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"Canada in a Dangerous World"

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Notes for Panel:

Canadian Defence Policy in a Human Security Context: Reshaping the Security Envelope

1. Canada's responsibilities / opportunities

1.1 Canada enjoys extraordinary levels of prosperity and peace and security at home, and as such is one of those states with the opportunity and the responsibility to make a significant contribution to international peace and security beyond its borders.

1.2 Canadians have traditionally been supportive of their country's active participation in efforts toward international peace and security, grounded both in the sense of a common humanity, and in a recognition that our security depends ultimately on a stable and prosperous international order of prospering and stable states.

1.3 Because we don't have daunting and imminent military challenges to our sovereignty and territorial security, we have flexibility:

--Not burdened by extraordinary security requirements at home, we have a special opportunity to devote significant resources to international security; and

--We can decide on the most effective way to respond to contemporary security threats (our tool box is not dominated by a hammer, so we don't need to insist on nails as the primary response to every problem).

2. What are the primary international security needs?

2.1 Failing states the primary custodians of international peace and security:

Conditions of insecurity and instability that have currently escalated to armed violence are primarily the product of conditions internal to states, rather than of conflicts between states. Ironically it is weak and failing states who are on the front lines of the struggle to maintain the social, political, and economic conditions essential to a stable order – the kind of order that protects and serves the welfare of its citizens and avoids the descent to war. Or, as the OECD peacebuilding guidelines put it, a primary security and war prevention measure is the development of state “institutions capable of managing socio-political tensions and avoiding their escalation into violence” (OECD 2003, p. 9) It is a measure of the dysfunction (or underdevelopment) of modern states that almost one in six has failed so badly in managing its

socio-political affairs that tension has escalated to a level of violence sufficient to define it as a location of ongoing war.

2.2 The experience of insecurity:

Nationally and internationally, for security policies and measures to be effective they should obviously address and mitigate the ways in which people and communities experience insecurity. And around the world, the most immediate experiences of insecurity come in the form of unmet basic needs, political exclusion and the denial of basic rights, social and political disintegration, and the related escalation of criminal and political violence. In addition, the retention and further spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction pose an ongoing extraordinary threat to the safety of people – much less immediate than the other threats just noted, but with extraordinary and irremediable consequences if such weapons were to be used.

The primary threats to the safety and welfare of individuals in most instances do not stem from external military forces bent on attacking the territorial integrity of their state or on undermining its sovereignty by imposing their will on an otherwise safe and stable national order. But in extraordinary, though not infrequent, circumstances (often when vulnerabilities are not addressed early enough with appropriate measures), conditions of human insecurity translate into military challenges.

Internationally, this means military support to efforts to provide protection to people in extraordinary peril in states that either cannot or will not provide such protection, to help restore order and thus confidence in public institutions in failed or failing states, and to enforce compliance with binding international norms and commitments, including human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

But that is not to say that the failure to deal effectively with criminal and political violence is due to a lack of military capacity. The international community collectively is in possession of extraordinary levels of military capacity, and simply adding to it will not prevent violence, nor will it make the world more responsive to the needs of the vulnerable or more inclined or able to assure compliance with international laws and standards. The point is not that military force has become irrelevant to international peace and security, but that for it to be relevant and effective it has to be applied within a two-fold context.

--First, it must be used in coordination with other security measures (e.g., diplomacy, political reform, disarmament) that have become increasingly relevant.

--Second, when military forces are employed, they have to be trained, equipped, and managed so as to support regional peace and security in ways that do not escalate violence and distrust and without resorting to attempts at militarily forced global engineering that ignores the transformative social, economic, and political conditions that are essential to durable peace and security (ICISS Report made this same point).

2.3 The five D's of security:

Based on the recognition that the maintenance of international peace and security is dependent upon more than military strength, Canadian security policy should consist of a variety of military

and non-military elements. In fact, a comprehensive security envelope should include five D's of security:

- **Development** – Measures to create the kinds of economic, social, and environmental conditions that are conducive to sustainable peace and stability (beware of securitization of aid);
- **Democracy** – Measures to promote good governance that emphasize political inclusiveness and participation, as well as respect for human rights;
- **Disarmament** – Measures to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms and to prohibit weapons of mass destruction;
- **Diplomacy** – Engagement in multilateral efforts toward the prevention of armed conflict, the peaceful management of political conflict, the development of a rules-based international order, and the promotion of development, democracy and disarmament;
- **Defence** – The capacity to resort to the use of force in extraordinary circumstances in support of the full range of peace and security efforts, i.e. the other four Ds, including protection and compliance.

3. Reconfiguring the security envelope

3.1 What is the level of current peace and security spending?

Canada spends money on all five Ds. Measuring that expenditure is a challenge. I'll give you our take on it, recognizing that there is lots of room for big and small quibbles (we used the entire defence budget as a contribution to international peace and security, whereas some of it is obviously domestic, but most of it is designed to be available – not all at the same time – for international efforts). But I think it provides a broad portrait.

Total spending on the five Ds comes to about \$16 billion, or 1.4 per cent of GDP (Table 1 – see Appendix I for details on how these figures were arrived at).

Table 1: Current Security Spending

Development	3,144,060,000	19%
Democracy	319,850,000	2%
Disarmament	196,710,000	1%
Diplomacy	186,550,000	1%
Defence	12,413,570,000	76%
Total Security Spending	15,907,710,000	100%

3.2 Is this the appropriate level or balance?

At almost \$16 billion per year, it's clear that Canada is making a significant contribution in absolute terms to the collective, multilateral pursuit of international peace and security, but two questions obviously follow:

--First, is it enough? Given Canada's extraordinary wealth, and given the high level of stability and security Canadians now enjoy at home, should we be doing more to support efforts in the rest of the world to reach similar levels of peace and security, and in the process contribute to the durability of our own well-being?

--Secondly, whatever the level of the security effort that Canadians decide on, is the relative balance of our effort appropriate? Should three-fourths of our security effort be on military roles when the most prominent threats to the security of people come from non-military sources such as unfavorable economic, social, and political conditions – especially when these threats are not amenable to military mitigation? It stands to reason that defence will always be the most prominent (given the extraordinary hardware and personnel requirements), but the basic question still applies.

3.3 The military-to-development spending ratio:

Another way to look at the proportions is to compare the military-to-ODA ratio among OECD countries. In Canada it is about 3.8:1 – putting it roughly in the middle of the DAC rankings (see Table 2). The most balanced ratio is held by Luxembourg (1.2:1), while the most disproportionate ratio belongs to the United States (25:1). Obviously it is not relevant to compare Canada to either Luxembourg or the US; however, in comparisons between Canada and like-minded, similarly situated, countries (Netherlands, 2.2:1; Sweden at 2:1; Norway, 2:1; Denmark at 1.6:1; and Ireland at 1.8:1), Canadian spending priorities are weighted more heavily toward military spending.

3.4 Shifting the proportions:

Action on two key proposals from civil society organizations engaged internationally could constructively shift the relative balance within the peace and security envelope. The first is the proposal that Canada more seriously pursue the declared goal of increasing development assistance to .7% of GDP. To reach that goal within a decade, development assistance funding, focused on poverty eradication, would need to increase by 12% over the next two years, and by 15% thereafter. A second proposal is that \$50 million per year, initially for three years, be allocated for a special fund for Conflict Resolution and War Prevention.

If development spending was actually increased to .7% of GDP, if at the same time there was modest growth in democracy, disarmament, and diplomacy spending, including special funding for conflict resolution and war prevention, and if defence spending moved during the same period from its current level of about 1% of GDP to about 1.2% of GDP, the result would be a significant shift in emphasis toward security measures and strategies that actually address the insecurities experienced by people in their homes and communities on a daily basis.

Development (.7% of GDP)	8,400,000,000	35%
Democracy	600,000,000	2%
Disarmament	400,000,000	1.5%
Diplomacy	400,000,000	1.5%
Defence (1.2% of GDP)	14,000,000,000	60%
Total Security Spending	23,800,000,000	100%

This formulation would raise security spending from its current level of 1.4 per cent of GDP to just over 2 per cent of GDP. It would retain defence as 60 per cent of the envelope, but would

move the defence to development ratio from the current 3.8:1 to 1.7:1 (making it comparable to Sweden at 2:1; Norway, 2:1; Denmark at 1.6:1; and Ireland at 1.8:1).

4. The military dimension and "the ability to pay"

The case for linking development spending, along with overall spending on international peace and security, to GDP, or to the ability-to-pay, is stronger than the case for linking specifically defence spending to that principle. Wealthy states have a responsibility to contribute to global economic and other conditions conducive to peace and prosperity. And the greater the wealth, and the more durable their own security, the greater is their responsibility to the wider community. Furthermore, it is in their interests to do so.

But in military spending, the principle of ability-to-pay does not apply quite so obviously. What is needed first in the case of defence is a clear assessment of national and international security needs against the military capability available. It would be hard to argue convincingly that international peace and security are threatened by a dearth of global military capacity. Annual world military spending now stands well in excess of \$1,000 billion (Canadian), of which at least 60 per cent is by NATO. Furthermore, in the OECD, the military to ODA ratio is almost 10:1. It hardly seems credible that Western security or a capacity to contribute to multilateral security operations is threatened by inadequate levels of military spending, or that an additional \$2-3 billion annually from Canada would somehow make the world or Canada a safer place, or seriously alter global capacity to contribute to UN-mandated peace operations.

States that do not face imminent challenges to their territory and sovereignty should take advantage of that situation to reduce the commitment to military resources and to do more to correct the current imbalance in OECD states regarding military and non-military commitments to global security.

And the military commitments that are made, should be oriented toward addressing the most imminent threats or immediate needs – capacity to contribute to protection and peace support operations (recognizing the current impediment to more effective protection operations is not military capacity, but military strategy and especially political and legal facilitation of such interventions.)

The case for some increases to Canadian military capacity (costs of restructuring), as well as contribution to the other four D's, is persuasive. But by now it is also obvious that simple increases in Canadian military spending will not automatically translate into improved capacity for peace support and protection interventions. The current submarine debate is ample evidence of that.

5. Defence spending

The most likely objection to such a scenario is apt to be that Canada's armed forces are already under funded and unable to meet burgeoning challenges beyond our borders. But the call for more military spending requires a thorough public debate and review of the military roles and

capacities relevant to international peace and security challenges in this first quarter of the 21st Century.

A review of Canadian defence policy to meet the challenges of the 21st century should therefore address four broad categories of needed change:⁸ the exploration and development of the kinds of **alternative military models** required; the promotion of a **more effective multilateral institutional framework** for multilateral military action; the development of a **comprehensive Canadian security policy** and spending priorities to reflect the military and non-military dimensions of our international peace and security efforts; and the development of a broader international consensus and a **more responsive, and accountable, multilateral decision-making mechanism** in support of the international community's military responsibilities in support of the safety and well being of people wherever they are in peril.

Prime Minister Martin has already signaled that "merely rebuilding Canada's armed forces on old models will not suffice." The proposed addition of 5,000 troops could be the start of a re-shaping of Canadian forces, and the need for more relevant military models was reinforced by the 2001 report of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Its focus on military intervention to protect civilians in peril posited a specialized military role between traditional peacekeeping and even more traditional war fighting: "The challenge in this context is to find tactics and strategies of military intervention that fill the current gulf between outdated concepts of peacekeeping and full-scale military operations that may have deleterious impacts on civilians."

Most current wars involve core intractable conflicts that are not amenable to either military or diplomatic quick fixes. Such conflicts tragically persist and persist, and to deal with them effectively the international community requires long-term peacebuilding strategies that address the fundamental social, economic, and political failures that fuel them. In the meantime the international community must also become more determined and better equipped to protect those civilian populations most grievously affected and imperilled as the process of slow change unfolds in the midst of ongoing violence and abuse.

Efficiency and affordability will require that much of the military equipment and many of the military functions at home and abroad be complementary, if not interchangeable. And the costs of Canadian military operations will have to be balanced with funding requirements for the development, diplomatic, disarmament, and democracy promotion efforts that are essential to ensuring that military.