Within the UN, it is clear that member states need to find new or re-tooled diplomatic vehicles to advance progress on the broad disarmament agenda.

On the eve of their “Summit of the Future” (September 22-23) in New York, leaders of UN member states adopted a comprehensive document entitled “The Pact for the Future”. This consensus outcome document painstakingly negotiated over several months represented an effort to impart a new momentum to the preeminent international organization. Covering 39 pages with 56 Action items (plus two annexes), the Pact addresses the major chapters of international relations: Sustainable Development, Science & Technology, Youth & Future Generations, Global Governance and of course International Peace & Security – the core business of the UN.

Against a backdrop of intensified nuclear sabre-rattling (especially by Russia since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine) and the on-going dismantlement of the arms control architecture, there were hopes that the Pact would endorse a significant package of remedial action to prevent nuclear war and re-energize disarmament activity. What emerged in the final version of the Pact, despite some valuable input and strong language in earlier versions, was to say the least, underwhelming. This commentary will focus on the disarmament elements of the section on International Peace & Security and will discuss how it might have been strengthened and what action can still be taken to make progress on nuclear disarmament.Like all such multilateral documents the language of the Pact was subject to a protracted process of negotiation and modification (there were four revisions of the Pact’s original “zero draft” leading up to the final version). The results tend to be a mixture of lofty rhetoric and prosaic positions often reflecting the “lowest common denominator” pressures that strip away more ambitious or substantive language in favour of reiterating past bromides or contorting new commitments to an extent that will drain them of all practical utility.

Still the document does acknowledge that nuclear weapons pose “an existential threat to humanity” and affirms, in its Action 25, “We will advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons” (albeit vaguer wording than the “accelerate progress towards” phrase used in the penultimate version). This objective is broken down into five components of a general nature to be assumed by all states and which, while paying lip service to the final objective of general and complete disarmament, stipulates that “the immediate goal is elimination of the danger of nuclear war”. Earlier versions of the Pact, in contrast, directly pointed to action that should be undertaken by the nuclear weapon states: i) call upon nuclear weapon states to prevent any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, ii) reverse the erosion of international norms against possession, spread, testing and use of such weapons, iii) accelerate the implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments and iv) a call for nuclear weapon states to engage in and intensify dialogue on strategic stability and to elaborate next steps for nuclear disarmament. Such specificity is abandoned in favour of repeating the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev formula of “a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought” (cliché might be a better term) along with a few pieties on avoiding an arms race and clearing the path towards lasting peace.

Although the G20 states were able to issue a statement in early September 2023 characterizing universally the threat or use of nuclear weapons as “inadmissible”, this clarity was absent from the Pact which substituted a convoluted sentence indicating that it was only in the context of existing nuclear weapon free zones that their members could benefit from assurances that they would not be threatened by nuclear weapons.

The Pact also agrees to “revitalize the role of the UN in the field of disarmament, including by recommending that the General Assembly pursue work that could support preparation of a fourth special session devoted to disarmament (SSOD IV)”. If this sounds weaselly worded to your ears you are not mistaken. By way of contrast consider how this issue regarding SSOD IV was treated in the penultimate fourth revision of the Pact: “including by recommending that the General Assembly start preparation of the fourth special session devoted to disarmament”. A crisp, clear direction was replaced by a watered-down text of diplomatic mush.

“Revitalize” is also a hardy perennial in UN disarmament discourse. Consider this phrase contained in the outcome of the first special session on disarmament (SSOD I) held in 1978: “[there is] an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized”. Almost half a century later member states can in a display of embarrassing fecklessness offer up nothing more that repeating this hoary injunction.

If the UN was able to raise a million dollars for every occasion of “we reaffirm” or “we recommit” to existing obligations in this outcome document, it would be a long way towards resolving its financial woes. The International Peace & Security chapter begins with an acknowledged “concern about the increasing and diverse threats to International peace and security [including] growing risks of a nuclear war which could pose an existential threat to humanity”.

The chapter sets out no less than 14 Action items to address these varied threats including through an intensification of diplomacy. Two of these Action items address disarmament (item 25, previously mentioned, that notes “We will advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons” and item 26 “We will uphold our disarmament obligations and commitments”). Neither of these paragraphs contain the degree of practicality and purpose reflected in the Secretary General’s policy document the “New Agenda for Peace”. This document carefully compiled by the Secretary General in 2023 with its many substantive recommendations is only referenced in the Pact with the rather dismissive sentence: “We take note of the New Agenda for Peace”.

Starting with his “Securing our Future: An Agenda for Disarmament” released in 2018 and continuing with his “New Agenda for Peace” Secretary General António Guterres has persistently raised the alarm over the nuclear threat and the dangerous behaviour of nuclear-armed states. The very first action item set out in his” New Agenda for Peace” is the elimination of nuclear weapons. In comparison, the Pact only manages a faint-hearted desire to advance towards the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons devoid of any benchmarks or concrete commitments by those possessing these weapons of mass destruction.

Perhaps with the freedom that comes with being a Secretary General in a second and final term in office, Guterres has bravely lectured the Security Council on its failings to halt the escalating nuclear arms race and has set out a demanding menu for action. In his address to the Security Council delivered on March 18 of this year, Guterres stressed that geopolitical tensions and mistrust have “escalated the risk of nuclear weapons to its highest point in decades”. He stated that “The Doomsday Clock is ticking loudly enough for all to hear” and cited the calls of civil society to “end the nuclear madness” alongside Pope Francis’ determination that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is “immoral”.

In his speech, the Secretary General prescribed six practical steps for the nuclear armed states to take: i) resume dialogue, ii) stop nuclear sabre-rattling, iii) reaffirm moratoria on nuclear testing, iv) act upon their disarmament commitments, v) support a joint No First Use agreement and vi) agree reductions in the number of nuclear weapons.

This was the kind of clear and substantial prescription for meaningful action by states to keep the nuclear demons at bay. Instead, the Pact’s section on disarmament provides a reiteration of platitudes and vague affirmations that cannot be rendered more energetic by applying to them the title “Action item”.

The Secretary General has also been clear that the UN’s disarmament machinery is in urgent need of “review and reform”. He has endorsed the call for the fourth UN special session on disarmament to be actually convened, the last such sessions having been held in 1982 and 1988 (SSOD II and III respectively).

While SSOD IV would not be a panacea it would shine the spotlight on the challenges the UN faces in making progress on its goal of nuclear disarmament – a goal by the way mandated by the very first resolution ever adopted by the General Assembly back in 1946. The special session could be a catalyst for a long overdue modernization of the UN’s disarmament machinery in a manner that would prevent the aims of the vast majority of states being stymied by the opposition of a few. The de facto veto wielded by any one of the 65 member states of the Conference on Disarmament, ostensibly the UN’s sole negotiating forum for multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, has ensured the dysfunctionality of that body, which has not produced a program of work, let alone negotiate anything for over a quarter of a century.

Any serious reform of the rusting disarmament machinery of the UN will have to come to terms with the perils of consensus decision making. While it remains the ideal should strict adherence to consensus procedures understood as unanimity enable the few to continually sabotage progress on agreements favoured by the many? When even the commencement of discussion on a subject of concern to the international community can be forestalled indefinitely are we really serving the interests of global security? Within the UN we need to find new or re-tooled diplomatic vehicles to advance progress on the broad disarmament agenda – humankind deserves no less.

By Douglas Roche

This article was previously published in The Hill Times, September 30, 2024

EDMONTON— Suddenly, there he was all over the United Nations. First, a visionary speech to the Summit of the Future. Then a meeting with Haiti’s prime minister to shore up U.N. support for that beleaguered island state. On to co-hosting a meeting of the Sustainable Development Advocates to drive action on the 2030 agenda on education, climate change, and gender equality. Co-hosting a meeting with the president of the European Commission. In between, private meetings with a dozen figures ranging from Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to to Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani girl who won the Nobel Peace Prize. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyypresented him with the Order of Freedom.

You couldn’t stop Prime Minister Justin Trudeau when he got to New York last week. He even bounded across Manhattan to the CBS studios for a late-night encounter with the TV host Stephen Colbert.

Trudeau was ubiquitous, with a burst of commitment to U.N. causes that, had he shown it a few years ago when Canada was running for a seat on the Security Council, might well have brought the country into a powerful political position. “Canada is back,” Trudeau boasted in 2015, during his first appearance at the U.N. as prime minister, but the performance never matched the rhetoric. Canada’s participation in peacekeeping and international development assistance, two of the U.N.’s mainstays, was dismal.

Perhaps recognizing that this might be his last chance to shine on the international stage, Trudeau rose to the occasion presented by the Summit of the Future. Four years in the making, the two-day massive gathering of world leaders, international organizations and civil society leaders laid the groundwork for overhauling the present U.N. system to deal with an inter-connected world that the founders of the U.N., nearly 80 years ago, never envisioned.

The summit had to contend with the hostility, not comity, that characterizes modern international relations. Trudeau’s speech was only five minutes long, but it was elegant and impassioned. He said the world is at a global inflection point with multiple crises causing havoc around the globe. He offered the leaders a choice: bury their heads in the sand or work together for the sake of future generations. “We can recognize that, collectively, we have a responsibility to set our differences aside, to confront the serious global challenges and to deliver on a pact for the future,” he said.

Then Trudeau was off to multiple meetings that revolved around revitalizing the global efforts to eradicate poverty and inequality. With the Sustainable Development Goals at only 18 percent of their target — largely because money that should go to development is being siphoned off by the wars now being fought — poverty-stricken countries are still mired in debt. Trudeau spoke with with Barbados Prime Minister Mia Motley on her Bridgetown Initiative to reform the international financial architecture that continues to discriminate against vulnerable countries. Their plight was eloquently summed up by Deputy Prime Minister of the Pacific Island state of Tuvalu, who told the summit, “The reality is that we will either drown in debt or be drowned by the sea.”

Trudeau also spent time dealing with restoring order in Haiti, plagued and virtually paralyzed by gang violence. Strengthening the Haitian police force is an urgent priority for Canada.

The summit’s outcome document, “The Pact for the Future,” addressed five crucial areas: sustainable development and financing, international peace and security, science and technology, youth and future generations, and transforming global governance. Its 56 action points are buried in turgid prose that I doubt many people will read. But buried in the Pact are the seeds of some ideas that could significantly improve U.N. work.

For example, the document says the Security Council will be enlarged to make it more representative and inclusive. Africa, which in a few years will contain a quarter of humanity, may be given two permanent seats. The use of the veto, which now cripples Security Council work, may be limited in the future.

The Pact was adopted with a nominal consensus, but not before Russia tried to derail it by submitting an amendment that would have severely curtailed the scope of U.N. work.  The assembly rejected Russia’s obstruction by a vote of 141 supporting the Pact, 7 opposed and 15 abstaining. The president then gavelled the Pact through, but it was clear that moving the U.N. forward will not be easy.

The agonies of the world, depicted in daily headlines, persist. Trudeau, besieged at home, deserves credit for trying to strengthen U.N. efforts to make the world a better place.. The Prime Minister of Canada, of course, plays a minor role at the big tables. But the enthusiasm Trudeau brought to his foray at the U.N. showed what Canada can do — when the top political leader exerts himself.

He even appeared to be enjoying himself as a guest on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert. “You have to be fundamentally hopeful,” he told the host. “If you don’t believe you can make a positive difference, you’re not in the right line of work.”  The studio audience applauded loudly.

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Former Senator Douglas Roche’s latest book isKeep Hope Alive: Essays for a War-free World (Amazon).

This article was previously published in The Hill Times.

The legacy of strikes on nuclear sites has made evident that nuclear power plants and waste disposal sites could become targets in conflict zones.

By Erika Simpson| September 2, 2024

Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency says he will visit the Kursk nuclear power station in south-west Russia this week. He is taking “very seriously” the risk that the facility could be damaged during Ukraine’s incursion into the region.

The nuclear station is situated about 40 kilometres west of the city of Kursk, home to about 500,000 people. The station has two active reactors, two decommissioned older units, and two partly built ones. The two operating reactors have no protective dome. “It’s a Chernobyl-type plant,” Grossi said, with the reactor core “totally exposed.”

Ukrainian forces are advancing within range of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), according to open sources, and Grossi noted that it is located “technically within artillery range” of Ukrainian positions. On Aug. 22, a Ukrainian drone carrying an anti-tank grenade was intercepted and downed near the spent fuel storage at the KNPP, Russian state-owned news agency TASS reported. The drone was brought down by electronic warfare countermeasures. The unmanned aircraft bore the logo of Ukraine’s Army of Drones project, and the Russian Federation informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Aug. 22 that its remains were found within the territory of the nuclear plant.

It may be possible to seriously damage a spent nuclear fuel pool with a drone. Spent fuel-pools contain some of the highest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet. Should a pool lose its cooling water, exposing spent fuel rods to steam or air, the rods will heat to the point of rupture, releasing enough radiation to seriously contaminate thousands of square kilometres.

Ukraine is deploying thousands of troops into the Kursk region, which includes the nuclear plant. Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have accused Ukraine of targeting the facility during the incursion.

Natural Resources Canada and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) can learn valuable lessons from the attacks on Kursk, and on Ukraine’s own Zaporizhian nuclear power plant, which has been under Russian control since early 2022.

The first lesson is that we need to keep radioactive waste out of the biosphere, but Canada’s new radioactive waste policy appears to provide the nuclear industry with free license to abandon radioactive waste quickly and cheaply. That will leave North Americans with little protection from radioactive wastes that will remain hazardous for tens of thousands of years.

According to critics, Canada’s new policy fails to address problems identified by the IAEA which explicitly said defunct nuclear reactors should not be entombed in place except in extreme circumstances. Yet the new policy enables the abandonment of reactors beside Lake Huron (the Bruce reactors), Lake Ontario (Darlington and Pickering reactors), and the Ottawa and Winnipeg rivers.

Ukrainians and Russians did not give free, prior, and informed consent before the Russian-designed nuclear reactors were built. But Canada must obtain permission to store or dispose of waste on Indigenous Peoples’ territories, as laid out in article 29(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Canada affirmed the declaration, but a proposed radioactive waste site in unceded Algonquin territory is close to approval, and would violate this principle.

Broad-stroke reassurances from supporters of another proposed deep geological repository for Canada’s nuclear waste have failed to allay important environmental and serious security concerns for current and future generations.

This October, the tiny community of Teeswater, Ont., will hold a municipal referendum on the plan to store all of Canada’s high-level nuclear waste in one deep geological repository (DGR). An earlier plan had proposed burying intermediate- and low-level nuclear waste in limestone caverns constructed under the Bruce reactor, but was met with a “no” vote from members of the Saugeen-Ojibway Nation. That led to Bruce Power withdrawing its own proposal in June 2020.

The current proposal for a $23-billion DGR project may be constructed 50 kilometres away from the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station, the world’s largest operating nuclear site that supplies 30 per cent of Ontario’s power. Whether the proposal goes ahead in partnership with a willing host community will be decided by the Governor in Council. Once one of the two remaining possible host communities—either Teeswater or Ignace, Ont.—is selected, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada will continue to lead decades-long consultation processes.

The legacy of strikes on nuclear sites, like the Russian assault on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, has made evident that nuclear power plants and waste disposal sites could become targets in conflict zones. Few people in Canada are publicly asking about terrorist threats, and whether the site could become hostage to nefarious bargaining.

In light of the attacks on nuclear power plants in Europe, the NWMO—which is responsible for developing and implementing Canada’s plan—should reconsider other options, such as a rolling stewardship model, which actively plans for retrieval and periodic repackaging of nuclear waste.

Erika Simpson is an associate professor of international politics at Western University, the author of Nuclear Waste Burial in Canada? The Political Controversy over the Proposal to Construct a Deep Geologic Repository, and Nuclear waste: Solution or problem? She is also the president of the Canadian Peace Research Association.