CNANW

The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons | Le Réseau canadien pour l’abolition des armes nucléaires

Why Two Percent?

THE HILL TIMES
March 25, 2024
by Robin Collins and Sylvie Lemieux
Co-chairpersons of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

Canada can engage in diplomatic efforts to end our reliance on nuclear deterrence. This means signaling to all NATO’s members to slow and reverse momentum in supporting a global arms race. Instead, let’s increase overseas development and peacekeeping contributions.

As global spending on weapons and war reaches its highest level ever—more than US$2.2-trillion, about twice what it was in 2001—NATO allies such as Canada have been called upon to pay up, including reaching the arbitrary two per cent of GDP that the alliance collectively “agreed” to. The clamour among columnists for Canada to step up is deafening, and we think this noise is misleading.

In 2006, NATO’s then-26 members committed themselves to the two per cent to ensure “military readiness,” and to enhance the “perception of the Alliance’s credibility.” This would entail a significant increase for Canada—now at ~1.4 per cent—even while this country is already NATO’s seventh largest provider—out of 31 members—in dollar figures, and 14th in a world of 193 states. Some freeloader!

The United States share (39 per cent) and Chinese share (13 per cent) combined are over half of all the world’s military spending. Russia (at 3.9 per cent) is far behind. This raises many questions. What is the money being spent on? Is increased military spending in perpetuity the best way to commit to global security, or is it intended to maintain a particular power dynamic?

We face a multitude of global crises that require global cooperation. Every dollar spent on weapons escalation will inevitably deprive funding of other important services. Addressing the climate crisis is urgent, and requires immediate attention and huge expenditures. The same goes for pandemic preparedness, international attention to artificial intelligence threats, and increased spending on conflict resolution mechanisms.

But the goal of an arms race is to achieve power superiority over a rival. We need to outspend them and—therefore, logically—they us. Particularly in a multi-polar world, this is a pointless, endless, and dangerous endeavor.

Two per cent for NATO also means cutting back on foreign aid. The rarely-mentioned competing alternative is former Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson’s proposal—which made it into a UN resolution in 1970—that States pay 0.7 per cent of their gross national income for overseas development. That would have the advantage of raising the material wealth of the world’s poorest countries, and simultaneously reducing the weaponizing mechanisms that lead to violent conflict.

We all have seen how nuclear deterrence both failed to impede Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and raised the risk of nuclear war, while conventional weapon inventory is quickly depleted in the bloodbath that is still in progress. NATO’s strategy, however, is substantially based on costing a reliance on “essential” nuclear deterrence for alliance security. This includes new spending earmarked for modernization of nuclear missile inventories held by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office, for example, predicts modernization of U.S. nuclear arsenals alone will reach US$60-billion per year through 2030. While polls show NATO remains popular among many of their citizens, nuclear weapons certainly are not. A strong majority of Canadians—80 per cent—think the world should work to eliminate nuclear weapons, not modernize them.

There is a financial and security relationship between steering away from a global warring framework based on nuclear threats and military superiority, and shifting spending towards cooperative alternatives that help solve our common problems. While conflicts will continue for the foreseeable future, there are better options available to reduce them than the ones we are being badgered to fulfil.

Canada can engage in diplomatic efforts to stifle and end our reliance on nuclear deterrence. This means also signaling to all NATO’s members to slow and reverse momentum in support of a global arms race. Instead, let’s increase overseas development and peacekeeping contributions. NATO members could start by agreeing to cut their military spending to 0.7 per cent and increase foreign aid to two per cent. This is a viable trend all nations and the planet will benefit from.

The Hill Times

Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Risks in the Ukraine Conflict

Report on November 29, 2022 Special Meeting of CNANW

In a recent statement, NATO’s Secretary General, a former social-democratic Norwegian Prime Minster, Mr. Jens Stoltenberg said that the alliance will continue to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes”. He added: “We will not back down.” Prominent columnists have challenged the very idea that a ceasefire in the Ukraine crisis is possible or have even suggested that it might lengthen the war on Russian President Putin’s terms. Some press for a “fight to victory” by Kyiv, given recent gains on the battlefield. Sometimes the nuclear weapons threat is seen as blackmail, a bluff, or a risk worth ignoring.

How then can Canada constructively contribute to peace?

Panelists at the CNANW discussion in late November were asked to consider opportunities for reducing the nuclear weapon threat, and prospects for peace. All acknowledged the dire situation in Ukraine following the illegal Russian invasion.

“NWC Reset: Frameworks for a nuclear-weapon-free world”

Brief comments at the NPT side panels
(by Robin Collins, Co-chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons)
August 9, 2022 by Zoom

“Don’t let your reticence with one approach for the sake of alliance solidarity be the excuse of convenience that you use to justify not proceeding with another.

A colleague in Canada recently asked us to imagine that day when “You wake up to the news that the last remaining warhead has been dismantled. The era of nuclear weapons is over.”

We know he wasn’t being overly optimistic, because he then offered a list of many of the hard cases and sticky problems that obstruct us: the nuclear sharing policies of NATO; North Korea; Iran; the nuclear weapons states outside the NPT, and all those NPT obligations and expectations that to a large extent are unfulfilled or are openly violated. 

He was urging us to be realists and to consider the complementarity of options.

The point is that the specific vehicle must defer to the desire and commitment by states to accomplish the abolition. What will inspire the political will to end the existential threat hanging over us all? What are the unnecessary obstacles?

As nuclear weapon abolitionists we can make the project of abolition and the replacement security framework coherent and as palatable as possible so that when the road is cleared, or clearer, things can as easily as possible fall into place. Which package, or options picked, is far less important. What counts is that the goal is pursued in earnest.

As Jackie Cabasso, one of our Abolition 2000 working group members said earlier at the NPT as an NGO representative — considering the ignoring of NPT commitments from 1995, 2000 and 2010, it’s time to refocus our attention on the nuclear-armed states. A time-bound target for abolition is overdue. Jackie said: we “call on the nuclear-armed and nuclear sharing states to commit to a timeframe of no later than 2030 for the adoption of a framework, package of agreements or comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, and no later than 2045 for full implementation”.

The Nuclear Weapon Convention Reset paper that our Abolition 2000 working group constructed, has this approach, which is to highlight the three primary options that are under consideration: Then it is up to the official and unofficial Nuclear Weapon States, NATO members and NATO umbrella states to proceed.

Proceed swiftly. 

Canada, my country, has no nuclear weapons although was involved in the nuclear bomb project from the early days, and is a member of NATO, along with three nuclear-armed states, five others with nuclear-sharing arrangements[i] and seven others that participate in Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (known as SNOWCAT).[ii] 

We are fully aware of the pressures on NATO members towards their being compliant and in solidarity with other NATO members, to go along with the prevailing winds – and therefore also the reluctance to push back or be that nuclear nag (once again). This is still the case, particularly in the most delicate of moments, by which I mean the current context of the Russian illegal invasion of Ukraine: the sabre-rattling rhetoric, the references to actual use of nuclear weapons. Not to mention the daily killing and dying. But just as the New START talks need to continue, now more than ever, so is this a good time for states to speed up, not slow down, progress on abolition.

Countries like Canada may have been involved at the Stockholm Initiative, a diplomatic forum that proposes risk reduction measures and a “stepping stones approach” to nuclear disarmament; or attended The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons this last June, but then avoided the TPNW like the plague, despite pressure from disarmament activists and many parliamentarians.

We are here pragmatically advocating for nuclear weapon states and NATO members to consider the options for disarmament that you can stomach. If not the TPNW with protocols, then a nuclear weapons convention or a framework of instruments. Don’t let your reticence with one approach for the sake of alliance solidarity be the excuse of convenience that you use to justify not proceeding with another. 

Some leader or leaders need to step up within NATO to break the silence and expose the illusory consensus, and begin the renewal of the abolition project, because, as the UN Secretary-General said, “Luck is no strategy!”

Our “Nuclear Weapons Convention Reset: Frameworks for a nuclear-weapon-free world” message, therefore, highlights this complementarity of three possibilities towards a time-bound abolition target, for de-escalation of the unhelpful rhetoric, for urgent risk reduction measures, and ultimately for a sustainable peace and common security wherein nuclear threats and nuclear weapons no longer exist. 

Thank you for your time.


[i] Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey

[ii] Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland and Romania

Canadians call on NATO:  Reduce Nuclear Risks

Les Canadien.ne.s demandent à l’OTAN de Réduire les Risques Nucléaires

In June 2022, NATO will conclude a review of its principal “Strategic Concept” policy. Backed by strong science-based information, we urge the Canadian Government to lessen the risk of nuclear weapon use, and emphasize diplomacy in resolving conflicts.

En juin 2022, l’OTAN conclura la révision de sa politique principale relative au “concept stratégique”. Sur la base d’informations scientifiques solides, nous demandons instamment au gouvernement canadien de réduire le risque d’utilisation de l’arme nucléaire et de privilégier la diplomatie pour résoudre les conflits.

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