range, nuclear-armed missiles – against which interception is exponentially more complex and far less reliable.

Indeed, experts estimate that thousands of space-based interceptors would be required to defend against even a single missile launch from North Korea, let alone a coordinated attack from a major nuclear power. The system is not only exorbitant, but fundamentally implausible.

  • Provocative and Destabilizing

Strategic missile defence disrupts the already fragile balance of deterrence among nuclear-armed states. If a nation believes its retaliatory capability could be compromised, it may feel compelled to expand its offensive arsenal or adopt risky postures such as launch-on-warning.

Rather than enhancing security, initiatives like Golden Dome increase the risk of miscalculation, arms racing, and preemptive escalation, especially in times of crisis. These risks are not theoretical; they are embedded in the logic of deterrence that governs nuclear relationships to this day.

The space-based components of Golden Dome would also accelerate the weaponization of outer space. Canada has long been a vocal proponent of keeping space free of weapons, in line with international norms. Participation in this project would undermine that legacy.

Golden Dome’s destabilizing potential is not only theoretical. Russian and Chinese officials have already warned that expanded U.S. missile defence efforts could trigger countermeasures, including the deployment of more advanced offensive systems and the loosening of nuclear postures.

Canadian participation could make us a target in broader geopolitical rivalries, increasing, not decreasing, our exposure to risk. In addition, it would hamper efforts to push for further strategic arms reductions involving China, Russia and the United States.

  • Fiscally Unsound

The $175 billion price tag cited by the U.S. President is widely considered unrealistic. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office has estimated that space-based elements alone could exceed $500 billion over 20 years. Canada’s suggested contribution of $61 billion would be wildly disproportionate to its needs and capabilities.

At a time of fiscal constraint and competing national priorities, Canada must focus defence spending on capabilities that actually strengthen security, readiness, and sovereignty. Golden Dome fails this test on every front.

The opportunity cost of such a commitment cannot be ignored. A $61-billion expenditure would crowd out investment in urgently needed capabilities such as cyber defence, Arctic security, and domestic resilience. It would also strain Canada’s ability to fulfil other global obligations, including peacekeeping, climate security, and humanitarian response.

A Better Alternative for Canada

The idea of a missile shield, however ambitious, has consistently failed to deliver. Its appeal is undercut by persistent technical challenges, exorbitant costs, and serious strategic risks.

Canada’s involvement in such a scheme would not only be ineffective and destabilizing but would entangle our defence posture in broader U.S. ambitions – some of which may conflict with international law or Canada’s core security priorities. The proposed space-based elements of Golden Dome directly contradict Canada’s long-standing opposition to the weaponization of space, voiced repeatedly at the UN Conference on Disarmament.

Moreover, a defence commitment of this scale demands transparency and broad political consensus. Yet there has been no public consultation, parliamentary debate, or cost-benefit analysis of Canadian participation. A $61-billion expenditure, it is larger than Canada’s entire annual defence budget.

At a time of rising costs of living, climate stress, and overstretched public services, diverting tens of billions to a flawed and provocative weapons system would be irresponsible. Canada’s defence investments must be effective, accountable, and aligned with our national interest.

Continued NORAD modernization provides a credible, cooperative path forward strengthening North American defence while upholding Canada’s commitments to arms control, space non-weaponization, and strategic restraint.

In an era of mounting global insecurity, Canada must choose credibility over illusion – and reject participation in Golden Dome.

 

 

Recent publications on defence and nuclear policy by Pugwash members

Paul Meyer: The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Program: Could Withdrawal from the NPT be Next?” Policy, July 5, 2025.

Robin Collins:Canada – and the world – need prudent not excessive military spending” Ceasefire Blog, July 2, 2025.

Cesar Jaramillo:Flawed in principle and practice: why Canada must say no to Trump’s Golden Dome” The Hill Times, June 30, 2025.

Douglas Roche: “The real Mark Carney is about to emerge” The Hill Times, June 30, 2025.

Erika Simpson and Gordon Edwards: “Iran’s uranium enrichment: myths, realities, and what Canada should understand” The Hill Times, June 30, 2025.

Michael Manulak, participant: “Canada’s foreign policy must catch up to its military spending” Globe and Mail, June 27, 2025.

Paul Meyer:Canada Shouldn’t Buy into the Mirage of “Golden Dome” CIPS, June 25, 2025.

Erika Simpson: “NATO’s dangerous new trajectory of expensive targets” The Hill Times, June 25, 2025.

Peggy Mason, participant: “Canada and Gaza: What are the Moral and Legal Obligations?” OFIP, June 16, 2025.

Erika Simpson and Hwang, J.: “Forging Peace in 2025-2030: The Role of Canada and South Korea as Middle Powers in Leading Global Conflict Resolution“. In Factis Pax: Journal of Peace Education and Social Justice19(1). June 16, 2025.

Jeremy Whitlock:Non-proliferation and the Nuclear Revival” 49th Annual CNS/CNA Student Conference, Toronto, June 8-11, 2025.

 

Published views by members of CPG are not necessarily those of our organization.

Meyer: Canada Shouldn’t Buy into the Mirage of “Golden Dome”

Paul Meyer is a Board member and Past Chair of Canadian Pugwash Group

https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2025/06/25/canada-shouldnt-buy-into-the-mirage-of-golden-dome/

A new Canadian Government is assuming power at a time of great upheaval in international affairs. Norms of non-aggression, cooperative security and strategic restraint are being undermined. Regrettably, some of this disruption originates with our American ally with whom, as the Prime Minister has said, we will need to forge a new security relationship. 

Whitlock: NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NUCLEAR REVIVAL

Jeremy Whitlock is a member of Canadian Pugwash Group

IAEA Dept. of Safeguards (ret’d)
Principal: Ottertail Consulting Inc. Stratford, ON

Paper delivered to 44th Annual CNS Conference and the 49th Annual CNS/CNA Student Conference
Westin Harbour Castle Hotel, Toronto, ON, Canada, June 8-11, 2025

FULL PAPER LINKED HERE: Non-proliferation and the Nuclear Revival – Jeremy Whitlock – CNS2025

The summary:

The nuclear revival will need to proceed in lock step with enhancements to the non-proliferation regime if it is to succeed while remaining consistent with international legal obligations. In the past the evolution of the nuclear industry has proceeded at a slow enough pace that nuclear safeguards – the cornerstone of non-proliferation and therefore of civilian nuclear energy expansion – has generally been able to keep up with emerging implementation challenges. The safeguards challenges of the current nuclear revival however, based on the diversity of technologies and timeliness of proposed deployment, will be both significant and quickly evolving. There is a clear need, therefore, for early engagement so that safeguards solutions can be integrated within the design process and considered alongside safety and security requirements.

The good news is that, given sufficient early engagement, safeguards solutions exist and non-proliferation does not have to be an impediment to nuclear innovation (or put another way, nuclear innovation an impediment to global security). Quite the contrary, as embodied in the tenets of the NPT, non-proliferation can rightfully assume its role as an enabler and cornerstone of nuclear innovation: the NPT, it must be remembered, recognizes the “inalienable right” of nations to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology.

For Canada this will possibly include a national debate over technologies such as reprocessing – a technology that it pioneered in the earliest years of its nuclear program but has generally avoided until very recently. For innovations such as this, there are clearly proliferation challenges but also non-proliferation solutions (largely in the form of adequate safeguards).

Safeguards by Design, the proactive practice of good engineering whereby an end user’s international obligations are accounted for as early as possible, is also a concept pioneered by Canada. By continuing to accord due weight to this requirement, Canada is in a position to honour its legacy of leadership in global non-proliferation, and help ensure a sustainable nuclear revival.

 

Open Letter to Prime Minister Carney: Canada Must Say No to ‘Golden Dome’

STATEMENT (PDF) HERE

The Right Honourable Mark Carney
Prime Minister of Canada
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6

June 11, 2025

Dear Prime Minister,

As your government begins its mandate at a time of profound international uncertainty, the Canadian Pugwash Group urges you to take a clear and principled position on a critical issue of defence and diplomacy: the United States’ proposed “Golden Dome” missile defence initiative.

As outlined in the statement that follows (Flawed in Principle and Practice: Why Canada Must Say No to ‘Golden Dome’) we believe that participation in this unproven, costly, and destabilizing scheme would undermine Canada’s strategic interests, global reputation, and longstanding support for arms control and multilateralism.

Canada should decline its participation in this initiative.

Instead, we encourage the Government of Canada to reaffirm its commitment to NORAD modernization as a credible and cooperative contribution to continental defence. This approach supports Canadian sovereignty and security without fuelling arms races or weakening international norms.

We hope the government will consider the perspectives offered in our statement and would welcome the opportunity to engage further.

Sincerely,
Cesar Jaramillo
Chair, Canadian Pugwash Group

cc: Minister of Global Affairs Canada, Hon. Anita Anand
cc: Minister of National Defence, Hon. David McGuinty

STATEMENT (PDF) HERE

 

Collins: Book Reviews of COPOUT and Nuclear is Not the Solution

Robin Collins is a member of Canadian Pugwash Group
Publiahed in Canadian Field-Naturalist journal July-Sept 2024

Download review here:
https://www.canadianfieldnaturalist.ca/index.php/cfn/article/view/3525

COPOUT: How Governments Have Failed the People on Climate—an Insider’s View of Climate Change Conferences, from Paris to Dubai By Nick Breeze. 2024. Gemini Books. 240 pages, 22.99 CAD, Paper.

Nuclear is Not the Solution: the Folly of Atomic Power in the Age of Climate Change By M.V. Ramana. 2024. Verso Books. 272 pages, 39.95 CAD, Hardcover, 11.99 CAD, E-book.

In two recent books addressing responses to climate change, readers learn about the unwieldly international policy process as well as technological options, and in particular nuclear energy, that may or may not effectively mitigate the global crisis.

A COP, or Conference of the Parties, is an annual United Nations meeting on climate change with official and unofficial representatives from countries around the world. Author Nick Breeze attended eight COPs, beginning with the Paris Agreement event at COP 21 in 2015 where 196 governments agreed on a baseline limit of 1.5o C global temperature rise above pre-industrial levels. His book, COPOUT, reviews the progress of those conferences; from COP to COP, we detect a growing malaise, as emissions increase faster than mitigation. An early focus on planting trees and carbon capture draw-down technologies was also missing the mark.

In Nuclear is Not the Solution, M.V. Ramana makes four core arguments against nuclear power: High cost and slow build time, weapons proliferation risk, contamination risk, and the spent fuel disposal problem. Early in the book, he says: “Although climate change scares me, I am even more scared of a future with more nuclear plants.”  Read: full article here

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