Speeding towards the Abyss: Contemporary Arms Racing and Global Security

Event Date: September 26, 2019 – 09:00am to 5:45pm
Location: FSS4007, 120 University, Ottawa
Presented by CIPS and the Canadian Pugwash Group 

The ‘arms race’ is a concept associated with the Cold War and often assumed to have ended with it. The current international security situation has led to a revival of arms racing amongst an expanded grouping of rival states. The breakdown of the strategic relationship between Russia and the US has prompted a resurgence of an arms competition that is affecting all the nuclear weapon powers and that places new stress on the global nuclear restraint regime embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Technological advances have also led to the initiation of arms racing in entirely new domains such as cyber, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and outer space.

This one-day conference offers a unique opportunity to hear the views of experts on the implications of this new round of arms racing for global security and  what countries like Canada can do about it.

Date: Thursday, September 26 – 9:00 am – 5:45 pm

Venue: Social Sciences Building, Room 4007, University of Ottawa

Admission: Free for students, Canadian Pugwash members and University of Ottawa faculty and staff. All others: $25 (a light luncheon is included). Registration and tickets are available here. For all payment inquiries, please contact Anna Bogic at abogic@uottawa.ca.

Conference program is available here.

Eliminating Hidden Killers: How Can Technology Help Humanitarian Demining?

Originally published in Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 8(1): 5, pp. 1–17. (html) (pdf) DOI: https:/doi.org/10.5334/sta.743. For tables see pdf.

Despite twenty-first-century technological advances by Western militaries for demining and the removal of improvised explosive devices, humanitarian demining relies mostly on mid-twentieth-century technology. While international legal efforts to curb the global use of landmines have been quite successful, constraints on humanitarian demining technology mean that unfortunate and preventable deaths of both civilians and deminers continue to occur. Developing devices and technologies to help human deminers successfully and safely carry out their work is a major challenge. Each phase of the physical demining process (i.e., vegetation clearance, mine detection, and removal) can benefit from the development of demining technologies. However, even with the prospect of “smart” demining technology, the human aspect of supervision remains a crucial challenge. Although current research and development hold promise for the future of humanitarian demining, the barriers to progress in the field are more than technical. The prioritization of military operations, a lack of coordination between governments and humanitarian actors, a tendency towards secrecy, and an underlying lack of funding are just some of the roadblocks to eliminating the yearly death toll associated with humanitarian demining, in addition to other impacts on post-conflict societies. This paper calls for new ideas, renewed innovation, and new sources of governmental and non-governmental support for this often-neglected aspect of international security.

Introduction

Landmines remain deadly decades after wars end. They continue to impact some 60 countries around the world. Annual reporting shows the gravity of the problem: thousands are killed or injured each year, primarily civilians, of which nearly half are children (International Campaign to End Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition 2018). The removal of this threat to life, limb and property falls to mostly humanitarian demining efforts. Some research and development (R&D) has been initiated since the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine ban (“Ottawa Treaty”) but most of these projects have been unworkable, underfunded, or underexploited. Technology adoption and innovation have not received sustained support. The humanitarian community relies primarily on mid-century, World War II-type technologies, i.e., primitive hand-held metal detectors and bayonet-style tools, to find and remove landmines when it should be possible for modern technologies, tools, and machines to do the work, or at least actively assist demining efforts. The humanitarian imperative calls for it.

Multi-faceted demining machines — remote controlled or semi-autonomous — should become available in the future to perform some human mine-clearing activities and improve upon them, making life safer for deminers, and speeding up the demining process. Eventually, these “robots” could do each of the three major stages of removing mines once the demining site has been located1: preparing the ground (e.g., vegetation clearing, obstruction removal); mine detection (along with other explosive hazard detection); and mine removal by excavation or destruction in place (e.g., burning, freezing, or exploding). Although the all-purpose, entirely autonomous robot may be decades in the future, primitive devices are already on the market, but they need considerably more development, testing, and cost-reduction before they can be widely used to carry out one or more of the three demining steps once a mine-infested area has been identified.

The initial technical survey to find the most likely locations of mine fields can be greatly aided by technology. Testing work using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has started to extend experimentation from basic survey work (e.g., as part of planning) to examining fields with advanced sensors before mine clearance begins (see Table 1). Work done by Norwegian People’s Aid, for example, conducted initial testing and validation flights (Lisica et al. 2019). Advanced image classification and recognition using machine learning/artificial intelligence has been used to identify areas with likely mines (e.g., Adlešič and Zobundžija 2019; Krtalić, Racetin and Gajski 2018). Once an area is identified for clearance, other technologies can then be used.

Table 1: UAV Applications for Technical Survey.

Technical Survey Role

Description

Assist in planning of demining operations

Selection of appropriate tool; selection of the best technical survey path; analysis of environmental conditions of terrain; identification of likely mine locations

Monitor demining operations, report on progress and completion

Monitor mine action operation progress, estimate completion date, progress documentation

Map demolitions and identify patterns

Completion documentation, identification of possible patterns for future survey work

Source: Based on senseFly (2016: 5).

Mini-flails are a promising new machine in demining and small “area preparation machines” are also arriving on the market.2 One remote-controlled vehicle, known as an area preparation tractor, is based on an Italian vineyard tractor, with added armour and blast-resistant wheels (Smith 2017b). It can clear vegetation far in front of manual deminers and is powerful enough to climb hills but small enough to manoeuvre between large trees, while continuously removing vegetation and small trees. The vehicle has the added advantage of knocking the fuses off fragmentation mines (or initiating them), thereby reducing the hazard for the clearance teams that follow. They are designed for humanitarian demining applications specifically, rather than military applications, i.e., they are not designed to withstand anti-tank mines (Smith 2017c).

Another useful tool is the excavator like the Arjun Demining System, that rakes through the soil to a depth of 20 cm using a back hoe. Most mines can be seen by the operator as they drop from the raised rake and are moved with the rake (GICHD 2012). Although it does not completely eliminate the threat of mines — deminers examine and hand rake the ground to search for additional mines — it is regarded as exceptionally cost-effective humanitarian demining equipment (Smith n.d.).

Mine Detection: Finding Hidden Killers

Once vegetation is cleared, deminers must painstakingly check every square centimetre of the ground to a minimum UN-mandated depth of at least 20 cm with almost complete certainty, sometimes specified as in excess of 99.5 percent (United Nations Mine Action Service [UNMAS] n.d.).

Basic metal detectors have, since World War II, been a standard tool for mine detection. They have induction coils at the end of hand-held rods, like the ones used by treasure hunters and beachcombers. One truly significant advance in recent decades was the addition of electronic filters to reduce the “ground noise” of these field-deployed devices. But even so, the problems with this technology are many: they can be set off by virtually any kind of magnetic metal, including from the numerous metal fragments or debris that litter former conflict zones; the metal detectors produce many false-positive signals (false alarms) and occasionally also produce dangerous false-negative signals (especially for deeply buried mines, where the metal remains undetected). They cannot reliably detect all mines, especially those with minimum metal, at all necessary depths3. As a result, much more innovation is needed.

A major source of potential innovation is the recent progress in military demining and improvised explosive device (IED) detection. Over the past two decades, Western militaries have made considerable efforts to deal with the major challenges of IEDs, which were causing the deaths of so many soldiers. NATO nations prioritized three major pillars to their counter-IED work: “Defeat the Device,” “Attack the Networks,” and “Prepare the Force,” supported by a robust intelligence process (NATO 2011: fig. 1.3). This combined effort places the emphasis on major advances in technology, including miniaturization, reliability, geomatics (i.e., inbuilt GPS), ergonomics, and ground-compensating technology. These efforts have saved many soldiers’ lives.

Another significant development is ground penetrating radar (GPR). This detection technology is the nearest to standard deployment in humanitarian demining. In dual-sensor devices, after a metal-detector sends an alert (usually an audio squeal), the deminer can turn on GPR. The GPR-head sends electromagnetic (radio) waves into the ground and the reflected-wave intensity gives a sense of the size and rough shape of the detected object. Metal clutter can usually be disregarded. Resolution has historically been quite poor and GPR imagery and readouts required user interpretation, which carries its own risks.4

Recent technological developments have built on decades of experience to decrease by an order of magnitude the false alarm rate, giving rise to the hope that “hand-held detectors are moving to the point where they can discriminate what the detected object may be” (Peyton et al. 2019: 31). Further research has started to make feasible lower-cost, lightweight, multi-band radars used in conjunction with metal detectors to “see” small objects buried at close range (Šipoš, Malajner, and Gleich 2019). Issues remain around radar head and power requirements adding weight, cost, and technological complexity to the hand-held device. Nevertheless, they can prove cost-effective by reducing false alarms, increasing clearing speed, and reducing the clearance cost per square metre.

When deployed on vehicles, GPR systems can be more powerful and allow side-scanning as well as vertical scanning, thus increasing the resolution to a level that can reliably detect anti-tank mines or IEDs. Hopefully, vehicle-mounted anti-personnel mine detection systems for real-time 3D subsurface visualization will become user friendly and commercially available. That technology has probably already been developed for the US military, but such devices remain highly classified and restricted to the military domain.

Despite these challenges, some hand-held dual-sensor detectors are already on the market.5 They have been demonstrated in field tests and praised for their capabilities and increases in productivity by organizations such as The HALO Trust (Boshoff and Cresci 2015; The HALO Trust 2011), while other advances continue apace with related technology (Sato 2019). However, these advanced devices are expensive and are mostly purchased by military forces, which have different needs and priorities. Humanitarian deminers must do more than cross a minefield to reach a military objective; they have to dig up all the mines and explosive hazards in an area while posing little or no risk to themselves, as their objective is to completely clear the mined land.

Militaries have found that dual- and multi-sensor detectors have been very useful against the modern IEDs, given that the IEDs generally have small amounts of metal, which provide the first indications of a buried threat, before the GPR or other sensors are used to find the much larger buried plastic elements of the device.

As indicated in Table 2, humanitarian deminers need to ensure that the land can be declared “clear” (with virtually 100 percent certainty) for civilian use, including for intensive farming. Before returning the ground to locals, deminer chiefs often walk the ground themselves to show locals that the ground is safe.

Newer, more exotic detection technologies will likely be deployable one day, but these are not yet mature or cheap, nor simple enough for widespread use in humanitarian demining applications. Some technologies may never be practicable. The drawbacks of many R&D technologies include complexity and high cost for a market with a limited customer base. Furthermore, despite claims from researchers, some technologies have not yet proven their utility or practicality, for example, infra-red imaging, X-ray backscatter, acoustic/seismic reflection or vapour sensing. A larger set of detection methods is provided in Table 3. For multi-sensor systems, the various outputs can be fused for automatic target recognition, using special signal-processing techniques, including fuzzy logic, neural networks, and 2D/3D texture analysis. The devices could eventually be miniaturised in a handheld device or a small vehicle. Some sophisticated sensors are already used in military vehicles. And commercial mining for precious minerals already employs an array of useful technologies that could be adapted, including handheld X-ray fluorescence devices.

Various innovative sensor technologies have been explored for humanitarian demining, including those that use animals as sensors. Attempts to use bees, although once ridiculed, have shown limited potential (Hadagali and Suan 2017; Simić et al. 2019). Rats as sensors, on the other hand, proved to be more hype (Fears 2017; Kalan 2014; Sullivan 2015) than practical (DeAngelo 2018; Fast et al. 2017; Smith9). By contrast, dogs have long been effectively used in demining but they are time-consuming to train, difficult to maintain, and quite expensive.9 While dogs can detect many explosives reliably, they have to operate in the working context, with training reinforced daily, especially to clearly indicate the threat; as a result, mine-sniffing dogs, although they may be friendly, are often neither cheap nor easy to work with. Experiments are under way to use free-running dogs equipped with GPS, cameras, and radio contact for technical surveys of large areas (Bold 2014: 12–14; Lisica and Muftić 2019).

Mine Removal: Extraction or Explosion?

While the military can tolerate the risk that not all mines are removed, humanitarian deminers work to a significantly higher standard. They seek to clear a field of all explosive hazards, including mines and any other ERW (Habib 2007: 152). When a metal object is detected, the standard procedure in humanitarian demining is to start digging some distance (e.g., 20 cm) from the mine at an angle of less than 30 degrees to the ground (ibid.: 167). Simple devices such as handheld garden shovels, rakes, and prodders are used. To overcome ground friction, both hands are frequently used to gently push and scrape, while being careful not to set off the mine on the approach. The loosened soil is scooped away, and prodding/scraping continues until the standard detection depth is reached. The deminer then starts to move the prodder slowly forward towards the location discovered by the mine detector and indicated by a marker (e.g., a bright “casino-chip” plastic marker). The mine is exposed using hand tools that “detect” the mine by feel at angles less than 30 degrees so as not to push on the mine’s top pressure plate. This is dangerous work that could eventually be done by machines.

The dangerous process of lifting a mine could also be done by autonomous or user-operated robots in the future (Hemapala 2017). Of course, lifting pressure-operated mines must be done with extreme care, especially if the mine includes an anti-lift device or is booby trapped, e.g., with a grenade underneath whose pin has been removed so it will detonate shortly after the mine is lifted. A hook is sometimes placed (gently) under the far side of the mine before it is “pulled” from a relatively safe distance using a hook-and-line system to trigger any booby trap. But this remains dangerous and risk-intensive work. Typically, when a mine has been safely lifted, it is then moved to a demolition pit, where demolition charges are used to detonate and destroy it.

Not Machines versus Humans, but Machines Serving Humans

To be sure, there are clear benefits of using human deminers. They have a learning and computing capacity combined with self-preservation instincts that far exceed the world’s best computerised robots at present. Deminers are mostly from the local population in a post-conflict environment; these non-combat jobs enable them to support themselves, their families, and their communities. They can bring in a real income (albeit often shamefully small) to help stimulate the local economy and so promote wider peace-building efforts. Humanitarian demining funding should include the local beneficiaries and help to empower them. Appropriate mine clearance machines, coupled with proper operator training, can do that by making the deminers’ jobs easier, safer, and faster — and help give them better control of their future.

It is equally important to avoid a highly expensive “military” approach that applies the most high-end and high-tech “solutions” but rather to organically develop tools that humanitarian deminers can work with. Andy Smith states from experience: “We should start from where the recipients are, then help them move towards where they want to be. That does involve using computers and sophisticated equipment — but step-by-step and respecting their priorities rather than just imposing ours.”10 This is echoed in the literature as well: “The ‘robotic solution’ becomes a[n] engineering job’ dependent on ‘imported devices where the know-how is not available. The increasing cost of the sophisticated devices incorporated in to the robotic devices making very high initial investment and low return on investments. […] Mainly robots work well for clean and reliable tasks” (Hemapala 2017: 3–4)

Small improvements to simple demining tools can be remarkably effective, such as long-handled ergonomic rakes, but these can be complemented with more advanced technologies and, in some areas, replaced by them (Furihata and Hirose 2005). It is not a case of human versus machine but one of machines increasing human efficiency and effectiveness, as well as safety and security. The traditional “mechanical assistance” in humanitarian demining should expand to include “technological assistance” as well. This would be an integrated solution, with all components (animals, insects, devices, and humans) working holistically.

Towards “Smart” Demining Machines

Eventually, smart technology should advance to the level where it could do much, although not all, of what a human deminer does. The devices would need to be human-controlled or supervised from a distance, with the machine doing the dangerous, labour-intensive work, and suffering the risk of explosions; the person removing and fixing damaged devices would be far out of the area of danger.

One system envisioned by the author would work on an overhanging boom or rail that extends along an area to be demined, e.g., a stretch alongside a road, and then systematically moving further into the field, row by row. The first device on the boom or rail would cut and remove all vegetation up to a certain height.

The second device (possibly a multi-sensor detector built into the first device) would pinpoint the mines or suspicious items in the ground, including by subterranean viewing from different angles on the boom. The precise areas would then be marked by spray-painting or by dropping (lightly) brightly coloured plastic chips. In addition, positions would be recorded by the computerized system using a differential-GPS or another accurate coordinate recorder. The third device on the boom or rail would be a sophisticated extractor, which would dig into the earth much as a human deminer would, employing highly tactile sensitivity. It would remove earth until the mine or metal object is exposed and then, after a human gives the go ahead, the machine would sound a warning to those around and slowly remove the mine or other explosive hazard. This type of envisioned system would mirror a suite of already-operational technologies and tools in use. If the machine encounters a sophisticated problem as it progresses, it should be able to signal a human to examine the problem, e.g., a deminer viewing the area by remote-controlled cameras on the device.

To verify that a thorough job has been done, the fourth device on the boom could do the quality assurance (QA). It could use sensors to detect if another mine had been buried beneath the first. The QA sensor could also scan the lane and conduct tests at selective points. It could apply pressure to the ground to test that no unexploded mines remain. Only then could a lane be declared successfully “cleared” before the demining machine is moved one lane forward. Of course, input from deminers at each stage of the R&D process should be sought.

Conclusions: The Need for Innovation

Given that the advanced systems and technologies described above may run into problems in some difficult field conditions, the preliminary or prototype devices could be used for the easier demining projects at first. The devices could cover soft homogenous ground containing few obstacles where detection and removal are easier. As the technology matures, future models could be deployed to areas containing more complex mixtures of landmines, shrapnel, anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned explosive ordinance, and IEDs. They could be designed to withstand different climates, and work in difficult soil and terrain.

Given the range of possibilities, one might wonder what has inhibited technological progress so far. Factors include: prioritization of military missions (e.g., in Iraq/Afghanistan); military secrecy and information classification (of both R&D and deployed systems); lack of multi-year funding for humanitarian demining; the small niche market for humanitarian demining that produces little profit; the inability to move from R&D to practical commercial devices; a bureaucratic short-term approach to cost-efficiency; over-hyped proposals that did not live up to expectations; cynicism of innovation by those convinced their current practices are entirely sufficient; governmental/humanitarian actors not sharing information; and an inclination to avoid experimentation or being innovative.

Importantly, the robotics and artificial intelligence revolution is just beginning to be felt and understood in human society more generally. Many potential uses have recently become visible and commercially viable, from autonomous vacuum cleaners to advanced UAVs, but much more is still to come. Demining is an area where such products can be life-saving. Since 2005, the US military has developed and deployed very sophisticated technologies for IED detection and removal that have saved soldiers’ lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Remote-control robots like the “TALON” series of unmanned ground systems have figured significantly in military operations (Wells and Deguire 2005) — and Hollywood depictions11 — with cutters and grabber assemblies to help deal with IEDs and UXO, as well as options for a range of other such tools, e.g., GPR (Chemring Group 2019b). Many of these technologies could be used or modified for humanitarian demining — some already are (Fardoulis et al. 2018), yet many technical details remain highly classified. However, there is bound to be some spillover as the companies producing the military hardware look for new markets.

There is additional reason to be hopeful: the emphasis on demining R&D is returning after the diversion away from humanitarian support after 9/11 and the Afghanistan-Iraq missions. In recent years, new initiatives and programmes have been launched. The UN Department of Peace Operations (which includes the UN Mines Action Service or UNMAS) has accepted the recommendations of the Panel of Experts on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping, which include new demining technologies, especially to enhance the mobility of peacekeepers (UN 2015). The European Union is supporting R&D programmes to examine wide-ranging technologies, including aerial drones for survey work, GIS, robots, multi-sensor detectors (including animals and biomimicry), vapour sensors, and small/miniaturized demining machines (European Union 2016). NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme is supporting activities in Partnership for Peace nations (NATO 2016). Japanese engineers have been pioneering “intelligent” robots for demining for some time (Habib 2008: 42–44).

UAV applications will continue to advance quickly in their sophistication and demining applications, moving from experimental trials to dedicated field tests (senseFly 2016: 5). One of the major academic journals focused on humanitarian demining dedicated an issue to the topic (Risser 2018). Various humanitarian demining groups have evaluated and tested UAV systems under operational conditions (Cruz et al. 2018; Gottwald, Docci, and Mayer, 2017; senseFly 2016; Wade 2016). Some have even developed applications using UAVs themselves for the extraction of mines (Mine Kafon 2019; UAV Systems 2016). As the development of experimental work continues, gradual recognition of UAV technology by the UN Mines Action Service as a viable tool has been seen as well (UNMAS, 2018: 30).

Other R&D possibilities that can be explored are fluorescent bacteria (Meurer et al. 2009) and novel animal-based detectors (e.g., involving a mongoose [Nanayakkara et al. 2008]). While many of today’s R&D projects are “blue sky” projects that may never reach the field during the funding cycle, some of them will reach maturity. This gives new hope that technology may yet come to the service of humanitarian demining. Long-term R&D investments can pay real dividends because the landmine and UXO problem remains so serious. Civilian technologies have produced some fruitful detection and foliage clearance devices. Smartphone and common GIS (like Google Earth) have helped in imaging, data analysis, visualization, and precise clearance marking for demining.

But the detection and extraction technologies are slower to come online, seemingly “stuck in the mud.” Devices mentioned earlier show promise but need encouragement and multi-year funding. Unfortunately, “[m]any promising technologies have not been exploited due to the lack of available funding. Although funds may exist, there is currently no formal mechanism to link donors to technology opportunities, and vice versa” (UNMAS 2013: sec. 9). To complete the laboratory-to-field R&D cycle, prototype field testing by established deminers is a much-needed validation step, but R&D risks, high and often multi-year financial commitments, and policy constraints pose significant hurdles (ibid. 9). Despite the best efforts of academic and non-governmental organizations, and biennial workshops organized by GICHD, there is still a need for an organization able to test devices independently and publish impartial results, as well as to set proven standards. The Landmine Monitor annual reports could consider developments in technology, something it has avoided doing for the last decade (from 2009 through 2018 it made no mention of technology related to demining operations). However, the Croatian Centre for Testing, Development and Training, at its annual International Symposium on Mine Action, does publish specific advances in demining technology R&D in its International Symposium on Mine Action Book of Papers (HCR-CTRO 2019). And while the Ottawa Treaty encourages states parties to share demining technology, especially through the UN,12 those efforts have petered out in recent years.13

Increasingly, advanced database technologies coupled with data collection tools, including sensors on devices — the “Internet of Things” revolution — will enhance the full spectrum of demining efforts, including integrating mapping, data collection, analysis, and modelling. Tools developed specifically for the mine action community have started to make an impact (Vikström and Kallin 2018), with the GICHD Information Management System for Mine Action being used in 47 countries (GICHD 2019). Finally, demining accident records need to be fed into a centralized, open database to derive lessons about safety, to improve industry technologies and practices, and enable detailed research and study.14

The need to clean up mines and other ERW will remain far into the foreseeable future, with new mines and IEDs still being planted. Even cleaning up the landmines currently in the ground would take many decades at the current pace, while accidental deaths would continue. R&D into new technologies and better equipment will require iterative development and refinement over the years. The connection from R&D to field application urgently needs to be strengthened. Mine action specialist Andy Smith sums it up: “We need young ideas, young idealism, young enthusiasm — and, of course, some old and hard money”.15

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, who suggested and encouraged this inquiry. The paper benefitted greatly from communications with Andy Smith, a UK-based mine-action specialist with much practical experience in demining. Assistance and feedback on the paper is much appreciated from Dave McCracken (deminer based in Thailand), Ryan Cross (Vancouver-based researcher), Robin Collins (World Federalists Canada), Paul Hannon (Mines Action Canada), Danielle Stodilka (Toronto-based chartered chemist), Mikael Bold (GICHD), and other experts at UNMAS and GICHD. The statements, views, and any errors in the paper are solely the responsibility of the author. Funding from the Canadian Pugwash Group is much appreciated.

Competing Interests

The author has no competing interests to declare.

Author Information

Walter Dorn is professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) who is based at the Canadian Forces College (CFC). As an “operational professor” he participates in field missions and the work of international organizations, including as a member of the UN’s 2014 Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping. His two most recent books are Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, 2014) and Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology, and Innovation in UN Peace Operations (UNU Press, 2011). Further biographical info and publications can be found on the website www.walterdorn.net.

Notes

1 Locating and deciding to begin demining activities includes socio-economic impact studies to determine areas that are presumed affected by mines and where demining would be most beneficial to the local population, gathering data and information to identify likely mine-fields, and reviewing accident reports, satellite photographs, etc. (The HALO Trust n.d.). This pre-demining activity, known as “non-technical survey,” has been greatly improved by technology, including satellite and airborne surveillance, modern geographical information systems (GIS) such as ArcGIS and services such as Google Earth, although gaps remain (Schmitz et al. 2018). It is then augmented by “technical survey,” which includes physically assessing for mines in a defined area. That is “a process using physical intervention that might include machines or breaching by manual deminers” (The HALO Trust n.d.).

2 Mini-flails reduce risks by setting off booby-traps, trip-wires, fused and even simple-pressure mines. Andy Smith (2015b) comments: “Before it was invented, the most common cause of deminer death was the bounding fragmentation mine. A mini-flail can break or initiate these before the deminers have to go near, removing undergrowth and so making the demining process both faster and safer.”

3 Andy Smith, Emails to the author, 20–24 May 2015.

4 Andy Smith, an expert mine action specialist, writes: “Variations in ground density give false signals when the ground has wet patches, rocks, tree roots or voids. The density change between ground and air makes it difficult for GPR to reliably detect small objects in that area. False alarms encourage the user to make spurious assessments; and accidents have occurred when military deminers have trodden on a mine that they had detected but had chosen to ignore because of the GPR” (2015b).

5 Examples of handheld dual-sensor detectors on the market include, e.g., “Groundshark” by Chemring (2019a); the “Minehound” series by Vallon (2019), HSTAMIDS from the US Army (US DoD 2019), and ALIS (Sato 2018).

6 The “maturity” column gives an indication of the time-span until the technology might be incorporated into practical application.

7 These bulk explosive detectors use radioactive sources to bombard the ground with radiation. They require heavy shielding. There is also a risk of losing radioactive sources to terrorist groups in conflict zones who might seek to make a “dirty bomb.”

8 Andy Smith, Emails to the author, 20–24 May 2015.

9 The first humanitarian dog programme started in 1989 in Afghanistan/Pakistan (under Op Salam) in conjunction with UN Development Programme and the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) further pioneered the use of demining dogs in the mid-1990s. After a disappointing and costly programme in Angola, NPA established its Global Training Centre for Mine Detection Dogs in Bosnia in 2004 (NPA-GTC/MCC 2012). The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation found that “more than 25 organisations worldwide currently use mine detection animals [dogs]” (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 2009: 42).

10 Andy Smith, Emails to the author, 20–24 May 2015.

11 For instance, the 2008 movie The Hurt Locker depicts the remote-controlled tracked TALON USG for the investigation of IEDs.

12 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction Anti-Personnel Mines Treaty (1997), in Article 6, on International Cooperation and Assistance, Paragraph 2: “Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.” Then in Paragraph 7(b): Each State Party shall provide “the financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the [mine clearance] program.” In Article 11, on Meetings of the States Parties, the signatories commit to “meet regularly in order to consider […] 1(d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines.”

13 While the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining, with a secretariat in Brussels, is now closed, an important role continues to be played by the Swiss-based GICHD. Organisations like the Centre for Testing, Development and Training and the Croatian Mine Action Centre are a kind of “halfway house” to test and coordinate humanitarian demining efforts. The Demining Technologies Information Forum (DTIF), launched by Canada, the European Commission and the United States and joined later by UNMAS, GICHD, and a number of nations, once provided a “systematic, multi-disciplinary opportunity for the identification of demining technology gaps, for the synergistic exchange of ideas, for collaborative international programme co-ordination and planning and for the review of progress in the mine action technology area. […] Regrettably, the DTIF is no longer functioning” (UNMAS 2015). Fortunately, the NGO Find a Better Way continues to work with various UK universities to explore better landmine detection and removal methods (Find a Better Way 2019).

14 A database on deminer injuries is available, although reporting is voluntary and far from complete (Global CWD Repository 2019). Some have argued that the humanitarian demining community ought to recognize a duty of care for its deminers and provide detailed records of incidents globally (Smith 2017a), as others have done in specific former conflict zones (Debač 2016).

15 Andy Smith, Emails to the author, 20–24 May 2015.

References

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Submitted: 18 July 2019 Accepted: 12 August 2019 Published: 03 September 2019

Lament for a Treaty (INF Treaty 1987-2019)

Originally published in the Cape Breton Observer

I did not weep, I turned to stone inside … Dante, Inferno

I rarely cry, but on the evening of 8 December 1987, glued to radio coverage of the signing of a nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Soviet Union, I wept with a relief I had never felt before, an ecstatic conviction that the Cold War, and with it the nuclear arms race, was ending.

It wasn’t so much the number of warheads the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, would scrap: over 2,500, tens of thousands of Hiroshimas but a small fraction of the Superpower’s gargantuan arsenals.

It wasn’t even that, for the first time in nuclear arms control history, an entire class of weapon would be banned – land-based missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers, capable of hitting their targets (cities) in minutes, and thus the cause of a major war scare in Europe since their deployment, first by Moscow, in the late 1970s.

It was more the doors the Treaty opened to further cuts, so deep and wide the goal set by the United Nations in its first-ever resolution in 1946 would finally seem within reach: Global Zero, a nuclear-weapon-free world.

In 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev had stated bluntly that “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.” In 1986, Gorbachev unveiled a plan of phased multilateral reductions, counting down to ‘Zero’ by the year 2000. With the signing of the INF Treaty, his proposal – technically viable, demonstrably verifiable – became politically realistic: a “sapling,” as he said, had been planted “which may one day grow into a mighty tree of peace”:

//May December 8, 1987, become a date that will be inscribed in the history books, a date that will mark the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarisation of human life.//

As I listened, I cried, in part because I had spent much of the previous year following the negotiations for my undergraduate dissertation at the only Peace Studies Department (University of Bradford) in the United Kingdom, a nuclear-weapon state which ‘boasted’ its own ‘independent deterrent’ (missiles leased from America) and which had – inviting its own self-destruction – hosted US INF weapons at Greenham Common, site of a truly heroic, routinely reviled Women’s Peace Camp, backed by millions of supporters in an antinuclear ‘Extinction Rebellion’ movement spanning Western Europe and North America.
Embracing the base, Greenham Common December 1982 At noon on December 12th 1982, 30,000 women held hands around the 6 mile perimeter fence of the former USAF base, in protest against the UK government’s decision to site American cruise missiles here. The installation went ahead but so did the protest – for 19 years women maintained their presence at the Greenham Common peace camp.

Embracing the base, Greenham Common December 1982: At noon on 12 December 1982, 30,000 women held hands around the 6-mile perimeter fence of the former USAF base, in protest against the UK government’s decision to site American cruise missiles here. The installation went ahead but so did the protest – for 19 years women maintained their presence at the Greenham Common peace camp.

And I cried, too, listening to the chat and music of the students in the University residence – most of whom had not been part of that movement and would never know what ‘INF’ stood for – for the dramatically saner, less menaced and more humane future they could now enjoy and explore.

I have more than once subjected Spectator readers to dense analysis of the post-Cold War decline of nuclear arms control in general, and the INF Treaty in particular.

In sum, with the fall of the Soviet Union the ‘Countdown’ Plan was consigned to oblivion by a NATO Alliance – suddenly the world’s only nuclear-armed alliance – determined not to disarm but expand, deep into former Warsaw Pact and Soviet territory, triggering a predictably nationalistic, we-love-our-nukes response in Moscow.

In 2002, US President Bush, to the delight of influential State Department official John Bolton, withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, radically limiting missile defenses to remove any temptation to ‘win’ a nuclear war by striking first and shooting down most of whatever missiles the obliterated enemy could still unleash. Not only, Russia believed, could American missile defenses in eastern Europe be used to intercept second-strike weapons, they could themselves be converted to offensive, first-strike weapons – with a range of, well, between 500-5,500 kilometers.

Bush’s move, allied to his illegal regime-change invasion of Iraq, eroded Russia’s faith in the INF Treaty, while both Moscow and Washington expressed alarm at a build-up of Chinese nuclear forces in the INF range. President Obama, while still trying to save the Treaty, accused Russia of at least flirting with non-compliance by researching and developing, if not deploying, new medium-range systems. President Trump, determined – at the urging of National Security Adviser Bolton – to scrap the Treaty, claimed the ‘red line’ of deployment had been crossed, giving Russia a deadline of August 2 this year to return to compliance. Compliance, that is, as adjudged by a US administration now itching for a justification to research, develop and deploy some of the new medium-range weapons lustfully eyed by Defense Secretary Jim ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis in his hair-raising 2018 ‘Nuclear Posture Review.’

Just how dangerous this ‘new nuclear age’ now is was revealed by the brief, inadvertent posting (!) by the Pentagon this summer of its updated ‘Nuclear Operations’ manual (still available on the website of the Federation of American Scientists, thanks to the quick thinking of researcher Steven Aftergood ) which states confidently that:

“Using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability.”

Wow, talk about an invitation to proliferate: who wouldn’t want such a magic wand? Indeed, given this impressive up-side to ‘going nuclear,’ it’s hardly surprising, to quote Obama’s Under Secretary of State Thomas Countryman, that “sadly, no US official today is able to repeat” the Reagan-Gorbachev ‘must never fight, can never win’ formula.

And so, on August 2, the INF Treaty was formally pronounced dead, leaving just one bilateral US-Russia arms control agreement still standing: the 2010 New START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty, limiting long-range warheads to 1,550 each side. Due to expire in 2021, New START could be extended to 2026 by mutual consent. Bolton, though, has told Trump New START – an Obama achievement, after all, like the Iran nuclear deal – is old hat, tired thinking, tying America’s hands, etc. And even though Trump recently said of Bolton that “if it was up to him, he’d take on the whole world at one time,” the President agrees.

No Treaty, of course, can really ‘die’. But the demise of the INF Treaty is sure to impact the lives, even help seal the fate, of millions of people. Including, perhaps, the children of the students I listened to that unforgettable night, 32 years ago, as the ‘sapling’ was planted.

But this time, I couldn’t cry.

Sean Howard

Sean Howard is adjunct professor of political science at Cape Breton University and member of Peace Quest Cape Breton.

Setsuko Thurlow video interview

Setsuko Thurlow, in a conversation with Canadian Pugwash members, June 2019:

(1) she takes us through her experiences in Oslo, receiving the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of ICAN, and
(2) she describes the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Toronto.

You can follow the discussion in the 22-minute video on this page (YouTube, embedded):

Trudeau et les casques bleus

Traduction de Pierre Jasmin approuvée par l’auteur. L’article original est paru dans le Toronto Star.

La semaine dernière, le déploiement pour une année par le Canada d’un avion de transport C-130 pour les opérations de paix des Nations Unies représentait un pas en avant. Toutefois, alors que le mandat Trudeau tire à sa fin, il est juste de récapituler ses promesses électorales précédentes de se réengager dans le maintien de la paix des Nations Unies.

À son entrée en fonction, le premier ministre Trudeau a donné d’importantes instructions à ses ministres de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères pour mettre à la disposition de l’ONU du personnel canadien et des capacités militaires spécialisées. Les ministres devaient également prendre le leadership d’une formation internationale au maintien de la paix et aider les Nations Unies à réagir plus rapidement aux conflits naissants.

Lors de la conférence ministérielle sur le maintien de la paix à Londres en 2016, le Canada s’est engagé à fournir jusqu’à 600 militaires et 150 policiers – un grand pas en avant par rapport au gouvernement précédent, mais guère plus de la moitié de ce que le Canada avait prévu pour les 40 années qui ont suivi la création de la première force de maintien de la paix en 1956. Néanmoins, la nouvelle contribution annoncée serait extrêmement précieuse pour une organisation mondiale qui lutte pour aider l’humanité.

Malheureusement, dans la pratique, le gouvernement Trudeau a atteint un niveau sans précédent en petit nombre de soldats et de policiers au service des Nations Unies. Seuls 56 militaires et policiers en uniforme étaient déployés en mai 2018, six mois après que Trudeau eut organisé une importante conférence ministérielle mondiale sur le maintien de la paix à Vancouver.

Le gouvernement n’a déployé qu’une seule unité militaire opérationnelle à court terme: une force extrêmement compétente au Mali.

Quand la mission au Mali viendra à terme à la fin du mois, le Canada fournira de nouveau moins de 30 militaires et moins de 30 policiers, bien loin des chiffres de 600 et 150! En fait, durant son mandat, le gouvernement Harper a déployé plus de personnel en uniforme (157 en moyenne par mois) que le gouvernement Trudeau (114).

En outre, le programme de formation de maintien de la paix promis n’a pas été lancé depuis quatre ans. Et la force de réaction rapide promise à la conférence ministérielle de Vancouver 2017 est loin d’être déployée rapidement. En fait, même sa destination n’est toujours pas connue.

Il est juste de demander à qui ou à quoi attribuer la responsabilité de cette promesse non tenue. Il est vrai que le ministère de la Défense nationale avait beaucoup de retard à se mettre au travail pour se réengager dans le maintien de la paix et apprendre le fonctionnement de l’ONU.

Le néophyte député et ministre, Harjit Sajjan, a adopté une approche prudente et tatillonne dans sa pente abrupte d’apprentissage des opérations de l’ONU. Le chef d’état-major de la défense, Jonathan Vance, croyait en l’importance du maintien de la paix de l’ONU, mais a abandonné l’attitude de bonne volonté pratique des chefs d’une époque antérieure.

L’armée canadienne avait fourni des soldats à toutes les missions de l’ONU jusqu’en 1995. Au cours de la décennie 1990, les Forces armées canadiennes ont fourni des généraux pour diriger sept missions de l’ONU, mais aucune depuis lors. L’OTAN est devenue priorité loin devant l’ONU, de nombreuses demandes de l’ONU ont été rejetées aux niveaux inférieurs du quartier général de la Défense nationale. Il est étonnant dans ces circonstances que l’ONU ait continué à demander. Le Canada n’a même pas placé un seul officier au siège de l’ONU.

Cependant, en décembre 2016, l’armée était prête à fournir un commandant de force à la mission des Nations Unies au Mali et celle-ci a ouvert le poste pendant deux mois dans l’attente de la décision finale. Mais le gouvernement n’a pas approuvé cette contribution lorsque Chrystia Freeland a succédé à Stéphane Dion au poste de ministre des Affaires étrangères, une fonction qui joue un rôle de premier plan au sein du Cabinet pour les questions de maintien de la paix.

Freeland a beaucoup parlé de la nécessité d’un ordre international fondé sur des règles, sans aider le moindrement au centre de cet ordre international, les Nations unies, ni à son entreprise phare de maintien de la paix en zones de conflit. Freeland a pris une initiative: promouvoir les femmes de différents pays en maintien de la paix, tout en n’y accordant que deux femmes militaires. Les chiffres, qui ont augmenté de manière impressionnante avec la mission au Mali, seront ramenés à moins d’une demi-douzaine dans une semaine.

Enfin, qu’en est-il du nouveau service de transport C-130 annoncé la semaine dernière ? Certes une innovation qui devrait aider l’ONU, mais ce n’est pas un grand engagement de détourner un seul avion des missions de l’OTAN en Irak pour seulement cinq jours de service mensuel aux Nations Unies.

Alors, qui a sapé la promesse de Trudeau en matière de maintien de la paix ? Eh bien, ce fut Trudeau lui-même. Il n’a pas réussi à faire adopter d’importantes propositions par son cabinet. Il n’a pas fait pression sur ses ministres sur la question (mais plutôt sur d’autres questions…). Résultat : la réputation du Canada en matière de maintien de la paix a souffert et le monde a compris que la réalité était bien en retard sur la rhétorique quant à l’appui du gouvernement Trudeau au maintien de la paix des Nations Unies.

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