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Table of Contents:

Cooper, Nicholas. *International Security and the Threat of Global Salafi Jihadism*. Fall, 2006. pp. 3 - 18

Davis, Steve. *Are nuclear disarmament agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty viable?*
Spring, 2007. pp. 19 - 30

Harrington, Cameron. *The Construction of Islamic Radicalism: A Constructivist Critique of al Qaeda and Global Islamic Terrorism*. Winter, 2007. pp. 31 - 43.

Henry, Steacy. *NORAD, BMD, and North American Security*. Winter, 2007. pp. 44 - 60.

Nicholson, Vanessa. *The Global Consequences of Pakistan's Nuclear Insecurity*. pp. 61 - 77.

Omstead, Katie. *The Millennium Development Goals and Universal Human Rights – Friends or Rivals?* Fall, 2006. pp. 78 - 91.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

International Security and the Threat of Global Salafi Jihadism

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Fall 2006

Authors Note: The Author Now prefers the term “global salafi qutbism” to the term, “global salafi ji-hadism” to describe the al-Qaeda movement’s ideology.

International Security and the Threat of Global Salafi Jihadism

The threat faced in the war on terror is not the tactic of terrorism, but rather the growing momentum and appeal behind the radical transnational ideology that is calling for the use of terror, and for which no appropriate counter-strategy has been formulated; Global Salafi Jihadism (GSJ). GSJ poses a particularly significant threat to international security because of the cosmic and indivisible ideological framework it risks exporting to new realms of conflict. Unaddressed, this ideology has the potential to hijack and complicate previously negotiable crises, drag the broader Middle East into conflict and continue spawning militant cells in the Muslim Diaspora. GSJ has gained significant momentum since the beginning of the war on terror, which has been instrumental in illuminating how one cannot fight a radical ideology. This momentum has also come as a result of the relative weakness of moderate Islamic voices that could otherwise serve to deconstruct the various falsities of GSJ. After sequentially addressing the questions concerning the nature, consequences and causes of GSJ current momentum and appeal, this paper will argue that the proliferation of GSJ can only be combated by renewed efforts to defeat its actors in Iraq, and more broadly, by international efforts to encourage diplomatic reform in the Middle East that empowers moderate Muslims to de-legitimize GSJ in the eyes of its potential adherents.

I - PROBLEM DEFINITION

Coined by terrorism academic Marc Sageman, Global Salafi Jihadism has three identifying characteristics.¹ Salafism is founded upon a desire to return society to the purer and more just days of the prophet Mohammed and the first Muslims, the forefathers or ‘salaf.’² It is an effort to create the peaceful soci-

¹ Marc Sageman, “The Global Salafi Jihad,” *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (9 Jul. 2003), online 16 Oct. 2006 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm

² Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (New York, United States of America: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 40.

ety and military and political superiority that Islam enjoyed as a result of its judicious adherence to the teachings of the prophet.³ Salafism is particularly dangerous because, rather than striving to impute Islamic practices into the traditional state system as political Islamists do, Salafists reject the state system altogether.⁴ The GSJ brand of Salafism is jihadist because it uses violence, framed in terms of a defensive struggle against encroaching physical and ideological forces, to effect its drastic revolution. Unlike other jihadists though, Global Salafi Jihadists (GSJs) wage a fight both at home in the Muslim world against apostate regimes, and abroad against the supporters of those regimes.

The appeal of GSJ has exploded since its inception. The GSJ effort began with the 1996 fatwa of al-Qaeda ideologues, Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, to fight “the far enemy” before fighting the “near enemy.”⁵ This resulted in al-Qaeda’s African embassy bombings and the attacks of September 11th. Subsequent bombings in Bali, Morocco, Madrid, London, Egypt’s Red Sea Coast, and Amman, Jordan illuminated the diffusion of the GSJ ideology beyond the ranks of al-Qaeda in the traditional sense. Its appeal and growing momentum have most recently been evidenced in the concentration of GSJs in Iraq.⁶ Not only has the convergence of GSJs in Iraq illustrated the unexpected breadth of the ideology’s appeal, but the critical mass that has emerged in the GSJ fight against coalition forces has also re-empowered the ideology by renewing the importance of fighting the “near enemy.” This could be seen in Zawahiri’s statement on September 11th, 2006, in which he said to the US “We tell you not to concern yourselves with the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, these are doomed. You should worry about your presence in the Gulf and the second place they should worry about, is

³ *Ibid.* 27.

⁴ *Ibid.* 40.

⁵ Sageman.

⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War,” *The Middle East Journal* 60.1 (2006): Proquest Research Library, Proquest, Western Libraries, London, ON, 28 Sep. 2006
<http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=09-26-2011&FMT=7&DID=985448041&RQT=309>

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

in Israel.”⁷ In addition to alluding to potential GSJ campaigns in these regional states, Zawahiri appealed to fighters in Gaza, Lebanon, Somalia and Afghanistan to continue their particular fights. With this increasing focus on the “near enemy” and the available vanguard of GSJ fighters in Iraq, it is likely that after Iraq, GSJ will be engaged in two parallel jihads. The GSJs in Iraq will have the option of returning to their European or Middle Eastern states, or moving as a vanguard to a new Middle Eastern state where fellow Muslims need to be “liberated” by terror.

In addition to its embrace of terror, there are two tenets of the GSJ ideology that make its increased momentum and appeal particularly dangerous in the context of international security. Firstly, its cosmic and transcendental nature lead it to link conflicts as being part of a broader cosmic struggle. The GSJ desire to return to an ancient state of existence implicitly rejects modernity and time itself. As Mark Juergensmeyer observes, religious extremists embrace “cosmic thinking” in which they use a larger than life lens which leads them to view their existence in terms of an ongoing ahistoric conflict between good and evil.⁸ The following quotation of Osama bin-Laden underscores GSJ’s cosmic inclination to tie conflicts together across time and space as components of a broader struggle:

... the people of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusader alliance ... The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon, are still fresh in our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines ... Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya and Bosnia-Herzegovina ... send shivers in the body and shake the conscience.⁹

With such a transcendental understanding of their struggle, GSJs have an extensive list of arenas in which to fight. Likewise, they have a willingness to commit a virtually infinite amount of time and resources to sustaining these battles because they are components of a broader cosmic struggle.

⁷ CNN Online, *Al-Qaeda Releases 9/11 Anniversary Message*, Online Sept. 11, 2006. <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/09/11/zawahiri.911/index.html>

⁸ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (London, England: University of California Press, 2000), 7.

⁹ Burke 163.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

Secondly, an increasingly appealing GSJ is particularly dangerous because its cosmic struggle is indivisible in nature. An observation made of religious extremists by terrorism academic Bruce Hoffman is useful here, that religious extremists “see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving, but as ‘outsiders’, and therefore seek vast changes in the existing order.”¹⁰ For GSJ, those “vast changes” include the toppling of the state system in the Middle East to make way for the Caliphate – a completely nonnegotiable and indivisible goal. This indivisibility is exemplified in the GSJ embrace of the thinking of radical Islamic scholar Sayid Qutb. Qutb modernized the Islamic conception of “jahiliyyah,” which traditionally refers to the state of barbarity and ignorance that existed prior to the advent of Islam.¹¹ In 1965 Qutb applied this term to President Nasser’s regime in Egypt, and was the first to argue that even Muslims could be unknowingly and submissively lost to a state of jahiliyyah and require some sort of Islamic ‘awakening,’ something GSJs have tried to achieve with violence.¹² The indivisibility inherent in the GSJ embrace of this thinking can be seen in the willingness of GSJs to label their fellow Muslims as being lost to the ‘jahiliyyah’ of the “Crusader-Zionist alliance”, making those Muslims equally as legitimate targets as the members of that alliance. This thinking was evident in the indiscriminate suicide attacks on innocent Sunni and Shia Iraqi civilians by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the recently deceased, self-proclaimed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. With such an intransigent understanding of the world, that even provides for the legitimization of killing fellow Muslims, GSJ is a nonnegotiable and indivisible ideology.

In defining the nature of the GSJ threat, it is necessary to address the issue of its virulence: How many of the world’s Muslims would adopt this kind of thinking? The answer is a minute percentage, not of all Muslims, but simply of frustrated Muslims. It is impossible to say with any certainty the number of groups that embrace this radical worldview. However, concrete physical manifestations of this ideology have been evident in

¹⁰ Bruce Hoffman, *Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism motivated by a Religious Imperative* (Santa Monica, United States: RAND, 1993), 3.

¹¹ William Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrinre of Ja-hiliyya,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003), 522.

¹² Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The ideological and political discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (London, England: American University of Beirut Press, 1992) 20.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

successful European and North American cells, Egypt's Islamic Jihad, Indonesia's Jama'ah Islamiyah and the groups that call themselves al-Qaeda in Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi-Arabia and Jordan. The attacks by these groups against symbols of the West, secular apostate governments, and against fellow Muslims civilians as part of an effort to 'awaken' those Muslims, illustrate that GSJ does have a greater virulence and momentum than was originally suspected. At the cost of its export of terrorism and cosmic and indivisible thinking, GSJ's appeal and ability to proliferate should not be underestimated.

II - POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

In addition to continuing its recruitment of Middle Eastern and Diaspora Muslims for attacks in the Middle East and the West, if the momentum of GSJ is not effectively curtailed, it has the potential to wreak havoc in two other respects. Firstly, the unabated proliferation of GSJ could result in this radical ideology becoming the dominant conceptual framework in new conflicts, where it would exacerbate tensions by imputing elements of cosmic thinking, indivisibility and terrorism into existing crises. A prime candidate for such a takeover is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The struggle of the Palestinians has already been framed in a variety of worldviews, from Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in the Arab-Israeli Wars, to Palestinian Nationalism with Fatah and the PLO, and most recently, with the 2006 election of HAMAS to the Palestinian parliament, it has come to be framed in Islamist terms. Should HAMAS's political Islamism fail, the Palestinians may fall victim to GSJs who wish to exploit an opportunity to illustrate that their radical worldview is the logical successor to failed Islamism. Should GSJs flock to the occupied territories as they have to Iraq, the Palestinian nation could either be dragged into a civil war between secular nationalists, Muslim moderates, and GSJ extremists, or GSJs could pull the region into war with Israel by coalescing with HAMAS and Hizb'allah in Lebanon. By throwing their momentum toward the destruction of Israel, GSJs would complicate the demands of moderate Palestinians and incite conflict that is outside the realm of negotiation and which they are willing to sustain indefinitely.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

The same dangerous potential for previously secular conflicts, or less radically religious conflicts, to be high jacked by GSJ exists in a number of other sites as well, including: Lebanon, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia (where the Lord's Resistance Army declared a "holy war" against Ethiopia in early October¹³), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Chechnya. These potential GSJ hotspots underscore the greatest threat of GSJ thinking; that the Jihad is not complete until the caliphate has been established – conflict in one location is to be used as a stepping stone to the next until the Islamic world has been liberated.

The hijacking of these conflicts by GSJ would not only imperil the chances of their resolution and destabilize the Middle East, but would also risk giving GSJs the opportunity to acquire control over a state, the results of which could be disastrous. A state in the hands of GSJs would serve as a centre for the recruitment, training and equipping of jihadists, much like Afghanistan did under the Taliban. The organization of these jihadists into a state army would threaten the alleged apostate regimes in its surrounding and prompt arms races and further militarization in the Middle East. An organized state would also be more capable of facilitating attacks against the West by cells in the Muslim Diaspora. Accordingly, the unabated proliferation of GSJ poses a threat, not just to the Middle East, but to the West as well.

III - PROBABLE CAUSES

Rather than exploring the myriad roots out of which GSJ has evolved and in which its principle grievances rest, this essay will examine the short and long-term causes of the momentum behind GSJ's recent appeal. There are two short-term factors that have contributed significantly to empowering GSJ. Firstly, the manner in which the war on terror has been waged has seemed to validate GSJ's suspicion of US imperialism and the resulting need for the GSJ retaliatory framework. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have been perceived as giving credence to the GSJ belief that the US has always sought to dominate the Islamic world according to its

¹³ Mohamed Sheik Nor, "Somali Islamic forces declare 'holy war' on Ethiopia again," *Globe and Mail* [Toronto] 9 Oct. 2006.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

own chosen systems of order. This is clearly visible in the GSJ overtones of the following quotation taken from a speech given by the spiritual leader of Hizb'allah, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah:

The United States comes today to tell us about reform, democracy, elections and human rights. This is the United States that had for decades installed in our Muslim region and world dictatorial regimes, and continues to support the most despicable dictatorial regimes. This is in the interest of the US plan to dominate the region with a new face. ... [the United States] will only replace a despot with another despot.¹⁴

In addition to fueling these GSJ suspicions, the dichotomous civilizational discourse in which the war on terror has been framed has paralleled and thus consolidated the GSJs ahistoric and cosmic view of their plight. As Reza Aslan observes in his work “The Struggle for Islam’s Soul,” by equating the war on terror with “a crusade” against “evil-doer’s” and as a battle between “good and evil,” President Bush has fallen into the GSJ rhetoric of a contest between Islam and Christianity.¹⁵ As a result of both these recent physical and ideational manifestations of the war on terror, the war itself has catalyzed the emergence of GSJs flocking to the invaded nations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Thomas Hegghammer observes that the Iraq war has even been instrumental in the development of “a new ‘strategic studies’ genre in jihadist literature” that examines where, whom and how to fight.¹⁶ The emergence of these GSJs clearly illustrates the incredible momentum the war on terror has given to the GSJ ideology by consolidating the stigma that GSJ attaches to the US and appearing to validate the GSJ understanding of the world.

A second short-term source of the appeal behind GSJ is the media and the extent to which GSJ has been able to profit from its use of the media. The dissemination of GSJ videos by networks in the Middle-East and around the world has empowered the GSJ ideology by attributing legitimacy to its greivances, falsely suggesting the presence of an elaborate network of jihadists and elevating the status and prominence of its ideologues –

¹⁴ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack* (New York, United States of America: Times Books, 2005) 216.

¹⁵ Reza Aslan, “The Struggle for Islam’s Soul,” *With all our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty*, ed. Will Marshall (Toronto, Canada: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006) 24-25.

¹⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War,” *The Middle East Journal* 60.1 (2006): Proquest Research Library, Proquest, Western Libraries, London, ON, 28 Sep. 2006
<http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=09-26-2011&FMT=7&DID=985448041&RQT=309>

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

as was especially the case with “the Ghost,” Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – all of which make the ideology appealing for potential recruits in the Islamic world and in the West. This is especially the case when moderate Muslims have no voice with comparable reach and scope. Aslan aptly describes the crux of this problem, saying

Unfortunately, while the jihadists have at their disposal the absolute attention of the worldwide media and a nearly endless supply of funds from wealthy Saudi backers ... moderate Muslims, who have little money or media attention, have thus far been unable to make themselves heard.¹⁷

The result of this GSJ media frenzy has been that the proliferation of GSJ thinking has been unabated and under-debated, especially in the Islamic world.

Lastly, in the long-term, the comparatively weak power of moderate Muslims has stunted the emergence of dissenting voices capable of de-legitimizing GSJ. This is partly the result of the absence of safe political outlets to vent one’s grievances in the Islamic world. Not only are such outlets completely absent in some states, but even states with limited democratic structures often stifle the grievances of their populace. Such states have consistently muzzled and leashed even moderate political Islamists. For example, in Jordan, although the Islamic Action Front was able to participate in politics from 1989 to 1997, it boycotted the 1997 elections alleging that they were rigged.¹⁸ Egypt’s 2005 election was tainted when the Muslim Brotherhood was allegedly denied a number of seats by political restraints and government vote-swaying at the polls.¹⁹ Reza Aslan observes that when these more moderate groups are outlawed “the unfortunate result is that they become radicalized.”²⁰ Likewise, scholars Oliver Roy, Gilles Kepel and Malise Ruthven all observe that earlier such Islamist failings prompted a retreat from political Islamism in the early 1990’s that was reflected in the alternative emergence of a wave of internationalist Islamic militants – GSJs.²¹ But the worst result of this apolitical climate is that the sti-

¹⁷ Aslan 29.

¹⁸ Jean Charles Brisard, Damien Martinez, *Zarqawi: The New Face of al-Qaeda* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2005) 7.

¹⁹ Reuters. “Egypt Shrugs Off Islamist Votes but Won't Lift Ban,” *The New York Times*, 29 Nov. 2005. Online. 29 Nov. 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-egypt-islamists-ban.html>

²⁰ Aslan 28.

²¹ Burke 119.

fling of moderate Islamic voices has left them without the resources necessary to deconstruct the perversions of Islam that are inherent in GSJ. As a result, moderate Muslims have been unable to effectively fight what Reza Aslan terms “a civil war ... that has been raging within Islam for more than a century.”²² Combined with the war on terror and the GSJ monopoly of the media, the absence of a moderate voice has empowered the GSJ ideology, increasing its recruiting drive and affinity for terror.

IV - POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Efforts to combat the proliferation of GSJ must take two forms: immediately curtailing the momentum of the GSJ ideology and simultaneously empowering moderates in order to lessen the appeal of GSJ in the long-run. To curtail the current momentum of GSJ it is first imperative that the GSJs in Iraq be defeated. Although the invasion of Iraq and the continued presence of foreign troops there has galvanized GSJ’s ranks, if coalition forces ‘cut and run’ the opportunity to empower moderate Muslims in Iraq will be lost and the GSJ movement will gain a strategic staging area and further ideological momentum from its victory. The importance of Iraq to GSJs was evidenced in 2004 when bin-Laden stated that “The outcome of this battle will have enormous consequences. If the Jews and the Crusaders prevail, the path is open to the establishment of a Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.”²³ Because of this significance, Thomas Hegghammer observes that the Iraq war prompted debate within GSJ discourse that resulted in the consensus that the prospects of GSJ victory are best in Iraq rather than on any other front.²⁴ As a result, most of the lost individuals, those who have already embraced GSJ and succumbed to cosmic thinking, are now concentrated in Iraq. It is better to fight them now on a single front in Iraq, rather than waiting for their next choice front and starting a new war, or responding to the spectacular terrorist attacks of an inchoate and diffuse enemy scattered across numerous states.

²² Aslan 20.

²³ Hegghammer.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

To defeat GSJ in Iraq coalition forces must stymie the GSJ effort to incite sectarian violence that can be blamed on the presence of foreign forces and thus verify GSJ claims. This can be achieved by infrastructure building, the continued Iraqization of mixed security forces, and focusing military efforts on unconventional warfare. It is essential that the coalition live up to and exceed the developmental aid that was promised to Iraq, so that Iraqis have mutual interests in the protection of significant infrastructural development. Moreover, as Kenneth Pollack observes in his “Grand Strategy for the Middle-East,” US forces should be concentrated in important infrastructure areas making their priorities presence, dismounted patrolling, protection of critical infrastructure, and creating a secure environment for Iraq’s economic and political life to revive and for the Iraqi armed forces to train and cohere.”²⁵ Shortchanging Iraqis of this development will only incite frustration and anger amongst Iraqis, causing potential GSJ candidates from around the world to feel compelled to assist their Muslim brethren either at home or in Iraq.

While those coalition forces move toward protecting infrastructure, the battle with GSJs can be “Iraqized” and infused with an element of moderate Islam by increasing the number, preparedness and competency of mixed military units (those containing Sunni, Shia and Kurdish soldiers, not those derived from sectarian militias) to take over from coalition forces. As a front of united Muslim Iraqis fighting GSJ, this force will be able to significantly reduce GSJ’s claim to represent the best interests of Muslims, and undermine its credibility for potential recruits; critical tasks that non-Islamic coalition forces simply cannot achieve. Lastly, to actually find and destroy the GSJs acting in Iraq, the US and UK must work jointly with covert Iraqi intelligence units that are capable of executing the tactical, unconventional and underground intelligence-based war that is highly effective when it comes to eliminating cells and their leaders, as was exemplified in the predator drone strike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and in the disruption of the recent GSJ plots in Toronto and London.

²⁵ Kenneth Pollack, “A Grand Strategy for the Middle East,” *With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty*, ed. Will Marshall (Maryland, United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006) 38.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

Collectively, this focus on infrastructure, Iraqiization and unconventional warfare will help to eliminate GSJ in Iraq.

Two more short-term policy recommendations are necessary to curtail the credibility of the GSJ ideology. Firstly, the US must abandon the war on terror's dichotomous crusading discourse and narrow its understanding of the GSJ enemy so that it reciprocally broadens its range of Muslim allies. This would help diffuse GSJ claims that the war on terror has only illuminated the US's crusading imperialist intentions, and also diffuse the "clash of civilizations" mentality which Reza Aslan observes "is gripping both the Western and the Islamic worlds" and falls into the cosmic discourse of GSJ.²⁶ Secondly, the US must take steps to alter the tarnished image the war on terror has accorded it in the Islamic world, especially as a result of the current state of Iraq.²⁷ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon observe that the most effective way for the US to accomplish this is to simply put "Palestine nearer the top of its diplomatic agenda."²⁸ These two changes, to the discourse of the war on terror and the US's Palestinian policies, would contribute significantly to denying GSJ the cosmic struggle for which it strives and the negative image with which it tarnishes the US.

In addition to these short-term recommendations, it is imperative that the international community undertake a long-term effort to empower moderate Muslims so that GSJ does not appear to be a viable Islamic avenue for venting one's grievances. Firstly, the West must commit to a strategy of gradual reform in the Middle East that entails the consistent, multilateral promotion of democracy. Benjamin and Simon prescribe the most practical and tangible strategy for Middle-Eastern reform; a long drawn out process of economic transformation, such as that promoted by the Marshal Plan after WWII, in which development aid is given for reform. They observe that through the EU, Turkey has already undertaken such transformative steps and is increasingly

²⁶ Aslan 20.

²⁷ Benjamin and Simon 216.

²⁸ Benjamin and Simon 206.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

suited to act as a beacon of reform in the region.²⁹ Such reform would promote gradual steps towards democracy, because, as Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul observe, democracy cannot be imposed, as it was in Iraq and Afghanistan, but must be homegrown.³⁰ Supporting chosen Islamist voices and other grass roots groups would promote movements such as the “Kifaya” (“enough”) movement for free elections in Egypt, and the recent “Cedar Revolution” to end Syrian domination in Lebanon.³¹

To effect such democratic change the international community must be less wary of political Islamists. Putting Iraq’s sectarian violence aside, Iraq has demonstrated that moderate Islamists, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party (the chair of which is Iraq’s current Vice President), can participate in government with secular forces.³² Across the Middle East, groups such as the Islamic Action front in Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are relatively moderate and equally as willing to partake cooperatively in government.³³ For democracy to take root, it will at some point have to be practically framed in the religious terms around which life in the Middle East revolves for so many.

Lastly, the power of the media must be handed over to these moderates in order to allow them to deconstruct the perversions of Islam inherent in GSJ and de-legitimize the ideology as a political framework and outlet. Not only must moderates be given increased media resources to disseminate their message, but as Aslan argues, such initiatives should consolidate moderate voices by establishing groups such as an international think tank of moderate Islamic scholars.³⁴ Such steps would contribute to exploiting what Aboul-Enein and Zuhur recognize, that “what al-Qaeda and its franchises fear most are Islamic laws, histories, and principles that do not

²⁹ *Ibid.* 203.

³⁰ Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul “Seeding Liberal Democracy,” *With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty*, ed. Will Marshall (Maryland, United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006) 58.

³¹ Pollack 44.

³² CBC News Online, *Indepth: Iraq*, 27 Apr. 2006, online 10 Nov. 2006
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/new_government.html

³³ Aslan 28.

³⁴ Aslan 29.

conform to their militant ideologies.”³⁵ Because GSJ often uses inaccurate interpretations of Koranic history to construct ideological caveats and conveniences,³⁶ accurate moderate portrayals of Koranic verses perverted by GSJ would help de-legitimize the ideology in the eyes of prospective adherents and defuse its viability in the long-term.

CONCLUSION

This essay has demonstrated that the threat posed to international security by the proliferation of GSJ is greater than that presumed by the war on terror and by views of GSJ as isolated radicalism, rather than as a fluid transnational ideology. Accordingly, this study demonstrated that, if left unaddressed, the momentum behind GSJ has the ability to seriously complicate relevant existing conflicts and to further compromise the security of the Middle East and the West. While counter-terrorism operations may be able to find and disassemble GSJ cells in the Muslim Diaspora and in the Middle East, it is essential that the significant limits of these physical efforts to combat GSJ be understood. In addition to defeating GSJ in Iraq, it is critical that the United States and the international community turn their efforts towards empowering moderate Muslims who are capable of deconstructing the Islamic inconsistencies of GSJ and undermining the credibility of the ideology for potential adherents. Should these strategies not be pursued, GSJ will only continue to thrive on the war on terror and export its radicalism, the result of which will be the emergence of new, and possibly increasingly radical, generations of GSJs. As Thomas Hegghammer notes, “Let us not forget that the current leaders of the global jihadist movement joined the first Afghan War as young recruits more than 20 years ago.”³⁷

³⁵ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, “Islamic Rulings on Warfare” *Strategic Studies Institute* (Oct. 2004), online 28 Sep. 2006 <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=588>

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Hegghammer.

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**Are nuclear disarmament agreements such as
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty viable?**

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*Are nuclear disarmament agreements such as
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty viable?*

Introduction

Nuclear weapons may be regarded as presenting the most dangerous short-term threat to humanity. Since 1968, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the centre of the nuclear arms control regime. Therefore this essay will examine the question, are nuclear disarmament agreements, such as Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, viable? In doing so, this essay will examine and critique the positions advanced by people supporting and refuting the viability of the NPT.

Although the broader questions of whether nuclear weapons can have a stabilizing effect, or can possibly serve effectively as a deterrent are relevant, they are characteristically different in scope and require an exploration of primarily normative issues that are beyond the scope of this essay. To be clear, this essay will focus primarily on the positive question of the NPT's effectiveness rather than related normative questions. In doing so, this paper will proceed by analyzing neoliberal and neorealist detractors of the NPT. Subsequently, supporters of the NPT will be critiqued. Incidentally, most available literature supporting the NPT is written by neoliberal academics and therefore this section will proceed by analyzing three commonly reoccurring themes: the NPT has worked before and will in the future, there is no viable alternative to the NPT, and the treaty is largely acceptable and simply needs sustained support and minor amendments.

NPT Detractors

The most visible divide amongst detractors of the NPT falls between neorealist and neoliberal academics. In accordance with a neoliberal institutionalist perspective Michael Wesley explicitly accepts the notion that institutions are appropriate mechanisms for cultivating rules and norms to constrain the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons (2005). However, in his estimation, one or two states per decade will acquire nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future (2005:283). As a result, he claims that although institutions are needed, the structure of

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the NPT is not equipped to address this inevitability (Ibid). Accepting Wesley's claim for future proliferation, and hence his critique of the NPT, is difficult as he provides no evidence or explanation for his claim. Also, he takes the position that the NPT is not viable because, it is unrealistic, historically ineffective, and a waste of diplomatic resources (2005). In the long-term, Wesley believes that both preventing proliferation and achieving a complete and general disarmament, as agreed to under Article VI of the NPT, are highly unlikely and therefore the NPT is responsible for establishing and maintaining unreasonable expectations (Ibid). A counter-claim could be advanced that the limited proliferation that has occurred in Pakistan, India, and Israel have been the exception rather than the rule and therefore, on the whole, the NPT has been effective, realistic and valuable. As the NPT does not allow for states to alter their status from non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to nuclear weapons states (NWS), Wesley argues that states seeking to develop a nuclear deterrent are forced to support transnational smuggling networks, which in turn, are more likely to supply terrorist groups (2005: 287-291). As a result, he sees the NPT as being the primary cause of the most serious form of proliferation facing the world today. Thus he believes it is best to abandon the NPT and adopt a more realistic regime that can stop nuclear smuggling networks and stabilize the spread of nuclear weapons (Ibid). This is a curious point for Wesley to advance, as he seems to be ignoring the potential for norms surrounding the nation-centric proliferation regime to be adapted to constrain transnational nuclear smuggling (EG multilateral approaches to monitoring the transportation of fissile material). Wesley continues to argue that the present structure of the NPT is unsustainable due to the unequal rights and responsibilities that are accorded to NWS and NNWS (2005:285-286). Finally, he suggests that due to the massive destructive capacity and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with their use are so high that it is irresponsible to rely upon what he regards as the flawed NPT regime. Given the above refutations of what he sees as being flaws in the NPT, it is evident that although the ascription of unequal rights and responsibilities is problematic, the other issues raised cannot be accepted at this time.

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Kuppuswamy takes a similar neoliberal position to Wesley in raising the above criticisms. He goes beyond Wesley's analysis and takes issue with Article IV's provision of the inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes claiming, "peaceful uranium is only a small step away from developing nuclear warheads" (2006:144). With the exception of North Korea, there is presently no information to suggest that any state has done this and therefore this may not reveal a serious defect in the NPT. Although he claims that the NPT is "strong in law" yet "weak in enforcement" (Ibid) it may be countered that the successful dissolution of Iraq's nuclear weapons program in the 1990s is evidence of an effective enforcement mechanism. In contrast to Wesley, Kuppuswamy does point out that the lack of an explicit date in Article VI's agreement to a "general and complete disarmament" at "an early date" does provide an opportunity for NWS to delay in fulfilling their obligation. On the whole, Kuppuswamy feels that the global approach to arms control is not working (evidenced by ongoing proliferation concerns in Iran and North Korea) and that regional approaches such as the E3 Trilateral Talks with Iran and The Six-Party Talks in Asia are more likely than the NPT to yield results (2006:146). This claim appears problematic as both the E3 talks with Iran and Six-Party talks with North Korea are leveraging Iran's explicit obligations under the NPT and North Korea's violation of NPT-cultivated nonproliferation norms. Additionally, although ad-hoc institutional approaches as cited above may indeed prove useful for resolving extraordinary issues, it is problematic to operationalize a large regime based on regions as deciding where to end one region and begin another is a highly arbitrary process.

Unlike Kuppuswamy and Wesley, O'Neill and Tkacik adopt a neorealist perspective and both suggest that the NPT has not worked and preventing proliferation is not possible (2005:343-345, 2002:64). Arguably, the NPT is not intended to prevent all proliferation but rather to manage it as best as possible. As for the effectiveness of the NPT, considering all but three states (India, Pakistan, Israel) have been visibly and explicitly constrained by the regime, it appears that the NPT has been a powerful institution. Additionally, O'Neill claims that as the NPT has been ineffective in the past, there is no reason to think that it will be effective in the future

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(2005:351-356). Even if one were to accept O'Neill's claim that the NPT has been ineffective in the past, the NPT does not exist within a vacuum and therefore it does not logically follow that interpretation, application and amendment of the NPT will persist unchanged in the future.

According to O'Neill and Tkacik, actors in the international system pursue a rational self-help course of action and therefore if the United States were to unilaterally fulfill its obligation under Article VI, other states would respond by seizing the opportunity to increase their relative nuclear capability and potentially even seek to eclipse American nuclear primacy (2005:351-356, 2002:55). Indeed such a quantitative shift may occur but they seem to be ignoring non-military forms of power (EG economic) in addition to avoiding an analysis of whether such a shift in weapons possession would change the overall American role in the international system or lead to explicit destabilization. Finally, Tkacik argues that although the NPT has contributed to threats to American security and is therefore worth rejecting, adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would constrain other actors in the international system to the extent that American hegemony will be preserved through zero-sum gains and international stability may be maintained (2002:61-64).

Although the academics mentioned above are at odds about the value of norms and the role of relative and absolute gains, there are both neorealists and neoliberals who regard the NPT as being an ineffective agreement that in some cases has explicitly diminished security. Additionally, there is a general agreement amongst them that proliferation is inevitable and can only be managed, thus the NPT is a mismatched regime.

NPT Supporters

As mentioned in the introduction, within the available literature support for the NPT is almost entirely confined to neoliberal academics. Accordingly, this section will examine the three commonly found reasons for supporting the NPT: it has worked before and therefore can in the future (Patricia, 2004, Fahmy, 2006), there is no alternative (Hanson, 2005, Walker, 2000), and the broader structure of the treaty is fine, only desire to apply its principles and minor procedural changes are needed (Simpson and Nielsen, 2005, Ozga, 2002, Carranza, 2006).

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Finally, T.V. Paul's position will be examined as he offers a critical view that challenges both neorealist and neoliberal perspectives of norms and power in relation to the NPT.

Both Patricia and Fahmy regard the NPT as having been an effective regime in the past and therefore has the potential to be effective again the future (2004, 2006). Fahmy points more generally to the lack of new NWS as evidence that the constraints and benefits offered by the NPT regime are effective (2006:81-82). Despite its historical effectiveness, Fahmy believes that the NPT needs to move beyond being an institution that merely constrains the behavior of states vis-à-vis proliferation and focus on buttressing norms relating to disarmament. Although Fahmy is correct to point out that only three states (the North Korean question notwithstanding considering its present state of rapid flux) have acquired nuclear weapons since the inception of the NPT and are the only states not party to the treaty, he does not provide empirical evidence that national decision-making has been affected by the regime. Additionally, he does not acknowledge the problematic nature of seeking to illustrate the effect of a variable through the absence of an event. Fahmy does examine the issue of NWS and NNWS being accorded different rights and responsibilities under the regime and he argues that over the long-term this will diminish the confidence of NNWS in dealing with NWS; potentially threatening regional and international peace (2006:86).

Like Fahmy, Patricia points to the fact that although non-proliferation has largely been achieved, the ultimate goal of the NPT is to achieve nuclear disarmament (2004). To illustrate the potential for institutions to be effective in weapons disarmament, he points to the success of the Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Small Arms and Light Weapons agreements (2004:246). Arguably, he is correct to point out the notion that institutions and norms may constrain some forms of military capability but it does not follow that all forms of weapons will be subject to the same constraints. It may be argued that as nuclear weapons can obliterate large blocks of people and infrastructure in a short period of time, intrinsically stronger norms and institutions are required to realize their elimination. Additionally, he argues that not only had the NPT regime been effective up until the Per-

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sian Gulf War, but also that the procedural and technical weaknesses within the treaty that Iraq was able to exploit were addressed in the Additional Protocol to the NPT in 1997 (2004:246-248). Notwithstanding the previously raised issue of claiming an effect in the absence of an event, the total absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq following the U.S. invasion in March 2003 may be pointed to as evidence that the Additional Protocol has been effective in preventing proliferation. Although Iran signed the Additional Protocol in 2004 they ultimately rejected the agreement in 2005 (Kerr, 2006). It may be argued they realized that to simply accept the Additional Protocol would amount to a constraint upon their ability to confront inequalities in the regime and thus diminish an opportunity to shape the rules within the institution. Finally, Patricia claims that the NPT regime is endowed with the necessary technical and procedural tools to achieve its ends and merely requires cooperation to be realized (2004:249). Although he may be accurate in making this claim, he does not examine the likelihood of whether such cooperation will occur. In summary, Fahmy and Patricia accurately raise the fact that little proliferation has occurred since the inception of the NPT but it does not necessarily follow that this will continue to be the case. Although cooperation in the NPT regime will almost certainly lead to constraints upon proliferation, it is difficult to project whether this will take place or not. Finally, if one is to accept that international cooperation will occur to control the use of fissile materials, it follows that the probability of non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons is reduced, thus enhancing international security and stability.

Turning to arguments that there are no alternatives to the NPT, Hanson and Walker generally make the same claim (2005, 2000). While Hanson advocates that a “real partnership” must be pursued by eliminating the difference in rights and responsibilities (205:313), Walker claims that the problem does not lie with status differences between NWS and NNWS but that the NPT must be amended to explicitly support norms and practices that “unambiguously” aspire to eliminate nuclear weapons (2000:723). Indeed Walker raises a key issue regarding the framing of the NPT regime’s objectives. Two areas stand out: the naming of the treaty, and the lack of an explicit timeline in Article VI. As the treaty is named the “Non-Proliferation” Treaty, it is understandable that

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focus is given to non-proliferation efforts and not disarmament. Additionally, the lack of an explicit timeline in Article VI undeniably allows NWS to delay compliance and maintain their unique position. To address this issue within Article VI would address Hanson's claim to the need for real partnership. She also alludes to Sagan and Waltz's debate over the role of nuclear weapons and claims, "We cannot afford to live in a world where "more nuclear weapons are better"" (2005:301) and therefore suggests that attempting to replace the NPT would compound existing problems and challenges (2005:311-314). Curiously, neither Hanson nor Walker examine and test alternatives to the NPT (EG model Nuclear Weapons Conventions). As neither of them do this, there does not appear to be a compelling reason to accept their claim that there are no alternatives to the NPT.

Turning to the third common theme that appears in support of the NPT, neoliberal academics Ozga, Caranaza, and Simpson and Nielson all claim that the NPT is a viable regime that has been effective in non-proliferation and disarmament and simply requires sustained international support and minor amendments to continue to be effective. In doing so, Simpson and Nielson explicitly state that the root problem is motivational and not institutional (2005:294). They point to the lack of substance & early conclusion of the 2005 NPT Review Conference as evidence of the need for greater motivational support:

...unlike the previous six that had been held at five-year intervals since 1975, it finished two hours before its allotted time rather than many hours afterward. More significantly, it was unable to start its detailed business for 10 working days after the date originally scheduled, thus reducing the time available for its core activities by two-thirds. Also, there was no written product from the meeting other than a technical report on the proceedings.

(2005:271)

In contrast, Ozga suggests that such procedural delays and lack of substantial output are not due to the NPT but because of how the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is currently structured to feed policy into the NPT Review Conferences (2002:54-55). Additionally, she feels that the CD and perspective of diplomatic representatives needs to take into account the differing quantities and qualities of weapons NWS possess and their varied reasons for having them (2002:53). She is correct to point out this fact, as the NPT, in its present form, has no provision acknowledging these differences. Largely speaking, Ozga argues that security, stability and a viable

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arms control regime will only be achieved through a shift in emphasis from an individual security focused model to a mutual security model of better applied enforcement, preservation of energy rights and changes to embedded beliefs through institutions (2002). Like Ozga and Simpson and Nielsen's arguments, Carranza claims that the NPT is a viable arms control regime. However, unlike the others Carranza argues that the key to preserving the utility of the NPT lies in reconnecting non-proliferation with disarmament (2006:492,516). In achieving this, he argues that the United States has the largest role to play and in doing so must reverse its shift from an arms control agenda in the mid 1990s to informal agreements and non-proliferation exceptionalism (IE identifying good versus bad proliferators, allowing India and Pakistan while rejecting North Korea and Iran) at present (2006:501). He also claims that American double standards in export controls and other unilateral foreign policy initiatives are weakening the NPT and must be reversed for the regime to remain viable (2006:491-500). Carranza is correct to point to issues raised by proliferation exceptionalism and the need for non-proliferation and disarmament to be connected. As disarmament is the ultimate objective of the NPT, it would logically follow that for this objective to be achieved, the norm must emanate from the institution. Additionally, long-term arms control cooperation seems unlikely if the United States is to continue applying different rules to different actors in the international system.

Finally, T.V. Paul takes what is perhaps the most nuanced and balanced look at the NPT in challenging both neorealist and neoliberal ideas (2003). Paul counters the neorealist view that the power of hegemons is the primary basis for institutions to survive (2003:138). According to his analysis, if middle power countries were to reject the NPT as an arms control regime, it would not be able to survive and therefore hegemons are not the only source of regimes (Ibid). Additionally, he claims that the neoliberal view does not appropriately account for the exogenous nature of non-proliferation and disarmament norms (Ibid). Although the regime was created according to the power structure of the international system in the 1960s in an attempt by the superpowers to maintain nuclear superiority, it is unlikely to be abandoned by the NWS on account of the credibility loss and

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reduction in opportunity to influence the behaviour of other states (2003:140-141). Most importantly, Paul claims that the creation and persistence of the NPT proves that not only is it a viable arms control regime but that international cooperation is possible in the security realm (2003:152).

Conclusion

As examined, the primary reasons found amongst academics disagreeing with the viability of the NPT are that it is maintaining an un-achievable expectation, leads to opaque proliferation, regional approaches work better, preventing proliferation is not possible, and it has not prevented proliferation in the past. Although concerns about opaque proliferation are legitimate, increased cooperation and monitoring of nuclear smuggling is enabled through institutional arrangements constructed by the NPT. Indeed regional approaches are useful for diffusing extraordinary issues but are frequently contingent upon NPT cultivated norms. Undeniably, very few states have acquired nuclear weapons since the inception of the NPT in 1968. Therefore it can be regarded as both effective in the past, and possibly in the future.

Of the three common reasons for the viability of the NPT as an arms control regime, the claim that there is no alternative is weakest and potentially false. Although the claim that the NPT has been effective in the past faces the logical problem of trying to prove the effectiveness of a regime through the absence of an occurrence, it is clear that many nations with the technical expertise and resources required to build nuclear weapons have chosen not to. Additionally, the persistence and stability of the NPT regime increases the probability that it will continue to be viable in the future. Finally, the notion that on the whole, the treaty is sufficient and merely needs minor amendments and greater attention to application is most compelling. Despite Article VI explicitly calling on NWS to disarm, the article has not been removed through an amendment, and the treaty as a whole continues to be supported.

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In conclusion, the NPT has demonstrated historical viability and shows no short-term signs of losing support from either major powers or middle powers. Therefore, it is likely to remain viable in the foreseeable future.

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**The Construction of Islamic Radicalism:
A Constructivist Critique of al Qaeda and Global Islamic Terrorism**

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*The Construction of Islamic Radicalism:
A Constructivist Critique of al Qaeda and Global Islamic Terrorism*

“This society which eliminates geographical distance reproduces distance internally as spectacular separation.”³⁸

I. Problem Definition

Accentuated since the devastating and spectacular attacks on September 11, 2001, global Islamic terror groups like al Qaeda have begun to assume a constructivist identity. Indeed, jihad itself must no longer be strictly defined by its various local causes or by the individual biographies and experiences of its practitioners. One must also see that its global effects have grown not through any increased degree of local tradition or situation. Nor can one particular school or lineage of Muslim authority be responsible for its contemporary existence and character. The forms of its current existence now must be understood as a series of global effects that have created a universality of their own.³⁹ This universality is best exemplified through the mass media. As Faisal Devji writes, “[F]rom spectacular attacks to sundry communiqués and beheadings, the jihad’s world of reference is far more connected to the dreams and nightmares of the media than it is to any traditional school of Islamic jurisprudence or political thought.”⁴⁰

Since the loss of its operational base in Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 it has employed an increasingly developed constructivist strategy.⁴¹ While al Qaeda has continued to employ violence, it has accorded a substantial degree of its effort to establishing powerful rhetoric and public spectacle with the aim of a strategic social construction. The United States’ strategy in its global war on terror has failed to fully grasp that Osama

³⁸ Guy Debord, *Society of the Spectacle* (Detroit: Black and Red, 2000), n.p Par. 167.

³⁹ Faisal Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 87.

⁴⁰ Devji, 90.

⁴¹ Marc Lynch, “Al Qaeda’s Constructivist Turn” *Praeger Security International* (May 5, 2006) online. Available <http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?x=x&d=%2fcommentary%2fLynch-20060505-Lynch-20060505.xml&original_url=doc.aspx%3fx%3dx%26d%3d%252fcommentary%252fLynch-20060505-Lynch-20060505.xml&ws=WS_PSI&as=doc.aspx&token=7C103E8802E77B1C36D79DCC012AA327&count=.!>

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Bin Laden and his global network exists as “shadows” rather than as “prey”. Even as he disappeared into the mountains and caves of Afghanistan in late 2001, pursued by GPS –guided missiles and unmanned Predator Drones, he reappeared in cyberspace and on evening newscasts claiming responsibility for deadly attacks as far away as Indonesia.⁴² Even its violent actions are intended to instill *perception* of instability and carnage rather than achieve victory under a conventional military understanding. By publicly proclaiming their goal to frame global politics as a clash of civilizations pitting global Islamic forces against the forces of the state system, al Qaeda and global jihadi groups seek to define the interests of all Muslims and to shape the normative environment in which Muslim politics is contested.

Up until recently, there has been a fundamental failure to appreciate the constructivist nature of global Islamic terror groups. This has led to a range of misconceptions about their strategies and aims, as well as the successes and failures of the global War on Terror. While the American military now lists the “war of ideas” as a centerpiece of the “long war” struggle against Islamic terrorism, there is still a sense among policymakers that constructivist understandings of the conflict are overly intellectual.⁴³ Many feel that attempting to apply them to the current conflict will divert time and resources away from quelling and placating the chaos experienced on the front lines of the war on terror - in Baghdad and in Kanadahar. And so it remains that the U.S. government, “encumbered by habit and inertia, has not adapted quickly to the changing terrain as the light-footed mercurial jihadists.”⁴⁴ The changing terrain does not exist solely in the geographic pursuit and strategic liquidation of key jihadi terrorists and their terrorist organizations. There is a need to apply a constructivist understanding that accentuates the terrain of norms, ideas, and public discourse over material power, economic rationality, and inter-

⁴² Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds*, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004), 6.

⁴³ See U.S. Department of Defence *Quadrennial Defence Review Report* February 6, 2006. Available online. <<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>>

⁴⁴ George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy”, *New Yorker Magazine* December 11, 2006. Available online. <http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/061218fa_fact2?page=1>

national institutions. In so doing there is potential to reorient our understandings of jihadist strategy and the appropriateness of potential responses.

II Probable Causes

Understanding of the contemporary constructivist nature of al Qaeda and global Islamic terrorism rests upon a broader sociological understanding of the communicative power among social groups. There is a need to reorient our awareness of Islamic terror groups by first acknowledging that societies ‘enculturalise’ people.⁴⁵ Societies cultivate people by various means to enter, be a part of, and contribute to, existing cultures. Education, art, and public address are a few means through which this occurs. Society, as a collective whole, establishes the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. An individual’s, or a group’s actions that are deemed antithetical to proper socialization, are deemed *antisocial*. Steps are taken to bring the perpetrator of antisocial behaviour “back into line” with the rest of society and its dominant culture. In this sense then there is little to divide between al Qaeda’s perceptual understanding of proper social behaviour from that of say Saudi Arabia or the United States. The social values, out of which have sprung, perhaps over centuries, norms or rules – both explicitly defined and implicitly inferred, are the result of societies’ enculturalisation process. The primary means by which the values, norms/rules and acceptable/not acceptable patterns of society are formed, expressed, and reinforced is through language. Language is also the primary means of defining our reality, and our perception of the world around us.⁴⁶ It is through its unique utilization of communicative language where al Qaeda derives its most potent political and social force.

As our perceptions of reality are formed and reinforced through language, then the tie that links the often dissimilar and conflicting parts of society into a cohesive unit is communication. It has the power to unite a sense of belonging within a community made up of individuals that share different attitudes, beliefs, and under-

⁴⁵ James Watson, *Media Communication: An Introduction to Theory and Process* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998) 12.

⁴⁶ Watson, 12.

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standings. Communication can equally serve as instruments of separation and create a sense of “otherness” between individuals, and communities. In many acts of social communication, such as the playing of national anthems, the effects not only unite “us”, they also separate “us” from “them”, and do so, often in adversarial terms, whether on the battlefield or the playing fields of sport.

The communication of acceptable social behaviour is transmitted through media channels. In wartime it is the media who generally, often at the behest of national governments, urge national cohesion and speak with a united voice against “common” perceptions of the “enemy”. The modern communicative process created, and sustained, by the media often uses language as a weapon that widens divisions, nurtures alienation, and provokes social, ethnic, or racial hatreds. As James Watson writes, “while communication may be a path to the truth it can also be used to obscure it.”⁴⁷ To be sure, communication, the form it takes, and the purpose of its use, has enormous power. The control of the communicative process within societies can be classified as a *form* of power. Those who have power seek to control it. Those with aspirations of power often seek to acquire it using the mass media as a form of legitimation and persuasion.

One of the key innovations of al Qaeda and its ideological ancestors in the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s was its reconceptualization of the field of Islamic contention from the local to the global. It did so through a horizontal reorientation that created a new understanding of Islamic society and culture.⁴⁸ Much of its bases of legitimation came through the utilization of new media forms to disseminate and legitimate their rhetorical appeals as valid and urgent. However, the South Asian, Egyptian, and Iranian groups that were the intellectual sources for al Qaeda and other contemporary like-minded groups certainly had no inkling that their movement would grow to contain an extensive global meaning. Their targets without exception were the secular nationalist regimes of their own countries. This reorientation did not occur overnight. The United States shared a deep desire along with the Islamic nationalist movements to purge Afghanistan of Soviet forces. Both sides

⁴⁷ Watson, 13.

⁴⁸ Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 126.

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worked together, despite their differences. The Afghanistan resistance grew to connect “Afghan Arabs” who coalesced around revolutionary Salafists, who remained independent of the Sunni clerical establishment.⁴⁹ Once the fighting ceased these informal transnational networks began to utilize existing camps as training grounds for militants who moved elsewhere to coordinate new insurgencies.⁵⁰ This would be the main source for the transnational force we call al Qaeda.

Even before September 11, al Qaeda had adapted its media strategy to take full advantage of new satellite and internet technologies. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden both understood the revolutionary potential that these technological developments offered. However, the attacks of September 11, 2001 radically altered the visual perceptions of millions of people worldwide towards terrorism and radical political violence. A global majority watched with horror and dismay the live television coverage showing spectacular violence and chaos. The expanded reach of the modern international news media ensured that the images emanating from New York and Washington would cut across distance, national boundaries and time differences.⁵¹ In so doing they alerted the global public to the reach and impact of Islamic terrorism and its networks of organization. Prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001 most of the general public had only a vague awareness into the existence of Islamic terrorism generally and the Bin Laden-led group al Qaeda. Even fewer were aware of its central beliefs and aims.

Since then, it has become apparent that while radical Islamic forces have shown little regard for human life, they nevertheless have adopted a clearly sophisticated strategy meant ensuring maximum media exposure regardless of whether they are capable of pursuing any large-scale acts of terrorism. The fact that the appeal of radical Islamic fundamentalism appears to have grown within predominantly Muslim countries as well as in Western nations like Britain since the attacks of September 11, and the ensuing response by the U.S. and its al-

⁴⁹ Christopher Henzel, “The Orgins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for U.S. Strategy”, *Parameters* (Spring 2005), 75.

⁵⁰ Tarrow, 127.

⁵¹ Shlomo Shpiro, “Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism”, *Politics* 22.2. (2002), 80.

lies in the War on Terror allows us to see al Qaeda and similar Islamic terrorist organizations as occupying a space of social construction. Its appeal to potentially sympathetic supporters is derived from the appearance of resistance to understandings of perceived grievances. With the invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, al Qaeda no longer holds a specific operational base from which to plan and coordinate large-scale attacks. Yet its power as the legitimate conduit for Muslim rage and defiance has increased. Al Qaeda today no longer exists in any physical sense yet it is stronger than ever before because it exists *virtually*. Its utilization of media discourses has allowed it to reduce itself within a universe of meaning and symbols to a space of influence beyond its material capabilities.

Terrorism is used so as to stupefy and astonish. Al Qaeda understood that its effectiveness as a strategic method is heightened through a perception of power. Because terror is obscure, indeterminate, unclear, incalculable and unpredictable it has a greater ability to stimulate passions, especially fear, than clear and familiar things. It impresses upon the mind more than the body. It creates the *idea* of pain. Terror has the ability to paralyze action and rational thought through stupefying. It freezes the body and mind through the spectacle of horrific and unpredictable violence. It thus assumes a legitimacy that is established through perceptions of its power, much like Hobbes' leviathan.⁵² As Edmund Burke wrote, "no passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear."⁵³

International relations scholars have surprisingly offered few constructivist critiques of the al Qaeda movement. Likewise though, the understandings of realism and liberal institutionalism have equally been challenged. Marc Lynch writes that "[R]ealism with its emphasis on the balance of power of self-interested nation-states, had little to say about a nonstate actor motivated by religion, and doubts the systemic importance of terrorism." He continues, "[L]iberalism, with its various arguments about international institutions, trade, and de-

⁵² Richard Devetak, "The Gothic Scene of International Relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after September 11", *Review of International Studies* 31 (2005), 628.

⁵³ Edmund Burke, as quoted in Devetak, 628.

mocracy, similarly offered little traction.⁵⁴ Advocates of global civil society were dismayed by the fact that a transnational actor – al Qaeda – was responsible for attacking the heart of Western civilization and so wholly rejected integration into the new transnationalism. As Sidney Tarrow has pointed out, “students of multilateral institutions who postulate that multilateral institutions should play significant roles whenever interstate cooperation is extensive in world politics were proved overly optimistic when 9/11 produced a failure of either the UN or the EU to take effective action.”⁵⁵ As well there was no doubt that following the attacks, the United States was leaving little room for the exercise of “soft power” or multilateral negotiation. Military aggression was emerging as the country’s instrument of power. It seems then that a constructivist critique should place prominently in the debate regarding the most effective ways to understand and engage Islamic terrorist groups.

III Possible Consequences

Al Qaeda’s stated goal is to stimulate the Muslim *umma*, or global Islamic community into confrontation with the West and its secular Arab allies. For practitioners of this virulent strain of jihad this confrontation necessitates a revolutionary transformation of the international order.⁵⁶ For al Qaeda then, this means that it must target not only the small numbers who identify with a radical school of jihadist philosophy, but the mainstream Arab citizen who, while certainly not adherent to the al Qaeda strain of radical Islam, is nevertheless concerned with perceived injustices in their frame of political reference – the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, disenfranchisement from corrupt Arab governments, and the seemingly forced imposition of American values and power in the greater Middle East region. One must be aware then that the al Qaeda media strategy remains inseparable

⁵⁴ Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Constructivist Turn”

<[⁵⁵ Tarrow, 216.](http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?x=x&d=%2fcommentary%2fLynch-20060505-Lynch-20060505.xml&original_url=doc.aspx%3fx%3dx%26d%3d%252fcommentary%252fLynch-20060505-Lynch-20060505.xml&ws=WS_PSI&as=doc.aspx&token=7C103E8802E77B1C36D79DCC012AA327&count=.!></p></div><div data-bbox=)

⁵⁶ Marc Lynch, “Al Qaeda’s Media Strategy”, *The National Interest* (Spring 2006), 51.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

from its political strategy. Its terrorism is rhetoric by violent action. They both aim to heighten the Islamic consciousness and identity and frame this identity in confrontation with the West.⁵⁷

Ayman al-Zawahiri, perhaps the second-most influential member of the al Qaeda organization, has written prolifically on the duty of the umma to broaden the conflict to a global scale. In his 2001 book, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, he outlined clearly al Qaeda's philosophy.⁵⁸ Gilles Kepel outlines how the text has allowed readers to understand that two key factors were brought together that led to the attacks on September 11: one external (the second Intifada and the crucial introduction of martyrs into the tactics of the Palestinian guerillas) and the other necessarily internal (the movements religious zealotry that programs its recruits to actively seek self-sacrifice). The Palestinian struggle for Zawahiri continued to occupy a frame of central importance in the Arab popular imagination and its continued persistence could be used as a referential point of contention that could be shared throughout the Middle East, the Muslim world and even in parts of the Third World.⁵⁹ In the book he also acknowledges that it may be impossible to defeat America and its allies. Rather though, the use of spectacular attacks are meant towards an end where the nature of the conflict changes from a small campaign waged by dedicated fighters into a fully-formed jihadist insurrection, which would ultimately attract support among the Muslim masses.⁶⁰

The potential consequences of the al Qaeda approach are of course impossible to gauge within any degree of accuracy or legitimate authority. Al Qaeda's authority relies upon its ability to craft narratives that are embraced by a critical mass of Muslims and Arabs. It has been made painfully aware that sometimes al Qaeda need not do all the work itself. Rather, by laying the foundations of background assumptions – in framing inter-

⁵⁷ Marc Lynch, "Al Qaeda's Media Strategy", 51.

⁵⁸ While English translations have been produced, they are difficult to find due to the sensitive security concerns that surround it. One is able to find excerpts however at <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/ibd/MiddleEast-Islam/Zawahiri's%202001%20book%20extracts.htm>

⁵⁹ Kepel, 100.

⁶⁰ Henzel, 77.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

national relations as a struggle between devout holy warriors against infidel invaders – he has relied upon the responses of the United States to increase his own power and influence. Everyday political life in the Muslim world is now being framed in a normative environment that places Islam in inherent conflict with the West. And with the continued spread of communication and media technology these narrative frames are granted ever-widening potency.

IV Policy Recommendations

To be sure, these normative contexts are not fixed permanently. And the strategies employed for their development have been diverse. Al Qaeda has chosen swift, dramatic, and violent action to galvanize the public into perceiving their conceptions of injustice and rightful grievances. There is no organic way to initiate constructed frames of reference. And there certainly exists no ideational panacea that will alter these frames of reality overnight. However, while it may seem that today the normative environment is framed as a conflict between “Islam and the West”, so too may that frame change to expression proclaiming that “extremists are perverting true Islam.”⁶¹ The goal for U.S. and Western policymakers then is to ensure its

One may see that unfortunately it has come to pass that Western governments have certainly failed to adequately accept or account for the constructivist nature of al Qaeda. The failure by the U.S. government in Iraq to placate Islamic terrorism must be seen as directly related to its, and the military’s, unwillingness and fundamental inability to comprehend that their Islamic enemies are waging an open-source campaign for cultural symbols. The struggle to wrest control back from extremists should not be viewed only in military terms. As the U.S. and its allies seem to be oblivious to anything they cannot tactically neutralize with conventional military force, the consequences of these policies are being felt today. The United States reliance on grand

⁶¹ Lynch “Al Qaeda’s Constructivist Turn” <
[40](http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?x=x&d=%2fcommentary%2fLynch-20060505-Lynch-20060505.xml&original_url=doc.aspx%3fx%3dx%26d%3d%252fcommentary%252fLynch-20060505-Lynch-20060505.xml&ws=WS_PSI&as=doc.aspx&token=7C103E8802E77B1C36D79DCC012AA327&count=.!></p></div><div data-bbox=)

strategies⁶² has to this point failed to contain a radical ideology that lacks conventional political legitimation in the form of statehood. Should the United States continue to utilize “grand strategies”, it must do so in ways that create a narrative of how the grand strategy itself works successfully. It will need to repeat this narrative as it goes about its foreign policy.

The repetition of framed narratives of conciliation and integration will be effective not through the overt use of military force. Rather the United States must utilize its enormous resources of ‘soft power’, so as to shape, influence, and determine others’ beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance.⁶³

By actively considering the constructivist understandings of al Qaeda’s character Western, governments will follow Gilles Kepel and see that a large portion of the war against radical Islam is being fought in the urban battlegrounds of Western Europe, where ten million immigrants from Muslim countries live. Kepel writes that it is imperative to work towards full democratic participation for young people of Muslim background – through institutions – especially those of education and culture – that encourage upward social mobility and the emergence of new elites.”⁶⁴ Al Qaeda and like-minded groups craft the self-definition of Muslim identity in epic narratives of grand struggles between true believers and infidel crusaders. To defeat the radical and violent definition of self, will require quite different, but equally dramatic means of norm construction. And it chiefly requires a long-term commitment on the part of Western governments to better tend to the needs of increasingly marginalized and ideologically susceptible youths wallowing in the urban ghettos on the edges of major metropolitan cities in Western Europe.

V. Conclusion

By adopting a constructivist critique I necessarily am not suggesting that there exists a “freedom-loving” Western way of winning hearts and minds, and that it will inevitably defeat “freedom-suppressing” radical Is-

⁶² As evidenced in the Quadrennial Defence Review 2006, and in such reports as that produced by the Iraq Study Group

⁶³ Steven Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds”, *Millennium* 33.3 (2005), 486.

⁶⁴ Kepel, 249.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

lam. As is certainly clear upon reflection, there is a great deal of indoctrination within Western forms of culture and communication. We are not immune. Rather it is imperative that to eliminate the violent threat of Islamic terrorism one employs a perceptual understanding that comprehends the use of normative frameworks within international relations in general. In so doing one becomes cognizant that conventional uses of hard power will likely have little effect in pacifying future Islamic extremists. A war of meaning and symbols exemplified through the use of the violent spectacle and disseminated via ever-widening webs of communication cannot be defeated at barrel's end. It must be met through a long and sustained epistemological attack that reinforces norms of integration, cooperation and acceptance, all the while working towards political settlements that allow for human decency to prevail. One must hold hope that this will lead the way for a new generation of Muslim universalist thinkers to emerge from the strait-jacket of authoritarianism and corruption and accept the compromises of democracy.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Kepel, 295.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

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NORAD, BMD, and North American Security

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NORAD, BMD, and North American Security

“This is the story of two best friends but, as we all know, as much as trust and accommodation has marked the past, no friendly relationship is without its tensions”.⁶⁶

I. Problem definition:

The North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) is a bilateral treaty between Canada and the United States (US) with the main objective of protecting and defending North American airspace. The purposes of Canadian and American participation in NORAD have become considerably divergent in recent years. Canadian and American objectives in maintaining NORAD frustrate one another, creating a counterintuitive mindset when this bilateral treaty comes up for renewal every five years. Divergent interests in NORAD have largely been a result of the United State’s decision to move forward in developing a ballistic missile defence (BMD) strategy. Canada’s reluctance to participate in this initiative ensures continued debate over the NORAD treaty.

If Canada stands by its decision not to work with the US in areas of defence and security such as BMD, this could cause the US to look inward, reinforcing the ‘Fortress America’ outlook and protectionist mentality.⁶⁷ BMD is an area of defence the two countries strongly disagree on; competing views between Canada and the US concerning this strategic dimension of North American security could serve as a potential catalyst for the dismantling of the NORAD agreement. BMD exemplifies the differences between

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66David R. Spencer, “The “Art” of Politics Victorian Canadian Political Cartoonists Look at Canada-U.S. Relations,”(n.p., 2003), pp. 1-51
<http://facstaff.elon.edu/dcopeland/mhm/mhmjour6-1.pdf>>

67Art Eggleton, “Factors Affecting Canada’s Approach to National Missile Defence,” *Canada and National Missile Defence*, Eds. David Rudd, Jim Hanson, Jessica Blitt, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 39-45.

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Canadian and American security interests and objectives. The US is moving ahead with its BMD program despite Canada's non-participation, prompting many to consider the costs and benefits of Canada's continued renewal of NORAD.

Should the BMD project ever be completed, NORAD would be the logical mechanism in which it would be engaged due to the institution's long-standing aerospace warning and airspace control responsibilities. With Canada's continued commitments to NORAD, and its desire to maintain a friendly relationship with the United States, debate on this issue and on the relevance of NORAD is sure to remain on the table. Until a consensus is reached on BMD, it will be difficult for NORAD to remain a strong instrument of defence for North America. Various theoretical approaches compete in determining why Canada and the US have chosen different perspectives regarding international and domestic security. It is apparent that such divergent worldviews impede the NORAD agreement and create particular difficulties in attempts to achieve common ground.

II. Possible Consequences:

Institutions such as NORAD rely on a cooperative structure and the maintenance of friendly relations between Canada and the US. Areas of defence such as BMD threaten the stability and reliance of bilateral defence arrangements when the two nations cannot agree and thus cannot cooperate. A lack of consensus on BMD is readily apparent. J.M. Beier argues that factors such as the influence of a Military Industrial Complex and / or worries about the future of alliances such as NORAD were of no interest to Canadians

3

throughout public deliberation on BMD.⁶⁸ Rather, the most convincing and decisive rationale identified by Canadians is to counter the threat of alienating the US.⁶⁹ Officials working for Canada's Department of National

⁶⁸ J. Marshall Beier, "Canada: Doubting Hephaestus," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 26, no. 3 (December 2005), pp. 431- 436

⁶⁹ Beier, p. 432

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

Defence (DND) articulate this argument as well. They say that very little of the pressure to join the US in BMD comes from Washington. The US does not need Canadian funds, technology or NORAD to fulfill their strategic aims.⁷⁰ What is most worrisome to pro-BMD policy planners in Canada's DND is the assumption that a significant element of North American security operations will not involve Canada if the US operates BMD unilaterally. Further, they argue that a decline in the Canada-US security relationship will occur, and NORAD will become marginalized.⁷¹ Reservations about a decline in Canadian influence on North American security and less access to the US military market are obvious concerns.

Regehr contends that missile defence is on the margins of North American security. He says it is somewhat a mystery why Canadian officials insist that the Canada-US security relationship can only be sustained by participating in the US BMD strategy.⁷² Canada is assured a seat at the table when it comes to North American security planning due to shared security concerns. Thus, the US is obligated to inform and consult with any of its neighbours that could potentially be affected by its military operations. If the

4

appropriate venue for this is not NORAD then one will be created elsewhere.⁷³ Regehr maintains a heightened awareness of Canada's international character in his analysis, illustrating the probable causes underlying Canada's decisions in regards to NORAD and BMD.

⁷⁰ Ernie Regehr, "BMD, NORAD and Canada-US Security Relations," (Project Ploughshares Briefing #04/4, 2004), pp. 1-6. <<http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf044.pdf>>

⁷¹ Regehr, p. 3.

⁷² Regehr, p. 3

⁷³ Regehr, p. 4

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Some analysts claim that what is at stake for Canada when deliberating whether to join the US in its BMD strategy is Canada's international influence, and core components of the Canadian identity.⁷⁴ Canada often articulates its perspectives on defence and security by means of multilateral networks and institutions, while at the same time maintaining its bilateral security ties with the US. Canada has long coped with a major dilemma; one that involves contemplating how to live with a giant neighbour. How can Canada benefit from the interdependence in security and economics that exists in North America, while preserving its independence as a distinct political culture?⁷⁵ When it comes to Canada's approach to defence and security, a delicate balancing act between Canadian sovereignty and North American interdependence is constantly at play.

A combination of factors that include technological changes, the ending of the Cold War, and a decline in Canadian military capabilities has meant that the American call for Canadian cooperation has declined since the late 1950s.⁷⁶ This is due to disagreement on BMD, America's disapproval of Canadian defence spending, and a heightened intensity on domestic security since the attacks on September eleventh

5

(9/11).⁷⁷ Thus, BMD is a central issue; Canada's future decisions about NORAD and BMD will be indicative of how strong Canada-US relations are.

The Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG), a non-government organization that advocates global disarmament, says that Canada cannot be a 'fence-sitter' on this issue. Canada needs to express its opposition to BMD now or risk losing its moral authority to do so later.⁷⁸ Sloan defines the new nature of threats to North American

⁷⁴ Beier, p. 432.

⁷⁵ Canada House of Commons, "Partners in North America; Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico," Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (2002,) pp.1-338. <<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/372/fait/reports/rp1032319/faitrp03/faitrp03-e.pdf>>

⁷⁶ Canada House of Commons, p. 109.

⁷⁷ Canada House of Commons, p. 109.

⁷⁸ Canadian Pugwash Group, "United States National Missile Defence," (Press Release, 2000), pp. 1-2. <<http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/>>

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security in the twenty-first century. She argues that the primary threat to North America today is international terrorist networks dispersed throughout the globe including within North America. Thus, a critical question for Canada and the US is whether it is more effective to fight terrorists abroad, or at home by taking homeland security and defence measures. The answer of course is not absolute; it is inevitable that both offensive and defensive measures are required.⁷⁹ Therefore the task is to find an appropriate balance between the two.

In the post 9/11 world, Canada's autonomous voice on defence and security issues is increasingly important. Canadian support for BMD would assist the US in two aspects. The first is political, as it would be difficult to convince other allies of a credible threat to North American security if Canada was not in agreement about this threat. Secondly, there is a technical aspect due to the fact that Canada's agreement would ensure existing NORAD facilities could control BMD defences.⁸⁰ A crucial consideration must be made

6

about Canada's price of membership in regards to BMD: the price could be that Canada becomes part of a broader architecture of globalized hegemony in which NORAD plays a significant part.⁸¹ If NORAD is to become part of an extensive architecture of globalized hegemony, the 'Fortress America' outlook described by Eggleton could potentially develop into a 'Fortress [North] America' outlook. This development could change Canada's entire course of international relations, and undoubtedly Canada would suffer a loss to its middle power status.

BMD supporters have not looked at an alternative account of the threat environment: one that would see Canada's participation in BMD as threatening to its international character.⁸² Beier believes US motives could

⁷⁹ Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era* (Quebec; Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), p. 133.

⁸⁰ House of Commons, p. 115.

⁸¹ Beier, p. 436.

⁸² Beier, p. 440.

lie in creating a function of legitimacy that Canada's 'good name' could play.⁸³ Other reasons given for Canada's non-participation in a North American BMD strategy include a reluctance to move away from long standing commitments to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ This line of reasoning was likely an underlying motive present when Canada announced its decision that it would not support the US BMD strategy.

Holman argues it is obvious that Canada has more to gain than the US in maintaining its commitments to NORAD. Compared with other US treaties, NORAD accords special status to Canada. This special status and the purpose of NORAD are attributed to the fact that the two countries share a great continent and the largest

7

undefended border in the world.⁸⁶ Clearly, this author believes the US places geostrategic considerations at the top of its priorities when it comes to NORAD, while Canada's reasons for maintaining its NORAD commitment are far more varied.

Consequences stemming from the lack of consensus between Canada and the US when it comes to defence and security objectives are far ranging. A primary concern is that cooperative defence arrangements such as NORAD will inevitably be harder to maintain when the two parties cannot agree on which arrangements should be made and thus what tools should be utilized (such as BMD), in protecting North America. The current climate of disagreement regarding BMD and the significance of NORAD begs the question; can NORAD remain an effective instrument in providing North American security?

Despite disagreement in areas such as BMD, NORAD remains an effective institutional mechanism for many reasons. Jockel illustrates the losses that would likely occur to Canada's air defence capabilities in the

⁸³ Beier, p. 444.

⁸⁴ Cristina Masters, "Gendered Defences, Gendered Offences: What is at Stake in the Politics of Missile Defence?" *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 12 no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 105-118.

⁸⁵ Canadian Pugwash Group, p. 1.

⁸⁶ D. Fraser Holman, *NORAD In the New Millennium* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd.; Co-published by The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. 30.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

event of NORAD's dissolution. The US currently pays approximately ninety percent of NORAD's costs, and NORAD is one of, if not the most, important structure in the Canada-US defence relationship.⁸⁷ The dismantling of NORAD would create multiple challenges for Canadian security.

Canada has an extensive list of space capabilities it would like to pursue in supporting its military. These include communications, navigation, search and rescue, intelligence, weather, and mapping projects. NORAD provides Canada with the resources it requires

8

to follow these pursuits.⁸⁸ In terms of technological and militaristic capabilities, NORAD is indeed very important to Canada. As illustrated by the authors noted above, the Canadian government would incur greater losses than its US counterpart in the event of NORAD's demise.

NORAD is viewed as the "keystone and symbol of bilateral military cooperation [between Canada and the US]". An American governmental report claims a similar attitude, admitting NORAD is arguably the most integrated defence organization in the world, and inarguably the cornerstone of the Canada-US security relationship.⁸⁹ NORAD thus provides the foundation for North American security and a forum for strategic planning and debate regarding bilateral security and defence for North America.

Further ripple effects would be felt in other areas of Canada-US relations if NORAD were dismantled. For instance, Canada's influence in Washington would decline, and the bilateral defence economic relationship would be seriously jeopardized.⁹⁰ Jockel argues NORAD is far more essential to Canada than the US, and that structurally, it would be quite easy to dismantle.⁹¹ Thus, Canada should be mindful in its objections concerning

⁸⁷ Joseph T. Jockel, "National Missile Defence and the Future if Canada-US Defence Cooperation," *Canada and National Missile Defence*, Eds. David Rudd, Jim Hanson, Jessica Blitt, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 83-91.

⁸⁸ Jockel, p. 84.

⁸⁹ House of Commons, p. 108.

⁹⁰ Jockel, p. 87.

⁹¹ Jockel, p. 85.

NORAD and BMD. As demonstrated by Jockel and Holman, in the event of NORAD's demise, the Canadian government would incur massive costs to its defence and security capabilities. Further, it has been shown that Canada-US economic relations as well as other dimensions of North American security such as military affairs would be expected to suffer if NORAD is dismantled.

9

A key aspect of NORAD is access to information; US intelligence plays a vital role in regard to Canadian defence and security. NORAD provides Canada with information about US military planning and policy development. NORAD facilitates the ability to gain insight regarding US alliances and concerns, and maintain an awareness of evolving discourse, technological developments, and changes to control processes and organizational structures.⁹² The Canadian viewpoint is brought into some of the highest strategic command circles in the US, and effective sharing of information is accomplished through NORAD.⁹³ If disagreement on BMD continues, NORAD faces becoming obsolete as the US builds other institutional mechanisms to deploy its BMD systems unilaterally. In this context, Canada – US relations face becoming more litigious and constrained.

III. Probable Causes:

Different geopolitical perspectives of the world accompanied by overlapping interests has led to contrary national objectives for NORAD, and conflicted approaches to its roles.⁹⁴ The US is the only remaining super-power and as such it has global views and interests. Canada has a very different international character, and is seen as a middle power with more limited global strategic interests than the US.⁹⁵ Canadian governments have remained certain for decades (over six) that defence and security is best maintained through cooperation with

⁹² Holman, p. 35.

⁹³ Holman, p. 35.

⁹⁴ Holman, pp. 29-30.

⁹⁵ Holman, p. 29.

allies, namely the United States. This viewpoint comes from the notion that threats to American security are reciprocal in nature and flow in their effects

10

to Canadian national interests and security also.⁹⁶ Canada and the US share a degree of military cooperation unparalleled anywhere else in the world. However, in spite of official representations that portray a friendly relationship, a suspicion of American social and political values remains in Canada.⁹⁷ According to Spencer,

Closer working relationships on economic and defence priorities, border security, [...] are issues that produce little or no consensus in Canada.⁹⁸

In pointing out the clashes between Canadian and American values, Spencer recognizes the differences in Canadian and American modern society. This highlights some of the underlying individual factors that may be affecting Canada's foreign policy decisions.

Another area where divergence exists is in regard to notions of security. In the US, attention is paid to events, alliances and international relations throughout the world. This is partially to observe where to take a leading role but is more fundamentally about identifying threats to its leadership or American security. On the other hand, living 'in the shadow of a giant' has meant security concerns for Canada have always included concerns about national sovereignty.⁹⁹ Thus, Canada and the US have always viewed NORAD as worthwhile for different reasons.

The most widely held view in international relations is one that sees Canada as a middle power. Beier argues that the concept of "middlepowerhood" relates particularly to

⁹⁶ House of Commons, p. 107.

⁹⁷ Spencer, p. 3.

⁹⁸ Spencer, p. 3.

⁹⁹ Holman, pp. 30-31.

Canada, and describes it as “less an objective condition than a performance”.¹⁰⁰ Middlepowerhood is contingent on the ‘moral capital’ gained by good international citizenship, and connotes a certain sense of responsibility to lead and act in a way that affects outcomes even when the interests of major powers are concerned. This moral authority to lead often enables the raising of multilateral efforts to address international dilemmas.¹⁰¹ Possibly, part of Canada’s strategy of non-participation in BMD was to set an example throughout the rest of the world, staying true to its middle power character and status.

The current security environment in the US could also be an impeding factor in maintaining the effectiveness of NORAD. Masters refers to the political landscape in the US as a “hyper-security environment”, and points out that this has not been the case in Canada.¹⁰² Masters says that in Canada, BMD debates have been focused on the dangers of the weaponization and militarization of space, as well as the proliferation of new arms races. It was for these reasons that Canadians felt reluctant to join America in its BMD initiative.¹⁰³ Masters provides an alternative account of why Canada has taken different views than the US in regards to BMD strategy, providing insight into the basis for the two countries diverging perspectives on international security. Hints at the international fallout in relation to how the US BMD strategy will affect global arms control and nonproliferation efforts are evident. For example, Chinese officials argue that the threats the US claims to be protecting itself from aren’t serious enough to justify a national

¹⁰⁰ Beier, p. 434.

¹⁰¹ Beier, p. 434.

¹⁰² Masters, p. 106.

¹⁰³ Masters, p. 106.

Canadian Student Young Pugwash Publication

missile defence (NMD) program and instead insist that the US NMD program poses serious negative implications specifically for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).¹⁰⁴ Canada has supported these international arms control agreements and deciding to join the US BMD campaign would undermine this support.

IV. Policy Options and Recommendations:

When the Canadian government was pursuing BMD discussions with the US it was made clear that NORAD was desired to be responsible for command and control of the BMD interceptors. If this were to occur BMD would become a joint Canada-US operation and the NORAD agreement would need to be changed as a result.¹⁰⁵

Rather than expanding the NORAD agreement, the US decided to pursue BMD through establishing a 'new Unified Command Plan' that assigns the role of BMD development to the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM). STRATCOM works with the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to do testing and operational exercises.^{106 107} When analyzing the logistics of BMD deployment it is clear that NORAD's early warning and assessment functions would be virtually inseparable from BMD operations. Thus, NORAD is bound to change given North America's current domestic security structure.

13

¹⁰⁴ Patrick M. O'Donogue, "Theater Missile Defence in Japan: Implications for the US-China- Japan Relationship," (Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), pp. 1-36.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub66.pdf>

Strategic Rela-

¹⁰⁵ Regehr, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Regehr, p. 1

¹⁰⁷ NORAD Website, n.p., n.d., http://www.norad.mil/education/home.htm#The_21st_Century

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US officials are now contemplating how to integrate the bi-national early warning function of NORAD with the national BMD interception function of NORTHCOM.¹⁰⁸ According to Regehr, three options are available to Canada here. First, there is the option of non-involvement. This would entail ‘dual hatted’ personnel acting in both NORAD and NORTHCOM capacities (NORAD and NORTHCOM are co-located at Cheyenne Mountain). This option would not require amendment to the NORAD agreement but would confine Canada’s role in NORAD to air defence due to the fact that as Canadians they could not switch to NORTHCOM hats in order to carry out the interception phase of BMD operations.¹⁰⁹ If no changes are made to NORAD this may very well be the place Canada finds itself in when / if BMD comes to fruition.

The second option given by Regehr is full Canadian participation in BMD. In this case, NORAD would be amended to expand its aerospace control function to include missile defences. If this were to occur, NORAD would carry out all aspects of BMD operations. The third option for Canada is to be “partly in / partly out”.¹¹⁰ Here, Canada would continue participating in the functions of NORAD related to BMD interception, but ultimately BMD actions performed would come from NORHCOM.¹¹¹ In each of these plausible scenarios, Canada would likely seek a formal role in BMD to gain a seat at the table, and gain further insight on US strategic affairs.

Given the geopolitical landscape of current international conflicts, severing bi-national treaties and alliances with the US would be a strategic nightmare for Canada’s

14

national defence capabilities. Clearly it is not in Canada’s interest to sever co-operational defence strategies with the US due to its geographical proximity and the multiple gains to Canada’s domestic security stemming

¹⁰⁸ Regehr, p. 1

¹⁰⁹ Regehr, p. 2.

¹¹⁰ Regehr, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Regehr, p. 2.

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from a friendly relationship. McDougall emphasizes this point in his work and predicts that Canada and the US are moving closer and closer towards North American integration and an era of North American politics.¹¹² On the other hand, if Canada decides to pursue a strategy of BMD it may be forced to de-sign international arms control treaties in order to ensure legitimacy on the international stage. Canada maintains a fragile balance between its bilateral and multilateral ties in its foreign policy decisions leading to competing and conflicting approaches to North American security.

Albeit differing objectives and international security interests, both countries enjoy underlying benefits that make maintaining NORAD a worthwhile task. The Canadian armed forces cooperate closely with their American counterparts in all military environments giving Canada a strong degree of technical ‘interoperability’ with the American military.¹¹³ The US devotes more national resources to its military than any other country, and enjoys strong leadership throughout the globe. Disbanding NORAD seems to be a bad decision from both the Canadian and American perspectives.

Canada has made massive cuts to its military spending in recent decades. This trend has begun to change, but the benefits to Canadian security gained through a strong alliance with the US have long been seen as outweighing the consequences. Canada’s priorities, interests, and obligations are shaped by a particular worldview and its close

15

proximity to the US. Thus an approach that links Canadian security to a stable, rules-based international order rather than one which projects Canada as pursuing a place of favour in ‘Fortress America’ should be utilized.¹¹⁴ In this way, Canada can advance its own views and interests in its deliberations with the US regarding NORAD.

¹¹² John N. McDougall, *Drifting Together* (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006), pp. 299-321.

¹¹³ House of Commons, p. 108.

¹¹⁴ Regehr, p. 4.

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If NORAD is to be preserved and act as an effective institution the current climate of disagreement must be overcome. Consensus on vital issues such as BMD will need to be reached in creating a climate of compromise, openness, and objectivity to replace the current one of variance. In this context, decisions about North American security can emerge and blend with nationalist goals instead of competing against one another. Thus, mechanisms that provide mediation and offer routes toward compromise and consensus should be developed to allow institutions such as NORAD to remain functioning efficiently in times of political disagreement between Canada and the US. As the US nears the deployment of its BMD shield, Canada will be under increasing pressure to join and support this type of defence strategy. A delicate balance will need to be maintained between Canada's conflicting foreign policy goals if it wants to preserve a degree of sovereignty from the US while retaining its character and reputation in the international community.

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The Global Consequences of Pakistan's Nuclear Insecurity

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The Global Consequences of Pakistan's Nuclear Insecurity

Nuclear proliferation has international consequences and requires unilateral, bilateral and multilateral solutions. In particular, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal remains unprotected from risks such as theft and sabotage. This vulnerability creates opportunities for the development of external state and terrorist nuclear capabilities. Pakistan's political instability, economic disparity and social discontent exacerbate its nuclear insecurity. The only way to completely prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism is to abolish nuclear weapons. However, for the short term, increased security measures by Pakistan and the international community could reduce the threat of wrongful acquisition.

I. PROBLEM DEFINITION

Pakistan's Inadequate Security Systems:

The production of nuclear weapons is a costly and complex process. Therefore the prospect of terrorists developing their own weapons remains highly unlikely. However, the theft of nuclear material or equipment poses a more probable threat. Since 1995, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained an Illicit Trafficking Database which contains 662 confirmed incidents of theft.¹¹⁵ These cases demonstrate the inadequacy of state and international security measures to prevent the theft or sale of nuclear weapons and materials. In Pakistan, "guards, gates and guns" provide the primary protection against theft and sabotage at nuclear facilities.¹¹⁶ But Pakistan lacks sufficient control and command devices, physical security mechanisms, and personnel reliability programs. Furthermore, the country's nuclear weapons lack internal safety devices to pre-

¹¹⁵ Hans Blix et al, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms* (Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006), 83.

¹¹⁶ Nathan Busch, "Risks of Nuclear Terror: Vulnerabilities to Theft and Sabotage at Nuclear Weapons Facilities", *Contemporary Security Policy* 23, no.3 (2002), 19-60, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/lwz03e55fgegcl451etath55.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2006).

vent accidental or wrongful detonation.¹¹⁷ As a result of these flaws, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is particularly vulnerable in times of political, economic or social upheaval.¹¹⁸ The hostile relationship between India and Pakistan poses such a threat. While currently stored in unassembled parts, Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be quickly assembled in response to threats from India.¹¹⁹

Throughout the past decade, intensification of the Pakistani-Indian arms race has jeopardized the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Neither Pakistan nor India signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The countries experienced the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 and India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974. These events strengthened Pakistan's non-adherence posture to the NPT and led to development of its nuclear weapons program in 1972.¹²⁰ Both countries refuse to participate in cooperative security or share the details of their nuclear programs. Instead they rely on the doctrine of mutual deterrence to prevent nuclear war.¹²¹ A dangerous strategy based on the fear of retaliation, deterrence enforces mistrust and encourages the two countries to develop more nuclear weapons. While India poses a serious external threat, internal personnel also threaten the security of Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles.

Disloyalty of Scientists:

Historical connections between Pakistani officials and terrorist organizations increase the likelihood of future cooperation between the two groups. For example, the nuclear proliferation network led by Pakistani scientist AQ Khan reflects the consequences of past connections. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Khan or-

¹¹⁷ Charles Ferguson and William Potter, *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism* (Monterey: Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), 87.

¹¹⁸ Busch.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Bhumitra Chakma, "The NPT, the CTBT and Pakistan: Explaining the Non-adherence Posture of a De Facto Nuclear State," *Asian Security* 1, no.3 (2005), 267-284, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/media/524gnngtyuj25c9j3kg0v/contributions/t/2/0/5/t205q48125451670.pdf> (accessed on October 10, 2006).

¹²¹ Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, and Nundy Samiran, "Nuclear Terrorism: The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia", *Biomedical Journal* (2002), 356-359, <http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1122278> (accessed on October 2, 2006).

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ganization sold nuclear equipment and information to foreign countries, including Iran, Libya and North Korea. Due to insufficient state and international regulations, the Khan network developed into a transnational illegal operation. The organization took advantage of the discriminatory and voluntary export control regime of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which does not include Pakistan.¹²² In addition, Pakistan's weak national export controls enabled the network's growth.

The exposure of the Khan network in 2003 revealed a global instrument for nuclear proliferation, with leaders spread around the world. However, since most Pakistanis considered Khan a national hero, the government initially resisted international demands for his arrest.¹²³ Eventually, under immense pressure Pakistan agreed. While Khan declared his actions independent of the government, experts argue that this claim remains questionable.¹²⁴ Despite Khan's arrest, Pakistan will not allow any outsiders to interview him or other network leaders.¹²⁵ The unwillingness of the Pakistani government to persecute leaders of an illegal nuclear proliferation network is a cause for international concern. Lack of action by the Pakistani government also increases the chance of future nuclear proliferation and terrorism efforts.

While the Khan network provided nuclear materials to states, other evidence exists of Pakistani scientist cooperation with nonstate actors. For example, Al Qaeda's nuclear efforts were aided by two Pakistani scientists in 2001. Sultan Mahmood and Chaudiri Majeed admitted to informing Al Qaeda officials on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.¹²⁶ These scientists apparently gave Al Qaeda a "road map" for building a nu-

¹²² David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks", *The Washington Quarterly* 28 (2005), 111-118, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/0163660053295176?journalCode=wash> (accessed October 2, 2006).

¹²³ Albright and Hinderstein.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ David Albright, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents," *Policy Forum Online* (2002), 1-12, <http://www.ipnw-students.org/Chapters/Pakistan/Al%20Qaeda's%20nuclear%20program.doc> (accessed on November 12, 2006).

clear weapon, including information on necessary technology and suppliers.¹²⁷ While it is highly unlikely that Al Qaeda has come close to producing a nuclear weapon, the relationship between terrorists and nuclear scientists remains a dangerous threat. Furthermore, the connection between military officials and terrorist organizations adds to this possibility.

Military Disloyalties:

Disloyal military officials further weaken Pakistan's nuclear chain of command. After September 11th 2001, Musharraf removed many high-level military and intelligence officers with ties to the Taliban.¹²⁸ While most Islamic militant groups have been outlawed, experts continue to raise concern about dissent within Pakistan's military. Lieven argues that cooperative relations still exist between military officials and Taliban-linked radical militant groups.¹²⁹ According to Busch, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and military may continue to assist these groups.¹³⁰ By increasing political disorder, these connections could undermine the government's centralized authority and Musharraf's military control. Since they increase the risk of theft and sabotage, inadequate security measures and lack of official loyalty threaten people within and outside of Pakistan.

II. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

Nuclear Weapons: An Exaggerated Threat?

Many experts believe that without improvement Pakistan's weak security measures could lead to future proliferation networks, and possibly state or terrorist use of nuclear weapons.¹³¹ However, some critics argue that risks of nuclear weapons use by states or terrorists remain exaggerated, and have in fact drastically de-

¹²⁷ Sara Daly, John Parachini and William Rosenau, "Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism," *RAND* (2005), 1-7, http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.sum.pdf (accessed on October 20, 2006).

¹²⁸ Busch.

¹²⁹ Anatol Lieven, "The Pressures on Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* (2002), 106-118, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020101faessay6560/anatol-lieven/the-pressures-on-pakistan.html> (accessed on October 20, 2006).

¹³⁰ Busch.

¹³¹ Albright and Hinderstein, Lieven, Busch, Ferguson and Potter.

clined. According to Arkin, this decline is reflected by the present number of non-nuclear countries. He argues that nuclear security has increased since non-nuclear weapons states exceed countries which have gone nuclear in the past 30 years.¹³² Furthermore, Arkin contends that the decrease in nuclear weapons states illustrates the success of international treaties, inspections, and regimes of control.¹³³ As a result, nuclear terrorism does not constitute a “vital, valid or even the most important weapons of mass destruction threat”.¹³⁴ However, Arkin fails to recognize factors such as improved nuclear technologies, failure of international agreements, or, most importantly, the consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack.

In contrast, Frost proposes a more comprehensive view of the current threat of nuclear weapons. Frost rejects the existence of a black market for nuclear weapons or terrorist capabilities to create their own nuclear weapons. He argues that nuclear weapons states, even “rogue” states, are unlikely to hand over such valuable materials to unreliable terrorists.¹³⁵ Nuclear materials are too costly and the threat of retaliation too high for state-sponsored terrorism. While Frost agrees with Arkin on the overstatement of the nuclear terrorist threat, he emphasizes the need for increased nuclear security.¹³⁶ According to Frost, states must focus on sabotage of nuclear arsenals, rather than the exaggerated risk of terrorists stealing intact weapons. Therefore states need to prevent and defend against attacks on nuclear facilities.¹³⁷ However, Frost fails to recognize that “state-sponsored” nuclear terrorism could result from secret cooperation, such as the actions of Pakistan’s disloyal scientists with terrorists. Therefore measures need to be taken to improve the physical security measures and personnel reliability systems of nuclear facilities.

¹³² William M. Arkin, “The Continuing Misuses of Fear,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 62, no. 5 (2006), 42-45, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so06arkin (accessed on October 12, 2006).

¹³³ Arkin.

¹³⁴ Arkin.

¹³⁵ Robin M. Frost, “Introduction: Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” *The Adelphi Papers* 47, no. 378 (2005), 7-10, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/6p8qdhlwtn2wwqmlhg71/contributions/r/q/6/l/rq6l273v3h82j136.pdf> (accessed on November 5, 2006).

¹³⁶ Frost.

¹³⁷ Frost.

Future Proliferation Networks:

The Pakistani government's inadequate response to disloyal personnel increases the chance for future proliferation networks to emerge. These could play a role in the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to both insecure states and terrorists. Sale of nuclear materials or equipment to states which seek to build up their arsenals could seriously undermine the efforts of the nonproliferation regime. While states have greater resources for developing nuclear weapons, some terrorist organizations may reach this goal in the future. For example, in 2001 the projects discussed by Pakistani scientists and Al Qaeda included plans to develop uranium mining in Afghanistan.¹³⁸ There was no evidence that Al Qaeda had acquired a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive material.¹³⁹ However, Al Qaeda's current inability does not rule out the possibility of future efforts to take advantage of Pakistan's nuclear insecurity. Continued cooperation between terrorists and scientists increases the chance of a nuclear terrorist attack, which would have detrimental consequences worldwide.

Consequences of a Nuclear Terrorist Attack:

While not as likely as other terrorist attacks, any risk of nuclear terrorism remains too great to ignore. The most probable exploitation of nuclear arsenals would be the theft of nuclear materials rather than intact weapons. Terrorists could steal fissile material and produce a crude nuclear weapon, sabotage nuclear facilities and release radioactivity, or acquire radioactive materials and detonate a "dirty bomb".¹⁴⁰ Even a relatively low-yield nuclear explosion could cause tens or hundreds of thousands of casualties, as well as huge numbers of burns and radiation injuries.¹⁴¹ Recovery from such an attack would be very difficult, with huge economic, political, and social consequences. In addition, a desire for revenge may lead to a retaliatory response. Such reac-

¹³⁸ Albright, 2005.

¹³⁹ Albright, 2005.

¹⁴⁰ Ferguson and Potter, 12.

¹⁴¹ Albright, 2005.

tion by any state would cause more suffering to civilians, and fundamentally alter the world order.¹⁴² The destructive and non-discriminatory consequences of nuclear weapons require immediate preventative action.

However, the causes of nuclear insecurity must first be understood in order to prevent use by states or terrorists.

III. PROBABLE CAUSES

Economic Instability:

Pakistan's dire economic situation further destabilizes weak nuclear security measures. The immense cost of its nuclear arms race with India contributes to the economic crisis in Pakistan. As a result of its nuclear testing in 1998 and 1999, Pakistan suffered economic sanctions imposed by the international community and faced near economic collapse. However, after September 11th the United States lifted previous sanctions against Pakistan, and the country received more than a billion dollars in foreign aid.¹⁴³ Despite this aid, Pakistan remains burdened by a 39 billion dollar debt, massive economic disparities, and low levels of foreign investment.¹⁴⁴ Poverty is a major cause of militancy and terrorism, and has been exacerbated by recent conflict within Pakistan.¹⁴⁵ In addition, this economic crisis could lead Musharraf's military officials to support a civilian government which rejects cooperative relations with the US.¹⁴⁶ Such state failure would have severe consequences on the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and lead to increased support for radical groups.

Political Instability:

Many factions exist within Pakistan, including a growing number of Islamic militant groups. Much of this Islamic radicalism is due to the failure of secular and mild Islamic political parties to develop Pakistan or

¹⁴² Albright, 2005.

¹⁴³ Busch.

¹⁴⁴ Busch.

¹⁴⁵ Bhutta and Samiran.

¹⁴⁶ Lieven.

improve the living conditions of its people.¹⁴⁷ As a result of economic instability and the arms race with India, Pakistan's government cannot afford to improve social services such as education and health care. These economic inadequacies encourage the poor to join radical madrassas, religious training schools within Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ Madrassas do not require fees and they provide incentives of food and clothing for supporters. However, these schools also provide training grounds for radical groups, who have caused terrorism in Pakistan and staffed the Taliban.¹⁴⁹ Many Pakistani radical groups not only base their opposition on the government's economic policies, but its foreign policies as well.

Pakistan's role in the 'War on Terror' has strengthened government opposition, especially in the North-west Frontier Province which borders Afghanistan. Musharraf justified his support of the US war in Afghanistan as a way to strengthen security against India and avoid a hostile alliance between Indian and US governments.¹⁵⁰ Most of the Pashtun population of Pakistan remains highly supportive of the Taliban regime; however, Pashtun's account for only 10 per cent of population¹⁵¹. Despite this relatively small percentage, even a minority of radical opposition increases Pakistan's insecurity. For example, in 2003 two attempts were made to assassinate President Musharraf. Furthermore, terrorist and radical militant groups within Pakistan greatly affect Pakistani-Indian relations.

Hostilities between India and Pakistan have increased due to the dispersion of Al Qaeda, efforts to rein in religious extremists in Pakistan, and terrorist attacks against India's parliament.¹⁵² Most importantly, the war over Kashmir jeopardizes the nuclear security of both countries. This conflict has intensified the Pakistan-India nuclear arms race, which is seen as a measure of power by both sides. Pakistan's government consistently pro-

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Lieven.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Bhutta and Samiran.

motes nuclear parity with India to show Pakistan's nuclear credibility.¹⁵³ Both India and Pakistan are believed to have nuclear arsenals and delivery systems capable of destroying all major cities and industrial centres of both countries.¹⁵⁴ Proponents of nuclear capability for India and Pakistan argue that nuclear weapons prevent conventional armed conflict.¹⁵⁵ However this argument is contradicted by the major conflicts which continue over Kashmir.

IV. POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Unilateral Actions by Pakistan:

One effective unilateral policy to increase Pakistan's security would be the prevention of future proliferation networks. According to Albright, the Khan network could not have evolved without corrupt and dishonest Pakistani governments.¹⁵⁶ Therefore it is necessary that the government becomes more cooperative with the international community. Also, the recovery of physical materials that could provide for future networks remains a necessary course of action. In order to prevent future networks, Pakistan should create a strict national export control system, place additional controls on nuclear scientists, and prosecute Pakistani members of the Khan network.¹⁵⁷ Without transparency however, unilateral actions will not reduce international concerns. Therefore it is necessary Pakistan cooperates with other countries and international organizations to improve its nuclear security.

Pakistan and India:

¹⁵³ David Albright, "Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex," *Institute for Science and International Security* (2001), <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html> (accessed on November 5, 2006).

¹⁵⁴ Bhutta and Samiran.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Albright and Hinderstein.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

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Little progress has been made by India and Pakistan on the improvement of nuclear security. However, the Lahore Declaration of 1999 committed cooperation on a number of issues, including reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁸ In comparing this case to the US-Russian cooperative nuclear threat reduction experience, Pregonzer offers tangible bilateral solutions for Pakistan and India. He argues that mutual respect, sufficient political will, and a step-by-step approach are critical for cooperative action.¹⁵⁹ Like the US and Russia, India and Pakistan should establish common ground on the reduction and security of nuclear weapons. This could be achieved through ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), joining the NSG, and becoming parties to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.¹⁶⁰

Bilateral Cooperation between Pakistan and the United States:

The War on Terrorism

Nuclear instability in South Asia threatens the global campaign against Islamic terrorism. The permanent assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons increase the risk of theft and sabotage. Therefore, security measures in South Asia should be incorporated into the goals of the American led “War on Terrorism”.¹⁶¹ Potter argues that it is in US interests to promote political stability in Pakistan by reducing the influence of Islamic militant groups and eradicating Al Qaeda from Northwest Frontier Province.¹⁶² However, many problems exist with US intervention in Pakistan’s domestic policies. For example, increased pressure could strengthen anti-American, and as a result, anti-government sentiments within Pakistan.

¹⁵⁸ Arian L. Pregonzer, “Securing Nuclear Capabilities in India and Pakistan: Reducing the Terrorist and Proliferation Risks”, *The Nonproliferation Review* (2003), 124-131, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol10/101/101prege.pdf> (accessed October 12, 2006).

¹⁵⁹ Pregonzer.

¹⁶⁰ Blix et al, 83.

¹⁶¹ Busch.

¹⁶² Ferguson and Potter 104.

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To decrease the likelihood of theft, in the short term the US could focus on suppressing Islamic militants and Al Qaeda. However, increased pressure on Musharraf to carry out more severe crackdowns on Islamic groups could create further divisions within the military or possibly cause a coup.¹⁶³ As a result the US should avoid depending only on Musharraf's individual support for the war on terror.¹⁶⁴ Lieven argues that the army remains the best instrument to prevent domestic chaos. Therefore the US must convince the Pakistani military that the campaign against terrorism is in Pakistan's national interest.¹⁶⁵ Some cooperative achievements have been made between the two countries. According to a 2004 news broadcast, Pakistan and the US have been meeting every two months and the committee has spent millions to secure Pakistan's missiles.¹⁶⁶ Despite these improvements, the American government must be careful as to what kind of assistance it provides to Pakistan.

US Provision of Technology

According to the NPT each nuclear weapon state must refrain from increasing non-nuclear weapons states "control over (nuclear) weapons or explosive devices".¹⁶⁷ The provision of command-and-control technologies would conflict with US non-proliferation obligations and increase opportunities for Pakistan and India to operationalize their weapons.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, some assistance may increase regional insecurity by leading India to demand similar assistance or take countermeasures.¹⁶⁹ Also, direct US assistance could increase concerns about US intentions to control Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Therefore, the US should not harm relations with India or inadvertently encourage nuclear testing or contribute to advances in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶³ Busch.

¹⁶⁴ Ferguson and Potter, 104.

¹⁶⁵ Lieven.

¹⁶⁶ Ferguson and Potter, 86.

¹⁶⁷ Albright, 2001.

¹⁶⁸ Busch.

¹⁶⁹ Albright, 2001.

¹⁷⁰ Albright, 2001.

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A more feasible option would be the provision of general information on how to design security systems and establish personnel reliability programs. Busch argues that the US should share broad information and encourage Pakistan to work with the IAEA to implement security systems.¹⁷¹ The US should maximize, consistent with the NPT and domestic law, sharing unclassified information on personnel reliability programs and security mechanisms to help Pakistan secure its arsenal.¹⁷² In addition, the countries need better intelligence on terrorist organizations in Pakistan. States must share information on terrorist activities and develop methods to detect attempts to acquire nuclear weapons or materials.¹⁷³

Some critics argue that because of the threat of a military coup in Pakistan, the US should prepare to provide security or remove Pakistan's nuclear weapons. According to Potter, the US should develop contingency plans and use nuclear recovery teams or specialized military forces to ensure these weapons do not fall into wrong hands.¹⁷⁴ However, this option would require the cooperation of Pakistani authorities. Otherwise it might be viewed as US desire to control Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Not only would this cause political upheaval, but the removal and transportation of nuclear weapons is extremely difficult and dangerous. Therefore, decreasing the chance of such a crisis would be better. Potter fails to mention international or multilateral cooperation. Multilateral investment into Pakistan's economy and social development would decrease levels of discontent, and thereby reduce the country's instability. Between 1944 and 1996 the US spent \$5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons, which is inexcusable when viewed against huge needs for human development.¹⁷⁵ Development aid could greatly reduce the instability within Pakistan, created by unaccountable governance, economic disparity and social discontent.

¹⁷¹ Busch.

¹⁷² Ferguson and Potter, 105.

¹⁷³ Albright, 2005.

¹⁷⁴ Ferguson and Potter 105.

¹⁷⁵ Bhutta and Samiran.

Multilateral Actions by the International Community:

The Nonproliferation Treaty

Both the NPT and current US policy emphasize prevention and reversal of the spread of nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁶ As a result, Wesley argues that these counter-proliferation goals increase Pakistan's suspicion of US offers of assistance on nuclear security. However, since Pakistan remains a vital ally in the war on terror it is unlikely Western countries will put pressure on Pakistan to sign the NPT or the CTBT.¹⁷⁷ Therefore Pakistani ratification of the NPT remains highly unlikely in the near future. Bhutta argues that global nonproliferation requires a case-by-case basis to examine potential weaknesses of nuclear controls in critical countries.¹⁷⁸ The international community should focus on motivating Pakistan through organizations where it is already a member, such as the United Nations (UN) and the IAEA.

The United Nations

As a member of the General Assembly, Pakistan should adhere to the recent developments made by the UN toward nuclear security. In 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1540, which requires all states to criminalize proliferation to nonstate actors and implement appropriate and effective export controls.¹⁷⁹ However, these rules are likely to be applied unevenly because many states cannot afford to establish and enforce adequate export controls.¹⁸⁰ Therefore greater funding is necessary to make this resolution successful. While the funding of nuclear security measures remains a problem, recent progress was made by the UN to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. In 2005, the UN General Assembly approved the International Convention for the

¹⁷⁶ Michael Wesley, "It's Time to Scrap the NPT," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 3 (2005), 283-299.

¹⁷⁷ Chakma.

¹⁷⁸ Bhutta and Samiran.

¹⁷⁹ Albright, 2005.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

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Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This convention commits states to criminalizing nuclear terrorism and cooperating in the international efforts to prevent, investigate and prosecute nuclear terrorist acts.¹⁸¹

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA provides the most valuable short-term solution to increasing Pakistan's nuclear security. It has issued many reports and adopted several resolutions to protect countries against nuclear terrorism. In addition, the IAEA sponsors training courses and provides physical protection advisory services to members that request them.¹⁸² Both members of the IAEA, Pakistan and India could use the organization to increase their nuclear security and cooperation. Currently, only Pakistan's operating power reactors and two out of three research reactors are under IAEA safeguards.¹⁸³ The countries should move to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Pakistan should pay attention to the IAEA's threat analysis, physical security recommendations, and suggestions regarding existing implementations. Furthermore, the IAEA should be used as an integral instrument of the war on terror to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons from insecure states like Pakistan.

CONCLUSION:

The current state of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal remains vulnerable to risks of theft or sabotage. In order to decrease these threats, Pakistan must improve its civilian nuclear security, establish common ground with India, and increase the role of the IAEA. The theft or sabotage of nuclear weapons in any country threatens global security. Therefore unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts are necessary to combat the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. However, ultimately the fear of nuclear devastation will only be lifted when nuclear weapons are abolished by all states.

¹⁸¹ Blix et al, 83.

¹⁸² Pregoner.

¹⁸³ Pregoner.

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**The Millennium Development Goals and Universal Human Rights –
Friends or Rivals?**

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***The Millennium Development Goals and Universal Human Rights –
Friends or Rivals?***

This paper discusses the potential of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in furthering universal human rights. It reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of the MDGs, focusing on how the process can be made more human rights inclusive to enhance the overall effectiveness of the initiative. It is important to emphasize that popularity must not be mistaken for perfection, or for accomplishment. In reality, the MDGs have been both a groundbreaking guide to international development and a distressing blow to universal human rights. Simply put, the MDGs can be understood in three ways: as an established agenda, a minimal agenda, or a partial human development agenda.¹⁸⁴ This paper argues that although the MDGs promote limited human rights, they fail to ensure that these rights will be universally met. Consequently, the agenda is partial, as it lacks clear references to universal human right. Surprisingly, this absence has been met with only minimal criticism; thus it is vital that universal human rights are quickly incorporated back into the MDGs for the betterment of all aspects of development.

In order to assess the potential of the MDGs, it is first important to understand how and why they were created. The creation was the result of a process that included international conferences and World Summits, throughout the 1990s.¹⁸⁵ In September 2000, the head of nearly every state on the planet united to approve the Millennium Declaration.¹⁸⁶ The MDGs were soon labeled “the single most important focus of international efforts” in several areas of significant developmental concern.^{187*} In 2002,

¹⁸⁴ Jan Vandemoortele, “Ambition is Golden: Meeting the MDGs,” *Development* 48.1 (2005): 6, <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy2.lib.uwo.ca> (accessed Sept.26, 2006).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Monique Perrot-Lanaud, “Making a Commitment to the Millennium Development Goals,” *Label France, The International French News Magazine* 60.4 (2005): 37.

¹⁸⁷ Philip Alston, “Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 27.3 (2005): 755-827, <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy2.lib.uwo.ca> (accessed Sept. 26, 2006).

* Refer to Appendix A for the list of Millennium Development Goals and Targets.

Kofi Annan, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General brought together a group of experts under the UN Millennium Project to identify ways to achieve the MDGs in all countries affected by extreme poverty by 2015.¹⁸⁸ In total, the UN has applied four main strategies to encourage success, which include the Millennium Project, the Millennium Campaign, the Millennium Reports and country-level monitoring.¹⁸⁹ It is clear that the MDGs have been made a top priority within the UN.

Arguably, the MDGs have gained a great deal of fame at the international level. The support received from governments and international development agencies is mainly due to the MDGs unique development objectives, which include prioritized and limited development goals, measured accountability, and time-bound guaranteed results.¹⁹⁰ This explains why the MDGs “framework for guiding development policies and assessing progress” has become a norm with the international system.¹⁹¹ Annan has linked the MDGs with the transformation of the global face of development cooperation, due to the unprecedented coordination of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN, World Bank and major donors.¹⁹² Although popularity has grown, it is important to note that words do not always equal action.

The large amounts of resources and energy that have been applied to the campaign have reprioritized the order of the development goals, pushing other important

¹⁸⁸ Jeffrey Sachs, “The Millennium Project: From Words to Action,” in *Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century*, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier UP, 2005), 19.

¹⁸⁹ Thomas J Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politic* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 291.

¹⁹⁰ Alston, “Ships Passing,” 756.

¹⁹¹ Weiss, *The United Nations*, 290.

¹⁹² Alston, 757. Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the strategies used to attain the MDGs and the Millennium human rights goals complemented and reinforced one another, and that most of the MDGs achievement targets came from the human rights framework (759).

issues such as universal human rights to the background.¹⁹³ The MDGs focus on “short-term input-related strategies,” but do not include rights into the process, which would encourage “long-term sustainable poverty reduction.”¹⁹⁴ Years after the Millennium Declaration, the success levels vary, as shown in the June 2005 Interim Report on the MDGs, which compares the immense progress in decreased poverty in Asia to the unacceptable levels of growing poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁹⁵ Evidently, equity and universality have not accompanied the MDGs popularity.

It is the responsibility of UN bodies and other human rights organizations to push for the recognition of universal human rights within the MDGs. Historically, the UN has played a crucial role in promoting human rights, as it is the only “global intergovernmental organization” that has defined universal human rights, however, its promotional work, as shown by the MDGs, has been minimal.¹⁹⁶ For example, in the over 50 national MDGs reports that have been created, there are very few direct references to human rights, as more subjective terms such as dignity and equity are instead utilized.¹⁹⁷ Although it is often argued that human rights must be recognized as indivisible, interdependent, interrelated, and universal, the MDGs fail to apply this need.¹⁹⁸ Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have emphasized that no single human right can be attained if isolated from others and that the MDGs need to

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Miquel de Paladella Salord, “MDGs as Friends or Foes for Human and Child Rights,” *Development* 43.1 (2005): 116, <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy2.lib.uwo.ca> (accessed Sept. 26, 2006).

¹⁹⁵ Perrot-Lanaud, “Making a Commitment,” 38.

¹⁹⁶ Weiss, 207.

¹⁹⁷ Alston, 760. Weiss argues that this may be due to the proliferation of human rights treaties, which have caused different human rights to compete with one another. (207). Similarly, he argues that the overlap of bodies, agencies, and organizations within the international community that already deal with human rights, can partially explain their absence in the MDGs (208).

¹⁹⁸ Amnesty International, *Human Rights for Human Dignity, A Primer on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, (London, UK: Amnesty International Publications, 2005), 6.

“contribute to the full realization of human rights.”¹⁹⁹ Although some criticism has begun to grow, it has been extremely quiet. It seems that no one wants to criticize the first set of global development goals, which has gained popularity.

Yet, there is much to be criticized. Differing from the Millennium Declaration, the MDGs fail to emphasize the rights-based approach to development that the UN is meant to implement. As argued by Miquel de Paladella Salord, access to services and goods is supposed to be a fundamental human right, not a statistical need.²⁰⁰ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have failed to integrate the rights-based approach to development in their work, even in areas with “direct human rights implications.”²⁰¹ Accordingly, favouring of the MDGs over the Millennium Declaration implies that a rights-based approach is an acceptable substitution for the “progressive realization of rights.”²⁰² The MDGs only partially reflect economic, cultural and social rights, and exclude several political and civil rights.²⁰³ Similarly, the focus on target-set prioritized outputs, in place of quality inputs, ignores the systemic roots of social problems.²⁰⁴ Development cannot be achieved by ignoring long-term solutions, nor can it be achieved by overlooking universal human rights.

Unfortunately, the criticisms by civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not been strongly voiced. The MDGs have been flippantly condemned for permitting governments to refer their obligations to human rights based on available resources, which implies a specific level of development

¹⁹⁹ Amnesty International, *Human Rights*, 33.

²⁰⁰ Paladella Salord, “MDGs as Friends,” 116.

²⁰¹ Amnesty International, 13.

²⁰² Paladella Salord, 116.

²⁰³ Amnesty International, 33.

²⁰⁴ Paladella Salord, 116.

is required before rights must be guaranteed.²⁰⁵ Similarly, it is suggested that the abstract targets may allow injustice to go unchallenged, as marginalized groups can potentially be overlooked.²⁰⁶ Paladella Salord stresses that the MDGs could disfranchise and isolate the poor by eliminating their negotiating position.²⁰⁷ As emphasized by Amnesty International, even wealthy and powerful states have failed to meet the targets of increasing education, preventing disease, eliminating hunger and so on.²⁰⁸ Clearly, the MDGs provide a loophole for states to justify ignoring universal human rights.

Similarly, the MDGs contrast states' obligations under human rights legislation. The MDGs do not provide for the use of "human rights instruments" to ensure that the poor are included within a country's legal structure.²⁰⁹ Christopher Colclough argues that states can diminish the judgment by the international community by claiming that human rights targets will eventually be achieved.²¹⁰ The MDGs create the risk that universal human rights will come to be only inspirational.²¹¹ Sadly, the attention can be shifted away from human rights violations towards the notion of progress.²¹² The MDGs do not enforce state responsibilities, but instead encourage human rights abandonment in exchange for small steps toward short-term development.

The ignorance of human rights is further emphasized by the low standards that the MDGs set in relation to legalized human rights standards. The MDGs fail to clearly reflect human rights commitments that are in-

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Amnesty International, 33.

²⁰⁷ Paladella Salord, 116-117.

²⁰⁸ Amnesty International, 2.

²⁰⁹ Paladella Sallord, 116.

²¹⁰ Christopher Colclough, "Rights, Goals and Targets: How do Those for Education Add Up?" *Journal of International Development* 17.1 (2005): 106, <http://scholarsportal.info.proxy2.lib.uwo.ca> (accessed Sept.26, 2006).

²¹¹ Paladella Sallord, 117.

²¹² Colclough, "Rights, Goals and Targets," 106.

cluded in relevant treaties.²¹³ For example,

Omstead 6

the target to halve hunger by 2015 – which is heralded as potentially increasing health standards, human dignity, and life expectancy – has already been agreed to by the 151 states that ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, to ensure everyone is free from hunger.²¹⁴ Many of the MDGs are lower than International Law standards.²¹⁵ Similarly, the dominance in development issues threatens other bodies' and agencies' superiority in the promotion of human rights.²¹⁶ The MDGs seem to be trumping the universal human rights competition, including long-standing treaties and covenants.

Even though the MDGs have reached a high level of popularity at the international level, in-depth analysis reveals a different story. Polls taken in several countries, including Canada and the US, reveal that there is either little awareness of the existence of MDGs or skepticism of their achievement.²¹⁷ MDGs are often viewed as “ultimately unsustainable” because they avoid the root causes of poverty.²¹⁸ They are criticized as repeating a familiar, minimized ambition, which ignores universal human rights issues, including employment, environmental sustainability, equality, governance, healthcare, and more.²¹⁹ Even though the goal of reducing human poverty is on the international radar, its actual outcome remains unimaginative, as it “perceives poverty reduction as a universal ‘good’ that will result as a by-product of economic growth and macroeconomic stability.”²²⁰ As emphasized by Alston, if universal human rights are excluded from the agenda, the past decades of combin-

²¹³ Ibid, 105.

²¹⁴ Amnesty International, 33.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Paladella Salord, 116.

²¹⁷ Jude Fransman and Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte, “Mobilising Public Opinion Against Global Poverty,” *Policy Insights* 2 (2004): 2, www.ciaonet.org (accessed Sept.26, 2006).

²¹⁸ Paladella Salord, 116.

²¹⁹ Jan Vandemoortele, “Ambition is Golden: Meeting the MDGs,” *Development* 48.1 (2005): 5-11, <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy2.lib.uwo.ca> (accessed Sept.26, 2006).

²²⁰ Vandermoortele, “Ambition is Golden,” 9.

will have been in vain.²²¹ Now is the time for CSOs, NGOs, and the UN to unite to positively add to the MDGs.

The exclusion of universal human rights within the MDGs is also partially due to the negligible response from civil society. The human rights side's response to the MDGs has been minimal, with little focus on the MDGs in UNGA deliberations or in the former UN Commission on Human Rights.²²² Being as the MDGs provide a valuable communication tool, it is peculiar that these groups have failed to make use of the MDGs potential.²²³ Similarly, human rights monitoring bodies have paid little attention, while human rights organizations have remained cautious.²²⁴ There are several reasons why these organizations have been hesitant to become involved in the process, however, the suspicion that human rights would come to be undermined should not be applied as an excuse for silence.²²⁵

Although there are several areas within the MDGs that pose potential problems, they are undoubtedly a good starting point for international action. They provide an "ideal lens through which to assess the current state of the ongoing debate over human rights and development, including the right to development."²²⁶ The MDGs also provide an opportunity to assess the level at which human rights and development communities have incorporated each other's priorities within their work.²²⁷ Equity could improve the situation for meeting the targets by 2015 with a more pro-poor and progressive approach.²²⁸ The MDGs can be viewed as a leap for-

²²¹ Alston, 757.

²²² Alston, 760.

²²³ Fransman, "Mobilizing Public Opinion," 4.

²²⁴ Alston, 760.

²²⁵ Alston, 770.

²²⁶ Ibid, 757.

²²⁷ Ibid, 758.

²²⁸ Vandemoortele, 7.

ward, as they have created an

Omstead 8

internationally recognized agenda for human development, which includes mutual accountability and shared responsibility by both developed and developing countries.²²⁹ Clearly, for true success to exist, coordinated action is required.

Along with the criticism, there have also been positive aspects. Encouraging steps include the eight references to human rights in the Millennium Declaration and the prominent role that human rights have played in UN reports.²³⁰ Likewise, the recent focus on the achievement of the MDGs offers a great opportunity for human rights organizations to bring attention to economic, social, and cultural rights, over the next decade.²³¹ The Millennium Campaign has created a rallying point for civil society to raise important development concerns and has led to national coalitions and platforms.²³² The potential exists to change the rhetoric so that it integrates universal human rights and to change the language into action.

Human rights and the MDGs have the potential to overlap and reinforce one another. They are complementary and compatible, thus they must be viewed as a natural fit.²³³ It is important that the inclusion of universal human rights does not imply a trade off, or a win-lose situation, but instead a win-win situation for all sides (Alston 766). Various governments and UN agencies have recognized the integration of development and universal human rights. The Human Development Report (HDR) 2000 stated:

Human development and human rights are close enough in motivation and concern to be compatible and congruous, and they are different enough in strategy and design to supplement each other fruitfully. A more integrated approach can thus bring significant rewards, and facilitate in practical ways the shared attempts to advance the dignity,

²²⁹ Ibid, 6.

²³⁰ Alston, 790.

²³¹ Amnesty International, 32.

²³² Paladella Salord, 119.

²³³ Alston, 759-760.

It also listed healthcare, adequate nutrition, a decent living standard and economic achievements, not as simple development goals, but as “human rights, inherent in human freedom and dignity.”²³⁵ The HDR 2003 affirmed that the MDGs mirrored “the fundamental motivation for human rights” and reflected a “human rights agenda.”²³⁶ It is obvious that commonalities and synergies exist between the two, and have the potential to increase progress and create an optimal outcome, yet due to the minimal convergence between the two agendas, only a “commonality of interest has been acknowledged.”²³⁷ The commonality needs to be developed into a framework for success.

In conclusion, it is imperative that universal human rights and development goals are unified in order to provide effective, long term solutions. Human rights organizations that operate on an international basis, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and *medecins sans frontieres*, must work hard to ensure that universal human rights are recognized within all international documents, specifically those that have the potential to galvanize public opinion, such as the MDGs. Similarly, it is also important for NGOs and CSOs who focus on specific issues such as AIDS or education to help to promote universal human rights within their specific area of the MDGs. Lastly, it is crucial for UN organizations, civil society, academics, and activists to come together to insist that universal human rights be incorporated into the MDGs. There is still potential to affect the MDGs at world conferences and meetings. Opportunities exist at the upcoming UN Global Youth Leadership Summit, which aims to link youth and the MDGs, as well as the upcoming MDGs Conference at the University of Western Ontario, which will emphasize the importance of grassroots support for the MDGs. Let it not

²³⁴ Ibid, 761-762.

²³⁵ Amnesty International, 13.

²³⁶ Alston, 759.

²³⁷ Ibid, 761.

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be forgotten that alongside peace and security, human rights is a core value of the UN.²³⁸

²³⁸ Stephane Hessel. Interview by author. "Underdevelopment is an Infringement of Human Rights." *Label France, The International French News Magazine* 60.4 (2005): 35.

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Appendix A:
Millennium Development Goals - MDG Targets and Indicators

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1: Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day

Target 2: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

Target 3: Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015

Goal 4. Reduce child mortality

Target 5: Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five

Target 6: Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Target 7: Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

Target 8: Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability

Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources

Target 10: Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water

Target 11: Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020

Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development

Target 12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system
Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction — both nationally and internationally

Target 13. Address the special needs of the least developed countries
Includes: tariff and quota free access for least developed countries' exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC's and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction

Target 14. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States

Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.

Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.

Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries

Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

