

May 2013

POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

Only one circumpolar nation has NWFZ in their Arctic Policy
- Next?



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Affilié aux Conférences Pugwash
sur la Science et les Affaires Mondiales

Ottawa University
October 26 & 27, 2012

DEDICATION

To the memory of Michael Wallace, who was a member of the Board of Canadian Pugwash. He was a Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, and his expert knowledge of international security and military matters was vast and often used on our behalf. His paper, with Steven Staples, gave us the official kick-off of our campaign to promote the formation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Arctic.

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COVER IMAGE

Arctic Circle (Oct. 2003) — Three Polar bears approach the starboard bow of the Los Angeles class fast-attack submarine *USS Honolulu* (SSN 718) while surfaced 280 miles from the North Pole. U.S. Navy photo by Chief Yeoman Alphonso Braggs. (RELEASED)

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_23/north2.htm

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Preface

For several years a program of advocacy for an Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone has received strong support from Canadian Pugwash and other peace organizations, particularly the Danish Pugwash Group and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation (in Canada). We have raised awareness in several constituencies, including small groups of parliamentarians, offices of the Government of Canada and other circumpolar governments, and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs). With the encouragement of the Pugwash Council, we convened an international expert group to explore ways that would advance the Arctic NWFZ proposal and to suggest necessary policies to that end. This is a record of the meeting that took place at Ottawa University, Ottawa, Canada on October 26 and 27, 2012, which took the format of a public meeting, followed by a workshop.

In this report, there are unique insights and new information, from the perspective of national policy makers, academics, and NGOs. Each session of the workshop contains the rapporteur's information on the papers and the discussion. Selected papers are then presented. Where only powerpoint presentations are available, the reader may view these at www.pugwashgroup.ca. The report ends with recommendations for ways to move forward on the proposed Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

The global future is potentially turbulent and the presence of nuclear weapons, in the Arctic, on or under the sea, in the air, or in missile bases is a threat to global stability that could be eliminated. The opportunity exists now to start negotiations for the Arctic to be a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). There are already seven NWFZ treaties under the United Nations, covering the southern hemisphere and some north of the equator such as the Central Asian NWFZ. These treaties are flexible to accommodate the needs of each region, but all require non-possession, non-deployment, non-manufacture, non-use, and these commitments must be verifiable and of unlimited duration. After ratification, these treaties must go through the legislative machinery of the nuclear weapon states for recognition, and assurance that the region will not be the subject of a nuclear attack. This NWFZ would be the first of its kind, encompassing only northern territories of sovereign nations, rather than the entire country. The challenges on the path to an Arctic NWFZ are formidable, as both the United States (Alaska) and Russia are nuclear weapon states (NWS). The Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), possibly motivated by Denmark's initiative in putting the goal of an Arctic NWFZ into their foreign policy, or Iceland's intention to become a nuclear-weapon-free sovereign state, should start now on informal bilateral and multilateral discussions, and seek commitment by all NNWS in the Arctic.

We wish to realize the goal of active involvement of circumpolar governments in the process of creating an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Program convenor,
Adele Buckley
On behalf of Canadian Pugwash

Keynote Address

Revisiting the Hiroshima Declaration:

Can a Nordic-Canadian Nuclear-weapon-free Zone Propel the Arctic to Become
a Permanent Zone of Peace?

Notes for an Address to a Canadian Pugwash Conference
Policy Imperatives for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
October 26, 2012

Thomas S. Axworthy
Secretary-General of the InterAction Council

INTRODUCTION

I want to begin, not only by thanking Adele Buckley for her invitation to speak at this conference, but for her long-standing dedication to the cause of a peaceful Arctic. Few represent better than she the spirit of Albert Einstein who admonished us that, “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” Adele’s career is a shining example of the truth that we have to learn to think in a new way about the environment, about our definition of security, and most important, about the scourge of nuclear weapons.

The Pugwash Group, of which she is such a prominent part, has dedicated itself since 1957 to using the expertise and moral authority of science to persuade humankind of the folly of relying on weapons of mass destruction. As the manifesto of Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein - which led to the inaugural meeting in Pugwash, Nova Scotia - proclaimed “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

So Pugwash has been devoted since its founding to injecting into the hard-headed discussion of peace and war the dimension of moral choice. Indeed, the determination of scientists to ensure that our leaders did not make their nuclear choices in a moral vacuum was there from the start of the atomic age.

In 1939, it was Albert Einstein, fearful that Hitler might use the achievements of German physicists to get the bomb, who urged Franklin Roosevelt to begin a research program on the military implications of the recently discovered process of nuclear chain reaction. Roosevelt eventually created the Manhattan Project and America built and dropped the bomb. But before the decision was taken in 1945 to incinerate Japanese non-combatants, scientists – including some who had helped Einstein write his 1939 letter – petitioned the decision-makers of the Manhattan Project that instead of making an attack on Japan without warning it would be better to either explicitly warn the Japanese about the extreme danger facing them or even to publicly demonstrate the power of the bomb. In June 1945, for example, the Franck Report recommended “a demonstration before representatives of all the United Nations on a deserted or barren island.” This advice was rejected. In July

1945, a second attempt was made: 70 scientists connected to the Manhattan project tried again by petitioning President Truman “that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan given an opportunity to surrender.” This advice was also not heeded.

THE LONG DIFFICULT ROAD OF THE CRITIC

Critics, especially of the prevailing nuclear orthodoxy, however, must get used to being rejected. I know this from my personal experience as an advisor to Pierre Trudeau. Throughout his career, Mr. Trudeau was preoccupied by the nuclear menace: he began his tenure as Prime Minister in 1968 by pledging to rid Canada of the nuclear roles and weapons that had previously been acquired as part of our NATO and NORAD commitments. The agreements that allowed the United States to store and use nuclear weapons on Canadian territory were rescinded. Mr. Trudeau could therefore declare that: “We are thus not only the first country in the world with the capability to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so, we are also the first nuclear armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear weapons.” The five non-nuclear NATO members (Italy, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey) currently allowing US nuclear weapons on their soil may wish to consider the Canadian precedent.

Having unilaterally divested Canada of nuclear weapons, Mr. Trudeau next turned his attention to the global arms race. In 1977, he made a speech at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament advocating a strategy of “nuclear suffocation” in which he called for a comprehensive test ban to impede the development of nuclear explosives and a prohibition on the production of fissionable materials for weapon development. Today, thirty-five years later, we are still waiting for the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and progress continues to stall on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. In 1983, during Mr. Trudeau’s so-called “Peace Mission,” he continued to advocate a “strategy of suffocation,” this time recommending a ban on the testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems to prevent an arms race in outer space. Alas, today, China, India and Russia are attempting to join the United States in developing an advanced anti-satellite capability. We are exporting our arms race to the heavens.

Statesmen, like Trudeau, at least can commit their own countries to a given track, even if they cannot persuade the superpowers. Think-tanks, NGOs, or advocacy groups like Pugwash do not even have that satisfaction. In 1987, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev in his famous Murmansk Speech unveiled a proposal for an Arctic Zone of Peace. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, which had long advocated a nuclear-weapons-free Arctic joined forces with the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, the Ottawa working group of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, and the Canadian Arctic Research Committee to develop a proposal for a new cooperative Arctic Council, whose agenda would include peace and security. When the dust had settled in 1996, the eight Arctic states had indeed created an Arctic Council, but had excluded one specific topic from the agenda – security – the very reason that so many NGOs and aboriginal leaders supported the idea of the Arctic Council in the first place. To quote Einstein again, “Perfection of means and confusion of ends seem to characterize our age.”

THE HIROSHIMA DECLARATION

The Interaction Council of Former Heads of State and Government was formed in 1983 by Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan and Chancellor Schmidt of Germany. Since that time, the Council has consistently advocated nuclear disarmament. Meeting in Hiroshima in 2010, the Council added its voice to the efforts of groups like the Global Zero Commission, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the Middle Power Initiative, Mayors for Peace, Pugwash, Scientists for Peace, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Jennifer Simons, whose foundation is a major backer of the Global Zero Commission, took the initiative, along with the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, to organize in February 2011 a conference entitled, "Humanitarian Law, Human Security" that eloquently captured the essence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement with the simple phrase: "Nuclear weapons are incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity."

Currently Co-chaired by Jean Chretien of Canada and Chancellor Vranitzky of Austria, and aided by distinguished experts like Sam Nunn, former chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, the InterAction Council met in Hiroshima, Japan in 2010 where the former leaders met with the Hibakusha, the survivors of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima (one man even remembered as a small boy seeing the US aircraft arrive over his city). "Speaking for Hiroshima, in memory of those who fell and those who still suffer the lingering injuries of nuclear attack," the Council declared, "As long as anyone has nuclear weapons, others will seek them."

Revisiting the Declaration only two years after its issuance makes for solemn reflection. The New START Treaty was ratified in 2011, committing Russia and the United States to a significant reduction in nuclear weapons over the next seven years. This is excellent news. But the InterAction Council also called on states to commit to a no-first-use policy, yet NATO for the moment still clings to its traditional nuclear posture. Nuclear weapons systems should be taken off high alert, the Council urged, but in response to US ballistic missile defence installed in Eastern Europe, Russia has threatened to expand its high alert policy. Similarly, the Council emphasized the problem of nuclear terrorism and "loose nukes" but only this week, Russia announced that it might not renew the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Program, which has effectively destroyed over 7600 nuclear weapons. The much heralded Joint Data Exchange Centre to share early-warning data on missile launches remains unrealized 14 years after President Clinton and President Yeltsin proudly announced it. The Council also called on states to abstain from modernizing their forces, but such modernization of their nuclear forces continues apace. Horizontal proliferation in North Korea and Iran continues. We are fast losing momentum in the effort to move to zero nuclear weapons.

THE ARCTIC AS A ZONE OF PEACE

The Hiroshima Declaration recognized the basic point that if we are truly to move to a nuclear-weapon-free world, we need to replace competitive arms races with the notion of

common security. This will take time but the strategy the InterAction Council recommended is to move on short, medium, and long-term benchmarks simultaneously. As part of that approach, the InterAction Council recommended that the Arctic Council should begin to discuss security issues within its mandate and that a possible nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Arctic should be one of the items examined. The InterAction Council asked, in effect, if Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 vision of an Arctic Zone of Peace could be realized.

A nuclear-weapons-free zone is a commitment by countries in a specific region not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Countries in nuclear-weapons-free zones commit to a total absence of nuclear weapons either through not acquiring them themselves or allowing nuclear weapon stationing by a nuclear weapon state. The onus of responsibility falls most heavily on the states that make the commitment to abide by the non-nuclear weapon rules and create verification systems to monitor compliance. The main responsibility of the nuclear weapons states is to respect the wishes and norms of the states taking the non-nuclear weapons pledge.

Five such zones, comprising 100 countries, exist today (Latin America 1967, the South Pacific 1986, Southeast Asia 1997, and Africa and Central Asia both created in 2009).¹ In effect, nuclear-weapon-free zones quarantine the nuclear weapons virus to those states so unwise as to sanction their use. The value of such zones in strengthening non-proliferation and promoting the global zero objective is obvious. This year for example, is the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world so close to nuclear annihilation. That crisis was precipitated by the Soviet Union placing nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba: the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin America, whose protocols have been ratified by all five nuclear weapon states, ensures that Latin America and the Caribbean will never again be subjected to such nuclear brinkmanship.

The InterAction Council suggested for its medium-term strategy, that the Arctic might be a worthy candidate for similar nuclear-weapon-free status. But it recognized that the Arctic is not Latin America in that two nuclear weapon states (the USA and Russia) are part of the region. So a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic necessitates major changes in the existing nuclear weapons postures of the two nuclear superpowers. That is the bad news.

The good news is that the Arctic is an excellent place to begin implementing a philosophy of common security since progress towards that end has been so rapid since the end of the Cold War. Rather than nuclear-armed Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles deployed under NORAD to strike Russian Bear bombers flying down from the high Arctic – which was the northern defence policy when I first arrived to work in Ottawa in 1967 – today, the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff hosts fellow northern chiefs of defence (including Russians) at Goose Bay to discuss cooperative support measures for emergency management. The Arctic Council announced a new Search and Rescue Treaty in 2011 and is currently working on a similar formal undertaking on possible oil spills. Whatever stall or freeze there is on the US-Russia restart button for arms control, on cooperation in the North, Russia is a real leader. We should build on this goodwill by creating, perhaps within the Canadian-Polar Commission and its Russian counterpart, a bilateral task force to expand links and mutual learning on

¹ In addition to these zones, Mongolia became a one-state nuclear-weapon-free-zone in 2000 (recognized by the UN General Assembly), and the Antarctica Treaty (1959), the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Seabed treaty (1972) prohibit nuclear weapons in the respective areas they cover.

subjects like permafrost, sea ice, and transportation corridors like the Arctic Bridge through Churchill Manitoba. Currently, Canada, Russia, and the United States cooperate trilaterally in the air/sea, search and rescue exercises, and Canada must make urgent investment in equipment and training to ensure that we can meet our obligations in the new Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement. Moving to Global Zero requires Russia as an enthusiastic partner and the place to start is in the Arctic.

The Canadian Pugwash Group in 2007 took the lead in issuing a call for an Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone comprising the territory and waters north of the Arctic Circle. However, as Pugwash noted, such a zone would impact Russia's nuclear capability far more than the United States' because the Russian nuclear submarine fleet is stationed in the Kola Peninsula. So one of the questions this conference must address is: if the burdens of a nuclear-weapon-free zone disproportionately affect the Russian military, what incentives could be offered to them to make such a zone a real possibility? Second, if, as Pugwash has recommended, Canada should declare its own nuclear-weapon-free zone, which includes the waters of the Northwest Passage, what capability would Canada have to build to detect nuclear submarines in our waters, and if we could detect them, what would we do about them? The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea privileges freedom of the seas including the rights to innocent passage, and most of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones recognize this. But you need a robust verification system to distinguish between permitted transit and prohibited deployment.

One way to avoid the complexities of dealing directly and immediately with Russian and American nuclear bases in the Arctic is to concentrate first on a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. During the Cold War, Finland consistently advocated for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone. In the late 1980s a Nordic senior officials group examined the concept. In 1993, the Nordic Council recommended establishing such a zone. In 2010, a draft law on an Icelandic nuclear weapon-free zone was submitted to the parliament of Iceland, and in 2011, the Danish ambassador for disarmament H.E. Theis Truelsen, spoke to the first committee of the United Nations saying "Denmark believes that we should explore how the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones, including in the Middle East and the Arctic, could become an integral element of a comprehensive multilateral strategy to implement global nuclear disarmament."

Denmark, of course, like Canada, Iceland and Norway, is a member of NATO, an alliance that relies on a nuclear deterrent. A NATO debate about its nuclear strategy, therefore, is a precondition to any nuclear weapon free zone, but I am optimistic that this debate is underway.

NATO's May 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review stated "the alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons." With this principle now established, it is not a bridge too far for NATO to commit to a no-first-use doctrine and to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, as the InterAction Council has recommended. With that accomplished, it should be possible to accommodate Iceland, Denmark and Norway, none of whom allow the storing of nuclear weapons during peacetime, if they wish to declare a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Finland and Sweden, members of the Nordic Council but not NATO, should also be members. Like the Nordic countries, Canada does not allow nuclear weapons on our territory. So six Arctic

countries already fulfill the conditions necessary for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Recognizing this, Larry Bagnell, a Member of Parliament from Yukon, in 2011 proposed a Canadian nuclear-weapon-free zone as a private members bill. Once the Nordic countries and Canada create a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the United States and Russia could be invited to eventually join. At a minimum, a Nordic-Canadian nuclear-weapon-free zone, valuable in itself, would also ensure that the Arctic dimension would at least be considered in future Russian and American arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Thus, in applying the framework of the Hiroshima Declaration, there are many short-term steps that can be taken in the Arctic to enhance confidence and build concrete cooperation around areas like search and rescue capabilities. Medium-term, the creation of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, on the way to an Arctic nuclear free zone, would be a real benchmark towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Long-term, the Hiroshima declaration supports the five point plan of the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, which calls on states to commit to negotiating a nuclear weapons convention to eventually ban nuclear weapons all together. Over 600 members of the Order of Canada – myself included – have urged Canada to take the lead in bringing states together to begin to seriously examine what such a convention will require. The House of Commons and the Senate have also unanimously called for such an initiative.

In any such nuclear-weapon-free world, verification will be key. Great Britain and Norway are showing the way with a joint initiative on Nuclear Warhead Dismemberment Verification. Canada once had tremendous expertise in the technical arts of verification: in the 1983-84 peace initiative I referenced, Canadian experts were then some of the most knowledgeable in the world on the anti-satellites issue. We need to again build up such expertise within the Departments of Foreign Affairs and National Defense, especially for verification in the Arctic. Technical expertise in disarmament and arms control must once again become a core strength of Canadian foreign policy and in implementing a philosophy of common security we can join with our Russia and other Arctic Council partners to build a robust multilateral response to the security challenges of the 21st Century. Canada has a constructive role to play, especially in the Arctic, of moving the world towards global zero.

Pugwash, the InterAction Council, and host of other organizations have done their best to educate the world about the horrors of nuclear war. Together, we must never stop working to honour the pledge on the Memorial Cenotaph in Hiroshima's Peace Park: "Let all the souls here rest in peace, for we shall not repeat the evil."

THOMAS S. AXWORTHY

Senior Fellow with the Munk School of Global Affairs and Massey College, University of Toronto



Presented by Canadian Pugwash Group in cooperation with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa and the Rideau Institute

Thomas S. Axworthy has had a distinguished career in government, academia, and philanthropy. Early in his career, he served as Senior Policy Advisor and Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, before leaving politics to teach. In 1984, Dr. Axworthy went to Harvard University as a Fellow of the Institute of Politics at the Kennedy School of Government. He was subsequently appointed visiting Mackenzie King Chair of Canadian Studies. In 1999, Dr. Axworthy helped to create the Historica Foundation to improve teaching and learning of Canadian history, becoming its Executive Director until 2005. To recognize his achievements in heritage education (he initiated the Heritage Minutes), civics, and citizenship, Dr. Axworthy was invested as an Officer of the Order of Canada (2002). In 2003, he became Chair of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, pursuing the themes of expanded human rights and responsibilities, democratic reform, Canadian-American relations, and modern liberalism that characterized his research, teaching and advocacy career. He is a distinguished senior fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs and a senior fellow at Massey College. Dr. Axworthy was recently appointed Secretary General of the InterAction Council of Former Heads of State and Government.

Session 1: Status of the Circumpolar Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and Other States with Arctic Interests

Officials or analysts from the non-nuclear weapon states give the present policy of their government on Arctic NWFZ, and if it has none to date, outline what conditions would be required to make progress. Each of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland is already effectively a nuclear-free state, but none of them has initiated relevant negotiations with other circumpolar Non Nuclear Weapon States. Policies of nuclear-armed states UK and France are presented, in relation to the potential for an Arctic NWFZ.

The government of Denmark has had a policy statement in support of Arctic NWFZ since fall, 2011; Iceland's parliament is considering legislation to make that country nuclear-weapon-free. What are next-steps that could be taken now by any government?

1.1 Report, Session 1

POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON- FREE-ZONE

October 27, 2012 Ottawa, Canada

Moderator: Peter Jones [University of Ottawa, Canada]

Panel Speakers: Thordur Oskarsson [Ambassador to Canada, Embassy of Iceland], Jean- Marie Collin [PNND, Policy Expert, France], Rob Van Riet [World Future Council, UK; Nuclear Abolition Forum]

By Rapporteurs:

Peter Meincke [Royal Commonwealth Society] & Adele Buckley [Canadian Pugwash]

PETER JONES, stressed the growing importance of the Arctic, the territorial claims and the need for special confidence building measures. Although the lessons learned from other NWFZ's were helpful, the differences with the Arctic require different approaches. The fact that the Arctic involves two nuclear weapons states requires substantial changes. He asked if it could be done without verification, and suggested it was not likely. Also, NATO would have to make substantial changes to its policies. He stressed the need for smaller countries to promote such a zone.

Papers

AMBASSADOR THORDUR OSKARSSON outlined the security policy of Iceland, beginning with its role as a founding member of NATO, and emphasizing the ongoing importance of NATO as a 'priority pillar' of its security. The bilateral defense agreement with the United States, another 'priority pillar', modified when the U.S. withdrew their military in 2006. Within these agreements, Iceland, though it has no military of its own, benefits from air surveillance, collective defense and cooperative arrangements for Search and Rescue, and natural disaster response.

Since 2011, Iceland has been developing a refined and new foreign policy for the Arctic, identifying it as a new 'priority pillar'. In summary, the Arctic Policy is to promote and strengthen the Arctic Council, securing Iceland's interest as an Arctic coastal state operating under the rules of UNCLOS, cooperating with states and stakeholder in the Arctic region, safeguarding economic, environmental and societal interests, and to oppose and work against any militarization of the Arctic.

Iceland views the Arctic Council as playing a central role in circumpolar cooperation, and opposes the existence of sub-groups because they work on issues of common interest to every Arctic Council

member including indigenous peoples. This does not preclude possibilities of regional cooperation and Iceland looks to strengthen cooperative activities with Greenland and the Faroe Island, and suggests extension of such a region to Northern Canada.

The Icelandic Coast Guard has responsibility for environmental threats and challenges, as a result of increasing economic activity. The risk of military confrontation is seen to be very low, and in 2009, a Government Manifesto laid down a broad national security policy, with a goal of full implementation by the end of 2012. Included therein is

“Iceland will be declared a nuclear weapon free zone and the Icelandic government will support nuclear disarmament internationally”

This is the culmination of a history of several decades of proposals and draft laws for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the country, and covers land, air, sea and under sea, and all of Iceland’s EEZ (exclusive economic zone). Nevertheless, Iceland strongly supports indivisibility of security under NATO. Iceland therefore is making a serious effort to become a nuclear weapon free zone, but the issue of an Arctic nuclear weapon free zone is unlikely to be under discussion as an element of Icelandic foreign policy. Amb. Oskarsson concluded by noting that “we exploit the opportunities by cooperating and we also address the challenges by cooperating.”

JEAN-MARIE COLLIN told the group that France only has a minimal presence, for research in the archipelago of Svalbard, and no territory in the Arctic. However, the Ministry of Defence includes Arctic strategy in its publications of 2010 and 2011, and implies in its 2008 French White Book that the country must have permanent maintenance of “ a certain level of external action” in defence of its interests based on an “arc of crisis”. In the 30-year prospective plan, 2012, the Arctic is seen as a potential zone of conflict over resources. The economic interests of France in the Arctic (marine transport, fishing, oil and gas) are expected to be more and more important.

France has had an Ambassador for the Arctic since 2009, is seeking support from the littoral states for unrestricted freedom of access to the Northwest Passage, and has brought this to the attention of the previous Canadian government. The Lisbon Treaty (entered into force in 2009) includes mutual defence, and mutual assistance in the case of disasters. Solidarity with EU states would include Denmark, the only EU member to have Arctic territory.

French submarines, armed with nuclear weapons, carry out missions in the Arctic Ocean every year. The French nuclear fleet of three SSBN class submarines also had six attack submarines. A significant number of French troops in the 27th brigade train in Norway annually for combat in the Arctic. Surface vessels of the French Navy, and surveillance aircraft operating under NATO have roles in the Arctic. A French SSBN can target major cities of Russia (and China). France, a nuclear weapon state, uses its policy of nuclear deterrence to justify its military presence in the Arctic, and it is not difficult to assume that such justifications are also made within the other P5 nuclear-weapon states. Each of the P5 states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) is organizing for an enlarged role in the Arctic – but why must they bring their nuclear weapons to the Arctic?

[RECENT NEWS – Jean-Marie Collin, in March 2013, announced publication of his book “Stop the Bomb”, co-authored with former French Defence Minister Paul Quilès and former French Tactical Air Force Commander Gen. Bernard Norlain]

ROB VAN RIET focussed his presentation on the United Kingdom’s nuclear policy and the Arctic. David Cameron’s interest in the Arctic pre-dated his time as Prime Minister. He visited northern Norway in 2006 because of his sense of urgency about climate change. Since most if not all countries state that their Arctic policy is to pursue cooperation, not confrontation, the British government reflected this policy by publishing a report, 2012, on Protecting the Arctic, and expressing concern about

reconciliation of future oil and gas extraction with the necessity to limit global temperature increase to 2 deg. C.

Although British troops train for cold weather warfare, a leaked Ministry of Defence paper reported that Britain was 'woefully unprepared' for Arctic warfare. However, its policy of continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence anticipates the Arctic as a potential area for operations. There are four Vanguard-class submarines armed with Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles with delivery from multiple independent re-entry vehicles. However, nuclear disarmament activists are encouraged by the cuts [160 operational nuclear weapons to 120 NW], a potential signal to the larger NWS that Britain can accept decreased reliance on nuclear deterrence.

The British submarines are based in Glasgow, Scotland. There is a plan for a referendum on Scottish independence in late 2014; it is known that post-separation, Scotland would want to be nuclear-weapon-free, but would be likely to join NATO. The UK House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, October 2012, discussed the effect that a separation would have on terminating Trident. With the cooperation of the Royal Navy, a speedy and safe removal of nuclear weapons would occur, creating "the prospect of unilateral nuclear disarmament being imposed on the UK, since the construction of facilities elsewhere could take upwards of 20 years."

Scotland extends significantly into northern waters, but it is not an Arctic state. Nevertheless, in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, a NATO Watch Briefing Paper, October 2012, has recognized that there could be a Nordic NWFZ including Scotland and the five non-nuclear weapon states.

Discussion

TOM AXWORTHY suggested using Nordic countries as a step to an Arctic NWFZ. He pointed out that there have been major changes in Russia and there is need for NATO discussion on what has to be agreed. How does one press NATO to change its policies? He cautioned not to bring in the matter of Scotland's campaign for separation, and interest in being free of nuclear weapons, into the discussion at this point.

ALYN WARE pointed out that UNCLOS puts some restrictions on free passage. Since the Law of the Sea (LOS) is that the oceans be reserved for peaceful purposes, he asked - what is the relationship of the potential for an Arctic NWFZ to the committee deliberations of UNCLOS? He pointed out that the LOS requires that the oceans shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.

PETER JONES stressed that NATO is very reluctant to tackle the nuclear issue, because it would be divisive. He hoped that there were other ways to keep the alliance together. At the recent NATO meeting in Chicago, they refused to discuss nuclear issues, even though Germany's new fighters are not nuclear capable and it is closing the nuclear bases.

JEAN-MARIE COLLIN pointed out that France's nuclear force, independent since 1974, can be used within NATO. There is concern about Germany.

ROB VAN RIET felt that the NWFZ has to be seen in the context of NATO.

AMBASSADOR OSKARSSON felt there was no possibility of a NATO resolution. The independence of Greenland could be a factor. He reiterated that Iceland is furthest along the path to being a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He also pointed out that the Nordic Council was going to discuss security and urged caution about contravening the second article of UNCLOS.

ADELE BUCKLEY mentioned that Denmark's 2011 Arctic policy in support of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was more like a long term goal than a priority. There remains a possibility of beginning low-key intergovernmental discussions with the other Nordic countries.

Responding to **PIERRE JASMIN'S** question about Iceland's position on observer status for China and the EU, **AMBASSADOR OSKARSSON** said yes to China as an observer.

ROB VAN RIET said that public interest was non-existent. He pointed out that Sweden is not in NATO and could proceed independently. He felt that nukes are the glue that holds NATO together and it is essential to find another "glue" in order to make progress toward a non-nuclear NATO.

PETER STOETT said that there should be a link to the Arctic Council, because its existence was part of the context

TOM AXWORTHY felt there was a chance for an Arctic NWFZ because NATO is in play. There is overwhelming opposition to China joining especially among aboriginals because of the way China has treated its aboriginals.

DENNIS BEVINGTON noted that China is already perceived as being involved in the Arctic and membership on the Arctic Council is necessary, because the Arctic Council members must deal with its active presence.

AMBASSADOR OSKARSSON agreed that public debate is totally lacking on nuclear issues, and the Arctic agenda is so overloaded that it is hard to introduce anything else.

PETER JONES asked how do we move NATO forward so members can step out to form a NWFZ? Civil society, such as this group, can contribute constructive ideas. He asked – what role can this group play?

1.2 Thordur Aegir Oskarsson, Ambassador to Canada, Embassy of Iceland

Subject of this panel:

Status of the Circumpolar Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and Other States with Arctic Interests

- **the present policy of their government on Arctic NWFZ , and if it has none to date, outline what conditions would be required to make progress.**
- **Denmark, this has not yet entered into policy decisions? The government of Denmark has had a policy statement in support of Arctic NWFZ since fall, 2011.**
- **What are next-steps that could be taken now by any government?**

To begin with I thank for the opportunity to be a part of this panel and inform you about the official policy of Iceland relevant to the topic under discussion, a nuclear weapons free zone for the Arctic.

Bear with me as I will dance a little around kernel of the panel topic in order to give you a picture of where Iceland stands with reference to the security issues in the High North.

First a brief historical context.

Iceland is in a unique position in many aspects when it comes to security.

It is a nation with no military but still is a founding member of NATO, an alliance that has evolved immensely since it was established 60 years ago. This is well manifested in the new Strategic Concept of NATO from 2010 which apart from collective defense tackles new threats and challenges such as climate change and security implications stemming from this change.

It is important to note in this context the evolution of the Alliance is not confined to military operations but cover also natural disaster response and relief operations through its Disaster Co-ordination Centre. It is, as you are aware of, engaged in various peacetime activities, of which one is of particular importance to Iceland, air surveillance in and around the island on a regular intervals. As the NATO membership is one of the pillars of our security this activity is of great importance for Iceland as well as for the organization' s situational awareness.

Iceland has always be one of the strongest proponents of NATO basic principle of indivisibility of members security.

Further pillar of our security policy is the bilateral defense agreement with the United States. From 1951 to 2006 was embodied in a military base in Iceland. This changed in 2006 when the US unilaterally withdrew their military after 55 years of presence. This agreement has undergone a significant adjustment with a Joint Declaration that was signed after the US departure and provides for cooperation areas such as Search and Rescue and defense exercises that address some of the risks and challenges that are associated with developments in the High North.

(Bilateral MOUs and dialogues on security and defence)

Currently we are looking to a new priority pillar in our foreign policy, the policy on the Arctic.

As you present here are acutely aware of, the importance of the Arctic region in international affairs has increased exponentially in recent years on account of the debate about climate change, natural resources, continental shelf claims, social changes and new shipping routes. Changes are not new to the Arctic but globalization and the rate and extent of current changes causes concerns and will demand strong and effective tools of diplomacy and cooperation.

Since the first settlement of Iceland in the 9th century Icelanders have based their livelihood on the offerings of the Arctic nature, both from the land and the sea. This remains much the current reality. Our economic well-being and livelihood is and will continue to be shaped by the natural riches and climatic conditions of the North. My country, therefore, has vested

interests in the Arctic - be those of economic, environmental and societal nature, or related to security.

The Icelandic Parliament –Althingi – approved on the basis of the proposals by Mr. Ossur Skarphedinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs in March 2011 a comprehensive policy on Arctic issues with the aim to secure Icelandic interests with regard to the effects of climate change, environmental issues, natural resources, navigation and social development. This policy stresses the importance of strengthening relations and co-operation with other states and stakeholders in facing and responding to the emerging challenges and opportunities in the region.

Iceland's Arctic Policy is founded on twelve key principles. Let me try to summarize.

The principles include:

- promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council as the most important consultative forum and decision-making body on Arctic issues;
- securing Iceland interests as a Coastal state within the Arctic region; resolving differences that relate to the Arctic on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;
- developing agreements and promoting co-operation with other states and stakeholders in the Arctic region;
- safeguarding broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region through civilian means
- and to work against any kind of militarization of the Arctic.

For Iceland the Arctic Council is the key forum for circumpolar cooperation as it includes all the eight Arctic States and Permanent Representatives from six organizations of Arctic indigenous peoples. The Council is coming of age, taking on a more affirmative role as an effective tool for circumpolar diplomacy and actions. More states and organization are applying for observer status, underlining the increased international interest in the region and the central role of the Arctic Council.

Transparency and cohesiveness are key factors for the success of any organization. Some of the Arctic Ocean coastal states have sought to establish a consultative forum for Arctic issues without the participation of Iceland, Finland or Sweden or representatives of indigenous peoples. If we dilute the Arctic Council work by creating selective bodies to handle issues of common interest, we as the circumpolar community will lose more than we gain. Iceland is resolutely against any such attempts.

This view does not preclude possibilities of some regional cooperation as we have in the Barents region and among the Nordic Countries. One of the tenets of Iceland's policy framework is to strengthen cooperation with Greenland and the Faroe Islands on Arctic issues regarding trade, energy, resource utilization, environmental issues and tourism. Such

cooperation could be extended to the Northern Territories of Canada thus facilitating stronger North to North cooperation.

The Icelandic Arctic Policy, in essence promotes a comprehensive view of the region, which we believe is necessary to address the challenges that may emanate and have potential security implications. Although, as others, we see economic opportunities in the receding of the ice cap, the opening up of alternative sea routes and the potential extraction of minerals, gas and oil, we are also much aware of the related threats and challenges. These are not military threats or challenges and in fact, Iceland deems the risk of military confrontation in the Arctic as extremely low.

The challenges and threats are rather environmental and connected with increased economic and marine activities in the Arctic, be those related to oil production or other resource developments, increased transportation of oil and gas, increased traffic of cruise ships or accidents of some sort.

For an island nation, which is highly dependent on what the sea around us has to offer, an environmental disaster in the Arctic, for example an oil spill, or nuclear or radiations pollution could have colossal and lasting effects on Iceland's ecosystem, fish stocks and biodiversity in general.

The Arctic Council is successfully addressing many of these security challenges to which the recent Arctic SAR Agreement and the Oil Spill Agreement bear witness.

Iceland has recently undertaken various practical measures to meet the multi-dimensional challenges rising from developments in the Arctic.

As Iceland does not have a military or military capabilities, the Icelandic Coast Guard has the main responsibility for marine security related tasks. This covers Search and Rescue, both maritime and aeronautical, tracking of vessels, maritime border control and environmental protection.

The goal is to ensure that the Icelandic Coast Guard has the capability to be an active and reliable contributor in enhancing maritime safety, maritime security and environmental preparedness and protection in some of the toughest marine areas in the world.

To reiterate, Iceland has direct interest in the peaceful, stable and secure development of the Arctic and sees the leading role by the Arctic Council pivotal in that development. The Arctic countries have expressed strong willingness to cooperate within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and have actually long standing experience in resolving disputes over natural resources in a peaceful manner.

However this comprehensive effort can and should be supplemented through focused bilateral cooperation on specific issues between the Council members. Iceland sees ample scope for developing such a bilateral and regional cooperation with Canada on many aspects of the wide ranging issues of the Arctic North, in particular economic and cultural issues.

Let me narrow the focus and approach more concretely the topic of this panel.

In its manifesto from 10 May 2009 the Government of Iceland laid down its security specific goals.

First relevant statement in the Manifesto is as follows:

“Work will continue on formulating a security policy for Iceland based on the country's own risk assessment in close co-operation with neighbouring nations and other allied states. The Icelandic Defense Agency will be reviewed, together with air space surveillance, having regard to the emphases in a risk assessment report for Iceland. Efforts will be based on a comprehensive concept of security, emphasizing collective international security”.

Since we deem above mentioned challenges regarding the developments in the Arctic relevant to our security in the widest sense, the Parliament at the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Iceland has acted upon this Government' s goal and is currently developing a broad national security policy to be finalized before the end of this year. This national security policy will be based on the fact that Iceland has no armed forces and also on a definition of the security concept which takes into consideration global, social and military risk factors, including environmental threats, epidemics, organized crime, cyber security and economic threats.

However, of most relevance to the discussions we are having here today is the following point in the Government Manifesto:

- Iceland will be declared a nuclear weapon free zone and the Icelandic government will support nuclear disarmament internationally.

Allow me to elaborate a little on this policy goal.

The interest in declaring Iceland a nuclear weapons free zone has a long history in Iceland and I believe that the in the past 3 decades or so 4 proposals for a parliamentary resolutions and 10 draft law bills have been introduced in Althingi, our Parliament. The last draft law was introduced in October 2010 and its main objective is to have Iceland declared as an area where stationing, storage, transit or any introduction of nuclear weapons and any other nuclear material is forbidden whether it is on land, in air on or under sea including the whole of Iceland exclusive economic zone.

The Arctic is not mentioned in the text of the draft law or the Government Manifesto. However there is a reference to such Arctic wide efforts in the supporting text.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs concluded in its comments on the draft bill that inclusion of a a ban of transit through the its territory, visits of nuclear powered vessels and transit of vessels carrying fissile material and nuclear waste would contravene Article two of the UN Law of the Sea Convention about peaceful transit

The conclusion in the Parliament on the draft law on nuclear free Iceland was to send it to the Government for further decision. The Government subsequently decided to refer it to

the Parliamentary Committee that is currently working on a national security strategy for further elaboration in that context.

It will be interesting to see what the outcome will be and regrettably I'm unable to provide you with any insights on that at this stage.

In effect Iceland has been nuclear weapons free zone for a long time. Political statements to that effect have been declared by former prime ministers and this policy was clearly stated in a agreed a resolution of the Althingi from 23 May 1985 and is still very much valid.

In 1987 the foreign ministers of the 5 Nordic countries authorized a study on the feasibility of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone. The main conclusion was that such a zone was not in the interest of the region due to the membership of three of five participants in NATO which deterrence strategy was based on the mix of nuclear and conventional weapons.

However, the big caveat to all discussion on nuclear weapon free zones is the fact Iceland is a full member of the NATO and therefore by definition responsible for its defence and security policy that builds on the inclusion of nuclear weapons as necessary part of its military strategy. As I said before, indivisibility of security in the NATO region is a major principle for Iceland. This is further reinforced by the fact that as nation without military we depend on other NATO members for our military security.

NATO itself has never addressed NWF in the Arctic and is not expected to do so. Before the agreement of the new Strategic Concept we witnessed different emphasis among the Allies in how to address the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe. It is not unlikely that the issue will surface in the future, although it can be argued that the energy regarding nuclear weapons issue is directed in totally different direction than North.

In short, the issue of Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone has not been discussed to any extent in Iceland. The discussions have been limited to Iceland itself. The awareness of potential nuclear disaster is though strong and will undoubtedly be part of the national security strategy discussion, as well as the draft law on nuclear weapons free zone for Iceland.

It is absolutely clear that Iceland has strong vested interest in the peaceful, stable and secure development of the Arctic Region. As outlined above there are both great opportunities and serious challenges emerging there. Simply said, we exploit the opportunities by cooperating and we also address the challenges by cooperating.

The institutional and legal framework is in place and the nations represented in the Arctic Council have a solid history of good cooperation in the area. Iceland, again, has no military, but we bring other points of view and capabilities – equally important - to the table

We are very much in favour of raising awareness of the security developments in the Arctic as clearly manifested in the Manifesto of the Icelandic Government.

This conference brings up an issue that can only inform and guide our debate on security challenges.

1.3 Jean-Marie Collin, PNND Coordinator for France Policy of Nuclear Weapon States in Arctic: The case of France

In the Arctic region, France has no territory, thus its presence is very low and only scientific (archipelago of Svalbard, with a permanent research base Jean-Corbel established in 1963). But anyway, for politic, diplomatic, military reasons, it's clear that France want to play a real role in the Arctic region in the next months / years.

Publications on defence:

Also as you know, there is a key element who shows that France, with these institutions, Think tanks have an increase is interest for this topic, it is the number of publication:

Thus, Ministry of Defence, military and geopolitics press, L'institut des Hautes Etude de l'Ecole militaire, school of the future chiefs of the French army, multiplied the topic on the Arctic:

- Les Cahier de la défense Nationale: « *L'Arctique, théâtre stratégique* »², October 2011
- Cols bleus, « *La marine et les pôles* », revue of French marine national, 27 February 2011,
- Bulletins d'étude de la marine, « *Les Pôles* », n°47, Le Centre d'enseignement supérieur de la Marine, 2010

But I want to assure you, to remove a doubt, the question of NWFZ is never addressed. The subjects are about the question of sovereignty, military cooperation's between arctic states, the right of way, the boundaries,

But two major publications speak for the first time about the question of Arctic:

- The French white book: Published in 2008 this document shows and indicates the defence option about policy, military means necessary for the 10 years. In this book the Ministry of Defence indicates "*in its White Paper on Defence and National Security, the Government reaffirmed the vocation of France to permanently maintain a certain level of external action necessary to ensure the defence of its interests and assume its responsibilities*". This document defines the strategy of French military action. It is based on an "arc of crisis" which goes from the Atlantic to Central Asia. Even the Arctic and Antarctic zones are not explicitly indicated, it's clear that this arctic zone is included.

In addition, this new white paper is now talking about security outside but also internal security. Therefore, according to a commander of a nuclear submarine ballistic missile, the stability of the Arctic region contributes directly to the security of France because "the distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant. Security must take into account all the factors, risks and threats that may affect the life of the nation. "France should not forget that the Arctic is primarily

² I wrote on this book the article « *Arctique, un territoire en recherche de souveraineté* »

an ocean. As such, she has a vested interest and a role to play. French interests in the Arctic are economic and strategic.

- The 30-year prospective plan is a document very strategic. It is published by the DAS, Division of Strategic Affairs. This agency of the Ministry of Defence is responsible for future action plans of France and is directly involved in the negotiation of treaties, conventions and regimes of non-proliferation. This document, the 30-year prospective plan, was published in April 2012. It aims to inform the preparation of armament programs, identify key factors and the risk of operational and technological breakdowns. For the first time such a document indicates the Arctic as a factor in the crisis: "In some cases, access to scarce raw materials and crucial to the development of certain technologies could trigger seizures in areas currently preserved (Siberian Arctic).

On the political level:

It should be noted that this issue begins to grow in importance

Rocard was appointed in March 2009 as Ambassador, responsible for international negotiations on Arctic and Antarctic Poles. He is the author of the Madrid Protocol, adopted in 1991, which prohibits exploitation of mineral and energy Antarctica until 2041

The appointment of Michel Rocard as Ambassador to polar issues has broadened the scope and voice of France in diplomatic spheres. Former Prime Minister heard his claims (such as freedom of navigation in the Northwest Passage west) and concerns (environmental safety). He also met many members of civil society, members of organizations Arctic. He wants new governance where "*coastal states agree to bind with non-residents of the rest of the world*"

Along with this active diplomacy, France, has interfered in the various regional forums Arctic:

- Member observer in the Arctic Council (an intergovernmental forum established in 1996), it has changed its status by becoming an associate member. A position that will allow him to fully participate in working groups (six in number) with the title "Emergency prevention, preparedness and response."
- Observer member, present at the Council Barents Euro-Arctic (non-governmental forum established in 1993), which urges its members to develop cooperation in the field of environmental protection and to take account the role of indigenous peoples.

Impact of Treaty:

France is bound by 3 majors treaties that have a direct connection with the Arctic:

- NATO member, France will be in the obligation (article 5, North Atlantic Treaty) to react, alongside its allies (Canada, Denmark, Norway, United States), against any military crisis: "*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them*

in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them”.

- Member of the EU, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (entered into force on 1st December 2009) strengthens the defence and solidarity links among members of the EU (so between France and Denmark, only EU state to have Arctic territories). The treaty establishes, among Member States two new clauses: A mutual defence clause (article 42.7) in that it states “*if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power*”. The second clause is the solidarity clause (article 222) is applicable in relation to a crisis within the EU (so in Greenland) if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack, victim of a natural disasters or a man-made disaster (like an *oil spill caused by tanker accidents*).
- Nuclear Weapon State: this area is strategic for the French nuclear deterrence particularly for its submarine component. The Strategic Oceanic Force comprises four nuclear submarines, though currently only three are operational (*Le Triomphant*, *Le Téméraire*, *Le Vigilant*) deploying nuclear missiles and also includes six *Rubis* class nuclear attack submarines. The Defence ministry recognized that each year, the French submarines carry out missions in Arctic.

Economy:

It is obvious that the economic interests of France (marine transport, fishing, oil company, gas ...) in the Arctic will become more and more important. This will require for French companies a total freedom of navigation, constituting an issue of safety and security. Of course, the dreaded risk is not some act of piracy but “*the opening of new trade road in the North and the emerging tensions between the countries bordering the Arctic for exploitation of any oilfield us [Ministry Defense] are aware of the challenge posed by securing access to resources.*”³.

French military Capacity:

However, the armed forces have got the know-how and the military capacities to intervene in *extreme climatic* conditions (like the Polar Regions) as shown in the minister’s answer of parliamentarians:

The Army has an expertise named the “Great Cold” with the 6000 soldiers of the 27th brigade of infantry of mountains (27e BIM). It is based in Grenoble and soldiers are trained to operate in mountains and in extreme climatic conditions. This brigade regularly carries out a specific training in the areas close to the North Pole, in particular in Norway. In addition, it takes part, every two years, in the Norwegian exercise “Cold Response”, whose objectives are to include a tactical staff of 800 men operating with specific materials within the combat in Arctic zone.

³ Allocution du CEMA Jean-Louis Georgelin, au colloque du Conseil économique de la Défense intitulé « L'Europe de la Défense de demain : pourquoi et comment ? ».

In addition, the *High Mountain Military Academy* at *Chamonix* has a specialized team in charge of trying out the new materials and the specific procedures in environment very cold.

Every year, the Navy realizes operational deployment of a unit of surface. Each new unit carries out a deployment in Arctic area before being allowed to be in active service (this is currently the case for the Frigate *Chevalier Paul*).

The French air force has also some "cold capacity". She has acquired this capacity through the realization of various exercises carried out beyond the polar circle:

- With the U.S. Army (Red Flag exercises in Alaska in August 2008 and April 2009 for *Mirage 2000* and Tanker Aircraft *C135*).
- With NATO (Cold Response 2009 and 2010).

France also ensures, sharing that role with the others allies of NATO surveillance missions of the Icelandic airspace (first mission in 2008), and similar mission in the 3 Baltic States Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (operation Air Baltic in 2007 and 2010).

French nuclear deterrence:

The Arctic is a very important area for a nuclear weapon state like France. Our deterrence strategy nuclear capacity is based on a second strike. It is based on four nuclear submarines. There is always one at sea, another in exercise near the base.

Our submarines carry sixteen missiles capable of reaching a target at 10 000 Km. Each missile M51 can carry between 6 and 10 nuclear warheads. In addition to these four SSBNs, France has 6 nuclear submarine Attacks. And this submarine realize also some mission in arctic

The Arctic is a strategic area for submarines, since they regularly patrol both watch "the adversary" (Russian) for sailing in extreme conditions such as to simulate the conditions of ballistic missile

The Arctic is an ideal place for our country. From this area, the French submarine can target everywhere in the world. So, from the ocean, a French SSBN can pose a threat of nuclear retaliation in all major cities of Russia and China. I'm sorry to appoint these two countries, but it must be clear and lucid, that French missiles didn't target Madrid, Washington or London.

For all this reason, France nuclear weapon state has a role in arctic. For the Minister for Defense, "France has military capacities right now enabling him to intervene under the extreme conditions of the polar zones if the evolution of the strategic situation requires". France is thus ready!

1.4 Rob Van Riet

The United Kingdom and the Arctic [see www.pugwashgroup.ca/]

Session 2: Governance of the North on the Path to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Arctic

In the changing North, could there be new developments in governance that would be concurrent with and useful for the negotiations toward an Arctic NWFZ? Would the idea be welcomed? Or considered to be a distraction? Are there connections with human security, environmental security and traditional state security? Considering the history that prompted the ICC⁴ Resolution of 1983, should there be mandatory inclusion of indigenous peoples in all Arctic NWFZ negotiations?

2.1 Report, Session 2

POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON- FREE-ZONE

October 27, 2012 Ottawa, Canada

Moderator: Adele Buckley [Canadian Pugwash]

Rapporteur: Alyn Ware [Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament [PNND]]

Panel Speakers: Dennis Bevington [MP NDP Western Arctic, NWT]; Shelagh Grant [Trent University] presented by Nicole Waintraub, [University of Ottawa]; Mayra Gomez [PNND]

By Rapporteur: Alyn Ware [Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament [PNND]]

Summary of presentations:

DENNIS BEVINGTON:

Arctic has not featured in parliamentary debates. There have been some committee reports, e.g. Defence Committee on Surveillance, Aboriginal Affairs Committee on Development and Natural Resources Committee on Resources (but not much reference to oceans).

New opportunity with Canada taking chair of Arctic Council. Foreign Affairs Committee will be considering Canada's role as chair of Council and related issues.

Key issue- Should we consider Arctic on national, regional or global perspective.

Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region – only 3 Canadian parliamentarians on it.

SHELAGH GRANT:

Increase in shipping in Arctic ocean and resource extraction (mining) create increased risks in Arctic. Chinese have just completed transit without icebreaker through northern route – close to north pole – rather than southern route (which is longer and goes through Russian waters incurring transit fees).

Priorities:

IMO⁵ reach agreement on mandatory Polar Code

Method for cleaning up oil spills be developed

Arctic Council be strengthened to be managing authority

Adding NWFZ proposal to Arctic Council could be divisive and hurt other efforts for collaboration and regulation building on environmental protection measures.

⁴ ICC Inuit Circumpolar Conference

⁵ IMO International Maritime Organization

MAYRA GOMEZ :

Basis of international law from Dum Diversas (1452), Romans Pontifex (1455) and Doctrine of Discovery. Gave rights to acquire territory and extract resources and enslave peoples for benefit of colonizing countries. This also included Terra Nullus (unoccupied).

Concept of State sovereignty has been built from this doctrine – with no relation to rights of indigenous peoples.

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples has outlined that this doctrine continues to today. Past wrongs from this doctrine have not been corrected.

Multinational corporations are given legal rights (as people) but not same responsibilities. Respect of rights of Indigenous peoples are still being sought by them.

Arctic is new frontier in this framework. Rules based on State sovereignty conflict with rights of indigenous nations.

International instruments:

UNDRIP 2007 – Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

ILO 169 on Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in the Independent Countries 1989.

There are other relevant instruments on human rights, elimination of racism etc...

Recommendation: Arctic declaration to be included the World Conference on Indigenous People (2014)

Questions and Responses, Session 2:

Question: Significance of traditional knowledge?

TOM AXWORTHY: Canada taking on chair of Arctic Council. Provides opportunities. Proposes to extend funding resources of Arctic Council to include more funding for indigenous participants in Council.

Response: **DENNIS BEVINGTON:** Maybe observers (e.g. China) could bring more resources to the Council.

Question: Would Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region be a useful forum to raise the Arctic NWFZ?

Response: **DENNIS BEVINGTON:** Yes. It meets every two years. It would be very useful to float a proposal that then the parliamentarians can take back to their parliaments.

Question: In opinion that Arctic NWFZ proposal is divisive in Arctic Council and strengthening of cooperative approaches to Arctic management: has there been a look at the negotiations of the Antarctic treaty or 1959 where the alternative argument won, i.e. that it was better to develop a cooperative security approach across all aspects – environmental and military – than have cooperative on one and competitive on another?

Response: Too much on plate of Arctic Council and adding military aspects could be a wedge.

2.2 Shelagh Grant, presented by Nicole Waintraub
Comments for Discussion at (Session 2) on the Arctic as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
[Slides see www.pugwashgroup.ca]

* Title Slide (1) Although Shelagh Grant endorses the proposal to make the Arctic a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, new information and recent events suggest that there may be other issues of higher priority. As she is unable to attend the workshop, she has submitted her comments for discussion.

*Slide 2 (Xuelong) The voyage of a Chinese conventional icebreaker last summer should have rung alarm bells for Canada's Foreign Affairs. The Xuelong (or Snow Dragon) sailed from Qingdao on July 2, north and then westward through the Northern Sea Route, arriving at Iceland on Aug 16th. As part of their "Arctic cooperation agreement," the ship assisted Icelandic scientists with oceanic studies, then left Akureyri on Aug. 20th, returning home by way of the high seas through a transpolar route a few degrees south of the North Pole – reaching the Chukchi Sea on Sept 3 – and arriving at Shanghai two days ahead of schedule.

*Slide 3. (arrival at Shanghai) In essence, the successful transit showed that it is now possible for a conventional (non-nuclear) icebreaker to lead a convoy of ice-reinforced cargo ships over the Transpolar Route – a faster link between the Atlantic and Pacific than the Northern Sea Route, and without paying Russian transit fees.

*Slide 4 (route of the Xuelong) At present, there are only voluntary shipping regulations for the Arctic Ocean, no nearby facilities for search and rescue, and as yet no proven means to contain oil spills in icy waters. China's plan to launch a more powerful icebreaker in 2014, coupled with South Korea's plans to send an icebreaker with helicopter to the Arctic next summer, underlines concerns that unregulated Arctic shipping across a transpolar route holds special attraction for Asian countries, posing a more urgent risk to the Arctic environment than the potential use of nuclear weapons.

* Slide 5 (Destination shipping) Increasing destination shipping may pose additional problems. According to NORDREG, total ship traffic in the Canadian Arctic increased 150% from 2005 to 2011, with more on the horizon as new mines and drilling for offshore oil come on stream.

*Slide 6 (Mary River Mine) For example, the proposed Mary River iron ore mine is planning for 242 ship transits a year, to and from a new company port on Foxe Basin. This will include a huge open pit mine covering 17,000 hectares and 150km railway. Total cost is estimated at \$4.5 billion. [*later, additional text*] Arcelor Mittal announced in January 2013 that they were drastically cutting back plans for the Mary River Mine, cancelling construction of the railway, and would be taking ore out by truck to a port on Milne Inlet in summer only. The new plans will first have to receive approval from the Nunavut Review Board.

*Slide 7 (Factory fishing vessel) NORDREG also reported an exceptional increase in large fishing vessels. Canadians are now competing for the offshore fishery, with Inuit now owning, or in part, six large fish factory ships.

*Slides 8 (extent) Meanwhile, last September the sea ice cover reached its lowest extent ever recorded..

*Slide 9 (composition of sea ice) Moreover, the composition is changing. The older ice is rapidly disappearing and the rate of melt is likely to further accelerate, because of the methane gas released by the melting permafrost.

* Slide 10 (break up of polar ice cap) Experts are now predicting that a summer sea route for ice-reinforced ships across a central route may be open within a decade or so – sooner if assisted with icebreakers. Scientists also predict that the ice-free season along the main shipping routes is likely to increase from 30 days in 2010, to 120 days by mid-century.

* Slide 11 (Icebreakers leading oil tanker) As a result of increased mining activity, offshore drilling and ship traffic, we are experiencing an unprecedented onset of Arctic industrialization -- far ahead of the coastal countries' ability to implement policies and seek binding international regulations. As a result, Shelagh Grant suggests the following issues should be considered top priority:

*Slide 12 (text slide)

1. that the International Maritime Organization be urged to seek agreement, as soon as possible, on a mandatory polar code for the Arctic;
2. that a method of cleaning up oil spills in icy waters be tested and proven effective as soon as possible and hopefully before further offshore drilling for oil takes place;
3. that the Arctic Council be restructured with a broader mandate and expanded authority, to gain acceptance as a legitimate governing body for the Arctic region;
4. that fish stocks in Arctic waters be studied and regulations established for commercial fishing on the high seas;
5. and that all Arctic countries be urged to acknowledge that both the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route are internal waters and not international straits.

*Slide 13 (NW P, TPR and NSR map) The status of the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route is last on the list, because it seems logical that once a central sea route through the Arctic Ocean opens up in the summer for conventional ice-breakers to assist commercial shipping, the argument that the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route are international straits will become redundant. Shelagh strongly disagrees with those who still believe that the breaking up of the polar icecap is a long way off, but agrees that ship transits will continue to be hazardous, thus the need for strong territorial and international regulations.

Since the circumpolar region encompasses eight nation states, it seems ineffective to have one country adopt the NWFZ and not the others. As a mutual binding agreement would likely be best negotiated through the Arctic Council, raising the subject before the Council is restructured and its mandate strengthened would likely be a distraction, as it would require the United States to drop their objection to discussion of military matters.

Similarly, since both the United States and the Russian Federation consider defence of the Arctic critical to their national security, it might be unwise to introduce a potentially

divisive proposal to the Council at a time when solidarity and cooperation of the eight countries will be imperative to protect the fragile Arctic environment.

* Slide 14 (text) As we witness an unprecedented industrialization of the Arctic, Shelagh reminds us that Arctic sovereignty is not just a legal right, but it also bears responsibility for the people and their environment

*Slide 15 (The end) Meanwhile, the sea ice is melting – rapidly! Thank you

**2.3 Mayra Gomez, Changing the Climate of Global Insecurity [see www.pugwashgroup.ca]
“Nothing about us...without us!”**

Indigenous Peoples constitute the oldest living cultures in the world. Today, about five hundred million Indigenous Peoples live in the 193 States of the world, and they comprise at least 5,000 distinct peoples. Their ways of life, identities, well-being and their very existence is threatened by the continuing effects of colonization and State-national policies, regulations and laws that attempt to force them to assimilate into the cultures of majoritarian societies.

The fundamental historical basis and legal precedent for these policies and laws is the "Doctrine of Discovery", the idea that leading European countries, enjoy a moral and legal right based on their religious identity (Christian) to invade and seize indigenous lands and to dominate Indigenous Peoples. The patterns of domination and oppression that continue to afflict Indigenous Peoples today throughout the world are found in numerous historical documents such as Papal Bulls, Royal Charters and court rulings. For example, the church documents *Dum Diversas* (1452) and *Romanus Pontifex* (1455) called for non-Christian peoples to be invaded, captured, vanquished, subdued, reduced to slavery and to have their possessions and property seized by Christian monarchs. Collectively, these and other concepts form a paradigm or pattern of domination that is still being used against Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, the Doctrine mandated European countries to attack, enslave and kill the Indigenous Peoples they encountered and to acquire all of their assets.

These oppressive doctrines are not quaint relics of yesterday; they are found in today's regulations, policies and court decisions in which States claim to have “extinguished” the rights of Indigenous Peoples to their lands, territories and resources, their right to self-determination, their languages, religions and “even their identities and existence through the notion of ‘recognition’, that is by recognizing some and not recognizing others as indigenous,” says the report. “No other peoples in the world are pressured to have their rights extinguished.” The enormity of the application of this law and the theft of the rights and assets of Indigenous Peoples have led indigenous activists to work to educate the world about this situation and to galvanize opposition to the Doctrine of Discovery, which was the theme for the 11th session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) in 2012.

The Arctic is new frontier in this framework. Contemporary international law is still not showing willingness to fully implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which affirms the basic collective rights of indigenous peoples in a

number of common concerns, under the framework of the general principle or right to self-determination. Yet the same contemporary international law is rapidly advancing the practice of legally recognizing inherent autonomy to multinational corporations by giving them legal rights and few responsibilities. Today, member States of the UN, have the obligation to engage with Indigenous Peoples at the earliest stage of any decision-making process that affects them, in order to obtain their Free, Prior, and Informed Consent. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, specifically mentions the principle five times (Articles 10,11,19,28, 29). The duty to consult is further reflected in Articles 19 and 32. ILO 169 Article 6 also requires that consultation with Indigenous Peoples be carried out through institutions that are representative of Indigenous communities, and specifies that Indigenous people should control the process by which representatives are determined.

Indigenous Peoples' struggle is for justice, and for everyone's common future. It is important to remain firm in solidarity with the defense of their rights to self-determination in their communities, territories and culture for the coming generations. Global society must call for respect of Indigenous Peoples' customs, traditions and land tenure systems and echo the UNDRIP's demand that states rectify past wrongs caused by the doctrines of domination - Article 28 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

As we move toward the UN's Post 2015 Development Agenda, we must remain vigilant that nuclear energy arguments take full account of all externalities such as the radiation and contamination of land and waters. In relation to the nuclear industry, we note that to this date, Indigenous Peoples have not been included in any of the negotiations on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones to date, which have been conducted primarily by governments with the help of UN agencies.

Session 3: Arctic Cooperation vs. Arctic Militarization

While every circumpolar nation declares their intent to cooperate, and to live by the rulings of UNCLOS, military buildup and joint military exercises continue. In the light of opening of the "new" Arctic, how does this affect the intention to deploy nuclear-missile equipped submarines, surface vessels, missile bases and nuclear-weapons on aircraft? Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland [plus NWS United States] are members of NATO, a nuclear alliance. How does this affect the ability of NNWS to negotiate and conclude an Arctic NWFZ for their territories? Would Russia be more pliable in this cause if NATO was notably absent from the Arctic Ocean and environs? The Search and Rescue Agreement of May 2011 is a model – what other cooperative agreements are in sight?

3.1 Report, Session 3

POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON- FREE-ZONE

October 27, 2012 Ottawa, Canada

Moderator: Alyn Ware [PNND]

Panel Speakers: David Harries [Royal Military College; Foresight Canada]; Steven Staples [Rideau Institute]

By Rapporteur: Pierre Jasmin [Université du Québec à Montréal]

The first speaker was **DAVID HARRIES**, a nuclear engineer whose vast experience of the North due to his numerous assignments as a Canadian army officer profited those at the round table not familiar with the Arctic environment. His presentation focused on five Rs: reflections, reactions, responses, realities and recommendations. To summarize, SWOT, but in somewhat reversed form: strength, threats and weaknesses which create opportunities.

1- **Strength** - A new Arctic policy would enable Canada to set best principles and practices ahead for the 21st century, for example by giving priority to expertise of the North by aboriginal people: *this point was met by a strong nod of approval by Mayra Gomez from the Aymara/indigenous people (Bolivia).*

2- **Realities and threats** – Dr Harries cited, among others, polar opposites such as immense geography vs scarce population; extreme climate vs environmental fragility; natural resources both living and mineral, sought after with eagerness, with very few NGOs present to double check environmental hazards or abuse. Fire departments are simply equipped with bulldozers because of non-existent water which would anyway change instantly into ice if it was used to put out fires.

4-**Weaknesses** – Polar opposites in summer and winter: days that are 24 hours either consisting of 100% daylight or ...night, a reality to which it is extremely difficult for non-experienced soldiers or researchers to adapt. A bit fed up with cute polar bears' photos, Dr Harries cleverly showed us, instead, a pitch-black slide to help us understand the reality of three full months a year without daylight.

5- **Opportunities** - Arctic cooperation should not be defined **versus** militarization; it should go hand in hand with military cooperative missions. For example, the Canadian army has engaged 19 aboriginal military cadets for a whole year's training with extremely various but interesting results. On the 20th of August 2011, there was a tragic plane accident 8 kilometers away from Resolute Bay; thanks to abundant daylight and to the presence of military rescue teams in the vicinity, a quick and efficient successful rescue mission was organized to the benefit of the stranded passengers, who would have been doomed without the lucky conjunction of these two elements.

Second speaker **STEVEN STAPLES** started his presentation with homage to Michael Wallace. He also thanked Michael Byers for a good description of circumpolar challenges and lauded the Arctic Council's vision, which encompasses every subject, except military security which is left to NATO or NORAD.

A NWFZ in the Arctic will prove very difficult to achieve. On one side, Russian submarines are making their expeditions from the Murmansk harbor, which is geography-wise an integral part of the Arctic ocean. On the other side, American submarines are now more abundant than in the Cold War period, equipped with 43% of their nuclear missiles. For the Russian submarines, the proportion stands at 23%. Mr Staples' own favorite photo of a polar bear looking with amazement at a submarine emerging nearby proves to be a chance meeting of two species, one which should not and one which should become extinct in the Arctic Ocean. To that effect, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones look great, except they never forbid **transit** by armed submarines or vessels; they only try to control their **patrolling**, along with an interdiction of launched missiles' exercises.

If New START has had a positive effect, it seems cancelled with the American obsession to achieve an anti-missile shield, which proves to be until now only a great way to gobble a lot of research money, thus making it a military firms' favorite. But monitoring does not appear to be close to succeed, as was demonstrated by a July 2009 incident showing a Russian nuclear submarine emerging near some American military vessels which had been utterly incapable of even detecting its presence, proving how inefficient radars, let alone missile shields, are.

[Panelist **ELIZABETH MAY**, MP and leader of the Canadian Green Party, was unable to participate due to illness and sent her regrets.]

Question period. Dr Harries also worried about the possibility of serious accidents even from friendly subs hitting each other (minor incidents were reported) or smashing themselves on rocks in the bottom of the sea.

Pierre Jasmin thanked Dr Harries for a realistic presentation much needed to actualize his own Glenn Gouldian “idea of the north” and proceeded in bringing back the “versus militarization” subject, by first remembering the Brian Mulroney-Kim Campbell ill-fated \$6 billion Augusta helicopters, which a Canadian firm (Paramax) was supposed to equip with heavy torpedoes designed to sink Russian submarines; on one hand, this equipment would have made them too heavy to land as foreseen on frigates, on the other hand a “successful” bombing would have created an environmental nightmare in the fragile Arctic ecosystem. His second question addressed the F-35, unable according to reports to land on the short arctic landing strips, also subject to a rapidly melting “pergélisol” due to climatic changes. Mr Staples answered by objectively stating that Lockheed Martin was busy (\$\$\$) designing parachutes that would decelerate enough their F-35 planes in such landing procedures.

Erika Simpson mentioned threats posed by simply transporting nuclear waste on barges: recently such a plan was averted by Pugwashite and Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility president Gordon Edwards’ diligence and by a united stand by American senators and Canadian mayors opposed to a federal plan to transport nuclear waste from Bruce nuclear power station to Sweden through the St Lawrence river.

On the subject of Arctic night, Canadian Forces officer Stephen Murray offered us his fond memories of his mission in the Arctic region in February 2006, where, even in daylight, he could not see objects a short distance away, which Inuit colleagues could easily see, thus offering his support to the first reflection of his colleague Harries about a constant need of aboriginal experience.

3.2 David Harries, Arctic Cooperation vs. Arctic Militarization [see www.pugwashgroup.ca]

Special Report to the Arctic NWFZ Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in a Future World without Nuclear Weapons (WWNW)

Presenter: Stephen Murray [Dept of National Defence, Canada]

Report on 1 of 4 Scenarios, for the year 2040, considered at Thinkers’ Lodge, Pugwash NS, in August 2012, as part of an exercise in Strategic Foresight

By Rapporteur: Adele Buckley [Canadian Pugwash], with Stephen Murray

STEPHEN MURRAY said that, in this scenario, a world without nuclear weapons is based upon a gradual expansion of NWFZs. The group concluded that, in 28 years (2040) making incremental changes along the way would be an ongoing task amongst states participating in the zones. This scenario represents a point during an incremental expansion of NWFZs

built upon the success of current NWFZs and grounded in the achievement of one of the three likely NWFZs: Arctic, Middle East, or North East Asia. Each of these is different and has specific security issues. One of these zones would need to be achieved in order to create a tipping point that would accelerate the expansion of interlinked NWFZs and reduce the number of NWS. Every newly adopted NWFZ would challenge the role of dominance through nuclear weapons and develop a new view of common security.

In order for this essential development to play out, an intensified cooperation between the zones would need to occur. Leaders of the different countries in these zones would need to push the NWS by being better advocates for a WWNW and working together as a new force in the fight against nuclear weapons. Key items in this scenario:

- preconditions; for example, conventional energy security or reduced reliance on nuclear energy through technological modernization;
- identifying broader social, population, demographic, and food issues as potential influences in building regional blocks through changing security dynamics that could encourage or discourage establishment of the tipping point NWFZ; and
- other positive and negative drivers changing security dynamics and the calculus of state interest such as:
 - overall progress toward a legal ban on nuclear weapons could positively influence the perception of status from possession of nuclear weapons toward renunciation; or regional nuclear weapons use or a serious nuclear power 'accident' could function as positive or negative drivers toward NWFZ establishment by encouraging new possessors or renouncers.

The overall the key to the group's discussion was achievement of a WWNW through incremental progress, which suggests identification and pursuit of short, medium and long term goals.

Session 4: Proposing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Arctic in the Geopolitical Environment

Examine the possible pathway toward partial NWFZs in the Arctic, e.g. Nordic, Nordic + Canada. What are the impediments to a cooperative agreement between the NNW states on a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Is it likely that such an agreement would pressure the U.S. and Russia to begin work on the NWFZ, for the Arctic alone? Likely time scales? What is the effect on NATO membership?

4.1 Report, Session 4

POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON- FREE-ZONE

October 27, 2012 Ottawa, Canada

Moderator: Peter Stoett [Concordia University]

Panel Speakers: Alyn Ware [PNND], Jean-Marie Collin [PNND France], Erika Simpson [Western University]

By Rapporteur: Rob van Riet [World Future Council]

PETER STOETT opened the session as moderator by placing developments in the Arctic, whether they are of a militaristic, environmental or commercial nature, in a wider geopolitical context. Stoett noted that in the media there is talk of a possible arms race in the Arctic and that it is seen as a region where US-Russian tensions may rise and come to a clash. Environmental/eco geopolitics is also playing out in the Arctic as a variety of environmental-related crises are converging in the region. In this context, the concept of environmental justice luckily seems to be gaining some ground. To provide the panel with a framework for its discussion, Stoett identified a number of pathways forward and considerations to take into account:

- Prospects of cooperation between the Nordic countries and Canada on advancing an Arctic NWFZ.
- Political will to make a push to get security considerations on the Agenda of the Arctic Council.
- With the Arctic opening up, more companies will get to work in the region – among these will most likely be private security companies.
- Even if political agreement on the establishment of an Arctic NWFZ would be attained, concerns on verification would need to be seriously examined and quelled.
- An important eco-politics issue is prevention of a major fisheries crisis.

ALYN WARE raised the question of what type of NWFZ would be appropriate for the Arctic. To inform the discussion on this question, he gave an overview of existing zones and identified potential “lessons learnt”.

The **Antarctica Treaty** bans both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. When it was found out that the United States still operated a nuclear reactor (McMurdo), the US removed it out of embarrassment. As such, verification and enforcement was carried out through the norm embedded in the Treaty. Although the Antarctica Treaty demilitarizes the region, this does not mean that the military is not involved in certain activities in the region. The same would apply to a demilitarized Arctic.

With regard to the **Tlatelolco Treaty** (Latin-America), Brazil, Argentina and Cuba initially did not join. Nevertheless, negotiators kept the door open to these countries, kept them informed, and made it clear to them that they did not have to join immediately. Eventually, they did join the Treaty. As such, the process to establish a NWFZ should aim for inclusion, but does need all parties to join from the get-go. An interesting aspect of OPANAL (the organization set up with the zone) is that in addition to being tasked with monitoring the zone, they also promote the zone in the context of achieving a Nuclear Weapon-Free World. In addition, OPANAL is used as a forum for regional security deliberations.

With establishment of the **South Pacific NWFZ**, there were some difficulties with French Polynesia, as it was part of France. Allied relationships, i.e. ANZUS, also proved to be challenging, and so when Australia was brought in, the ANZUS nuclear deterrence arrangement was modified (via 2nd Protocol), not ended.

The **South-East Asia NWFZ** gives some insight into how to deal with nuclear navy (ships and submarines). The Treaty does not prohibit transit. The ban on transport is extended to the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone and this is why the 2nd Protocol has yet to be signed by

the 5 NPT nuclear weapon States. For an Arctic NWFZ you could prohibit transport through territorial waters (12 miles), but not extend it to include the EEZ (as with Tlatelolco).

With the **proposed North-East NWFZ** (based on the 3+3 model), the zone looks at NWS (US, Russia and China) and non-NWS (Japan, South Korea and North Korea) and differentiates its obligations accordingly.

JEAN-MARIE COLLIN noted that as an EU and NATO member, France has an interest in the Arctic. More specifically, an Arctic NWFZ would be seen to affect France's "force de frappe" (nuclear deterrent). In addition, French companies are involved in the Arctic, working on nuclear energy issues, and considering how France sees nuclear energy as one of its core businesses, the focus of an Arctic NWFZ should be on weapons, not on energy, if France is to support such a zone. There have been some discussions recently on the changing Arctic environment in the French Parliament.

Collin also noted that the publication of Paul Quiles's (former French Minister) book "Nuclear – a French lie" has for the first time opened and stimulated the domestic debate on what, if any, role nuclear weapons play in France's security.

ERIKA SIMPSON underlined the need for multilateral and unilateral confidence building measures and appropriate institutional machinery in achieving both a nuclear weapon free Arctic and a nuclear weapon free world. In addition, she highlighted the importance of individuals (e.g. Head of States) in all major social causes – this would also apply to nuclear disarmament.

Simpson also raised the possibility of initiating (in Canada) a parliamentary enquiry, debate or motion on an Arctic NWFZ.

She noted that the big elephant in the room is that the Arctic is still in many ways the theatre for the stand-off between the United States and Russia. Russia sees the Arctic as a key strategic asset (considering it is where their nuclear submarines are based and manoeuvre) and as such, a sea-change in Russian-US relations would need to occur. Referring again to the importance of individuals in moving these issues forward, the re-election of Obama is a condition for such a sea-change.

Simpson then turned to the question of how NATO ties in with an Arctic NWFZ. She noted that for NATO the major issue that is currently being debated is the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from European soil (possibly in return for the removal of Russian tactical nuclear weapons). The Arctic is not on NATO's agenda. This begs the question: do we need to bring NATO along in our efforts to establish an Arctic NWFZ?

Ending on a sobering note, Simpson noted that a major crisis or disaster – such as the Fukushima disaster or the Cuban Missile Crisis – may be needed to get all political players moving on achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

In the Q&A session, the idea arose to pursue a UNGA Resolution initiating a UN Study on an Arctic NWFZ, as a way to move the agenda forward.

Session 5: Insights & Workshop Recommendations for Action

The goal is to summarize the potentially useful insights and information developed during the day and then to consider next steps.

POLICY IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON- FREE-ZONE

October 27, 2012 Ottawa, Canada

Moderator: Pierre Jasmin [l'Université du Québec à Montréal]

Panel Speakers: Rob Van Riet [World Futures Council]; Steven Staples [Rideau Institute], Adele Buckley [Canadian Pugwash]

By Rapporteur: Professor Erika Simpson ,Western University

The final panel “**Insights & Workshop Recommendations for Action**” was attended by about twenty persons. It featured three keynote speakers as well as an extensive discussion with the audience reflecting Arctic security themes. The discussion on recommendations for the future also contributed to the final session of the workshop.

The first keynote speaker **ROB VAN RIET** was introduced by the moderator, Pierre Jasmin, as the Coordinator of the World Future Council’s Disarmament Programme; the Coordinator of the United Kingdom’s branch of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; and as a director of the Nuclear Abolition Forum since its founding in 2011.

Mr. Van Riet highlighted general and specific objectives and concerns of WFC’s disarmament programme with special attention to developing NWFZs. He addressed conceptual issues surrounding how parliamentarians could be further educated and empowered on this issue. He highlighted the urgency of affecting the upcoming chairmanship by Canada of the Arctic Council. He suggested roles and initiatives that could be undertaken by individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Pugwash, in Canada, and the international community. He also emphasized the importance of mobilizing parliamentarians to become more active. Accordingly, he drew the group’s attention to the imperative of understanding and opposing NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons as ‘the glue for the alliance’. He argued that it would be good to think about not relying on nuclear weapons as some sort of glue that keeps the alliance together, particularly since so many other institutions (e.g. NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly) as well as NATO’s own diplomats and bureaucrats engage on a variety of other issues, apart from issues concerning NATO’s outmoded nuclear weapons.

In his wide-ranging overview of many aspects of his international involvement in anti-nuclear work and his involvement in working with parliamentarians from around the world, Mr. Van Riet drew attention to problems ranging from the lack of discussion about nuclear weapons in NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly to the fact that little is known about what Canada will bring to the table when it chairs the Arctic Council. He emphasized the need to involve the US-Russia aspect once the upcoming U.S. election had a hand in deciding the direction of U.S. politics. But he also underlined the necessity to engage with European countries in the Nordic Zone, like Sweden and Finland to develop solutions that appealed to North Americans and Europeans.

The moderator then introduced **STEVEN STAPLES**, the President of the Rideau Institute; a long-time member of the Canadian Pugwash Board of Directors; and a frequent commentator on the national media. Mr. Staples has a long history of involvement in campaigns to end the arms race and is well known for his first book, *Missile Defence: Round One* and his second edited volume, *Afghanistan and Canada: Is There an Alternative to War?*

In his analysis of many of the conceptual issues underlying the debate whether to establish a NWFZ in Canada's Arctic, Mr. Staples emphasized the importance of asking ourselves 'what is our vision of success' and 'how will we know when we get there?' He pointed out the imperative of figuring out whether we envision success as a nuclear free zone, a military free zone and/or a nuclear weapons-free zone. Would success mean that a 'model treaty' had been achieved to protect the tundra that was similar to the 1997 draft of a Nuclear Weapons Convention? Was it, indeed, our goal to begin drafting a model Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty?

In his concluding comments and subsequent reply to questions from the audience, Mr. Staples also put forward specific recommendations that this may be the time to pull together a model treaty for an Arctic NWFZ and such an exercise would be valuable but it would be imperative to engage other experts in that process. He also dealt with questions and concerns about the capabilities and range of different types of American and Russian submarines. Dwelling on the academic contributions made by the belated Professor Michael Wallace, Steve Staples encouraged the audience to read the paper they wrote together for a previous Pugwash workshop in August 2007, entitled *Canadian Pugwash Call for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone* which is available on the Canadian Pugwash website.

Mr. Staples's presentation was followed by an extended group discussion regarding the slides and proposals put forward earlier in the day by **ADELE BUCKLEY**, the convenor of the conference. Dr. Buckley took this opportunity to reiterate various ideas she and others had suggested earlier in the day, asking the group for feedback about the relative weight that should be accorded to various future proposals and initiatives. For example, she explained that Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is about to schedule an 'Arctic review'; accordingly this would be an appropriate time to work together with other like-minded groups and individuals to ask the clerk of the Standing Committee to engage with representatives at today's meeting to help conduct a review of Canada's policy in the Arctic. Some discussion followed about who would represent the group. Thomas Axworthy suggested that NATO also be pressed to study issues concerning the Arctic. This led to a lengthy discussion of the merits and demerits of pushing NATO headquarters to spearhead a policy review of its Arctic policy given the history of NATO's review efforts and its historical lack of attention to the Arctic region.

ERIKA SIMPSON was invited to comment upon how NATO might be pressured to study the issue of an Arctic NWFZ and she suggested it would be imperative that the idea of a review of NATO policy be carried forward not by a NGO but by a single government, like Canada or Denmark. Some discussion followed considering the optics of engaging with Denmark rather than Canada, discussion which was governed by Chatham House rules as was the rest of the conference proceedings. Then Dr. Buckley suggested that single zonal states cannot cover the entire Arctic issue alone and it would be useful to involve multinational corporations as well, particularly for contributions to the financing of major infrastructure in the Arctic, as they would be major beneficiaries. This led to considerably more discussion about whether there is any single, overarching process that members of the audience should single-mindedly or like-mindedly attach themselves to.

ALYN WARE strongly suggested that the time is appropriate to draft a model treaty for an Arctic NWFZ. Some of the lessons he learned from working on the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention were that the first draft of our document might be preceded by others working on their own first drafts. It might be that other groups would write something along the lines of the Japanese lawyers, who had first endeavoured to write a Model NWC. It might turn out that our document was more aspirational than practically minded—or it might turn out that we explored the full range of political and technical elements as well as the entire context of how these problems might be resolved in a

negotiating format. In his experience, the initial drafting of the Model NWC proved to be successful because they placed themselves within the context and asked critical questions of the process which proved to help produce a stronger document. It would also be highly useful if we had references to a UN resolution which was a follow-up to the International Court's advisory opinion on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Ware's proposal that we ourselves draft a model document to establish a NWFZ was generally met with restrained and cautious enthusiasm. The highly experienced group were well aware of the obstacles and difficulties so the discussion turned to whether engaging in such an exercise would be valuable because it would engage other experts in the process. Is there any other process that we can attach ourselves to that would bear more fruition given the limited energies and time of the group so this led to more discussion of the work being done to engage parliamentarians around the world. Would it be more efficient and successful to embark on our own process of drafting a model treaty—which could lead to major difficulties and the status quo—or should we continue to 'explore the modalities' and 'test the waters' in Canada and around the world.

After a full day of intense discussions and meetings, preceded by a long evening the day before and complicated travel arrangements, it was generally felt that this was not the moment to decide upon a definite direction and outlet for our energies as a group. Dr. **DALE DEWAR** from Physicians for Global Survival recalled lessons learned about opposing nuclear power when the NPT was not moving forward. PGS resolved to investigate the dangers of nuclear power more fully and this led to work on everything from PGS taking a critical position on the ethics of nuclear mines; considerable work on researching and educating people on the amount of radioactivity they were being exposed to; and a lot of activity on alternative methods to cut off our reliance around the world on nuclear power. This record of successful engagement to oppose nuclear power led Prof. Jasmin to similarly comment on the work *Artistes pour la Paix* had done over the last four years to oppose the Gentilly nuclear power plant, which had paid off very recently in the Quebec government's official decision to close the plant forever.

It was evident that a general consensus on one direction that should be taken would not—and could not emerge—after that day's discussion. Conflicting priorities and issues were involved, taking up each person's time and energy but we could be united in 'different dimensions', according to one representative of indigenous priorities globally. Simply recognizing our commonalities and not our differences on this issue meant we were making significant progress. Just as indigenous people around the world were united in working toward a better world for our children and grand-children, we could be confident that we were working toward a 'global view' no matter what precise direction we might finally decide to take, either individually or as a group. The key factor is to work together on all these connected issues which are 'stepping stones' to a nuclear free world.

General Recommendations for Action

During the Group's extensive discussion during this particular workshop and during all the preceding workshops and speeches, a wide variety of questions and comments were raised. For the sake of clarity, these have been grouped here into five major themes, and general recommendations on future developments that would move the NWFZ proposal forward. A separate section of this report has specific recommendations for action.

Major Themes

5.1.1. The Problem of Russia and US Involvement in the Arctic

One of the principal themes brought forward during the day-long discussion concerned the fact that the United States refuses to confirm or deny where its under-water submarines and ships are deployed in the Arctic--and Russia uses that stance to justify its own secret activities in the Arctic. Meanwhile, countries with actual territory and waters in the Arctic, like Canada must operate in all types of international forums not knowing what is happening in their own sovereign territory and waters.

Many members agreed that the U.S election would indicate the general direction of U.S. policy on all sorts of disarmament issues but there was a chance that if President Obama was re-elected, there could be sudden and quick movement on a range of arms control issues involving Russia and the CD in Geneva. Hopes were high that with his re-election there might be stronger movement toward ratification of a CTBC, another global summit on nuclear weapons, strengthening of the movement toward a NWC, etc. This could imply that strong action could be taken on tackling the problem of US and Russian militarism in the Arctic.

On the other hand, deeper structural problems could arise if members of the international community continued to accommodate American and Russian military interests in the Arctic. The lesson learned from the United States' unilateral withdrawal from Antarctica in the late 1950s was a hopeful one but strong diplomacy and much more prevalent cooperation in the North will be needed--this means that the Arctic needs to be a 'new high priority pillar' (according to the Ambassador from Iceland Thordur Oskarsson) for other countries, like Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway.

In particular, some speakers cautioned Canadians to refrain from making benign assumptions about US intentions in the Arctic, particularly given an Obama victory over Mitt Romney. A Republican or Democrat victory could still mean that nothing much would change given the United States' and Russia's deeply-held militaristic interests in the Arctic. Middle powers, like Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden would have to act in greater concert together to harness Russian and American involvement in the Arctic. But as a whole, the group's sense was that none of these nations (apart, perhaps from Denmark) might be pressured to act more stalwartly on the Arctic pillar of their foreign and domestic policy.

5.1.2. The Importance of Understanding and Tackling the Relationship between an Arctic NWFZ and other established NWFZs

Many emphasized that the history of establishing NWFZs in other regions of the world could impart hope rather than despair. Initially every NWFZ that has been established--eventually spanning over fifty percent of the world's surface--had seemed unlikely to come into being. While it might seem daunting at the beginning, we were already making substantial progress and in hindsight, the story of how an Arctic NWFZ was established would probably reflect similar stories of overcoming opposition that came out of every other NWFZ's inception and eventual widespread acceptance.

Participants noted as well subtle causal relationships between the actions that a wide variety of global actors, including NGOs were taking to help bring about a nuclear-free world, and the actions being taken among the Circumpolar nations to demilitarize the area around the North Pole. Members agreed that the subjective and politicized nature of the debate was such that there might not be complete agreement on whether to work toward an entirely nuclear weapon free Arctic or a nuclear weapon free Northwest Passage--but it was, nevertheless, important to widen the parameters of analysis to include the possibility of establishing an entirely demilitarized Arctic area circumscribing the North Pole. Whether a future Arctic NWFZ was first established on Canadian territory, bridging international waters or simply among indigenous people working together would not matter in the final analysis. It was important to understand the relationship between an Arctic

NWFZ and other already-established NWFZ around the world but how an Arctic NWFZ ultimately came about could depend on a wide range of capricious and unpredictable factors. The 'story' of how it came about might prove to be a long narrative but it would end with a happy ending.

5.1.3. The Role of NATO and the Arctic Council in Bringing about an Arctic NWFZ

There was considerable debate about the efficacy and timeliness of engaging with NATO to consider the possibility of an Arctic NWFZ. Some members of the audience argued strongly that the prospect of engaging with NATO and NATO parliamentarians on yet another review of nuclear policy (similar to the recently-ended *Defence & Deterrence Review*) would be a waste of energy and a similar disappointment to other types of reviews NATO had a penchant for holding. Others felt that as the leading alliance with many member states which shared Arctic territory, NATO was a better organization to grapple with than the Arctic Council, whose mandate prohibited engagement on military issues. While some argued that members of the international community should aim to move the Arctic Council toward considering security matters, others pointed out that this might never happen given the Council's agreed-upon mandate and its consensus-making set-up. The original plan was to include security issues within the Arctic Council's institutional machinery but a 'deal was cut'. This theme led to considerable discussion all day about whether and how indigenous groups would be given full membership in the Council (e.g. given Russia's sudden decision a few days prior to exclude its own indigenous representatives from the Arctic Council's public deliberations). Evidently indigenous members and organizations could and should be fully involved in discussions to establish a NWFZ. Getting the Arctic Council to think broadly in terms of military security might be a non-starter but it might be possible to ask it to consider broader themes concerning human security.

5.1.4. The Importance of Addressing Other Security Concerns within the general framework of establishing an Arctic NWFZ

Members agreed that there were many impediments to a path forward on the Arctic at the same time as concerns were growing about the implications of a Republican government in the U.S., the possibility of a new Cold War emerging, the Chinese taking a path toward nuclear stockpiling, etc. All these types of threats could affect governments' willingness to accept more stringent verification methods and in so doing the possibility of establishing any kind of demilitarized zone in Canada's Far North. In particular, the Canadian government's seeming willingness to condone further militarization of its Arctic had implications for undertaking work in Canada to ask the federal government to sponsor a NWFZ in the Arctic. At the beginning, countries like Brazil and Argentina did not want to join a NWFZ and the lesson they learned was that a regional cooperative forum is possible. Similarly, it would be important to address the security concerns of countries, like Canada, within the general framework of establishing an Arctic NWFZ.

In terms of concrete proposals to address these other security concerns, the discussion returned to the merits and demerits of a Republican versus Democratic regime dominating in the forthcoming U.S. Presidential election. At the same time, there were plenty of examples from other countries of leaders taking the lead on this issue (including the former Foreign Minister of Japan) so there were lessons to be learned from defending other proposals to establish NWFZs around the world. There were a host of lessons learned from past efforts and models that we might be able to obtain agreement upon. 3 + 3 proposals, efforts to bring together both sides of the house, exclusive economic zones merging into prohibitions on the threat or use of nuclear weapons from within the exclusive economic zones, efforts to ban nuclear weapons going through waters, decisions not to allow warships, saying no to nuclear waste dumping....the list could go on and on but the general trend of history was and is toward addressing security concerns within the general framework of establishing a NWFZ.

5.1.5. *The Importance of Discerning the Underlying Reasons for Opposition to an Arctic NWFZ*

Group members spent considerable time discussing the implications of retaining outdated policies of nuclear deterrence, which would have the effect of undergirding opposition to NWFZs. It was apparent to many that countries, like France and the United States would remain opposed to efforts to denuclearize the Arctic so long as they retained such significant reliance upon nuclear deterrence as a policy of threat reduction. For this reason, attention was paid by the audience to news of the United Kingdom possibly reducing its reliance on Trident nuclear systems due to a possible Scottish referendum on separation from Britain. It was felt that the Scottish Assembly's possible endorsement of a nuclear-weapon free Scotland would have significant implications for British nuclear policy because the Tridents are deployed on Scottish territory therefore even if a referendum rejecting separation ensued, it might be possible in the interim to raise questions in Britain, and in NATO as a whole about the ethics and credibility of relying so heavily upon the nuclear deterrent. Questions about the viability and credibility of relying upon nuclear deterrence were being raised more and more worldwide but movement by the United Kingdom—an original P5 member state—might herald more widespread rejection of the principles and tenets of nuclear deterrence.

It was argued that the faulty reliance of policy-makers upon outdated assumptions surrounding deterrence was leading to nuclear proliferation rather than nuclear disarmament. Until these Cold Warriors in Pakistan, India and Canada learned that nuclear weapons would not work in all circumstances; until American and Russian defence policy makers acknowledged that nuclear weapons were expensive and unreliable; and until Canadian and European leaders learned not to rely on extended nuclear deterrence, we were caught in a 'nuclear cage' or 'nuclear jungle'. Accordingly, it should be understood that in the international climate spawned by September 11, those of us who sought a NWFZ in the Arctic would be criticized for being 'unrealistic' and overly 'idealistic'. We would be condemned for being too 'liberal' and too 'progressive'. Moreover we would surely be seen as naïve for overlooking the United States' intention to preserve its own interests in the Arctic, just as we were objectionably naïve about Russian interests in the Arctic during the Cold War years. Yet there seemed to be no other choice. Because we have no other alternative but to work on obtaining agreements and regimes of great import and meaning to others, the members of the group gathered in Ottawa in October 2012, from all over the world, agreed they had no other choice but to move stalwartly forward toward establishing some kind of 'Circumpolar Nuclear Weapon Free Zone'.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ways to move the Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone agenda forward

Circumpolar governments

- **Engage with the World Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region**
- **Propose that the Nordic countries and Canada create a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, as these countries already fulfil the conditions for a NWFZ**
- **Recognize the need for unilateral- and multilateral confidence building measures, and propose action on this to the circumpolar states**
- **Develop concrete proposals that address verification and enforcement of a NWFZ agreement**
- **Engage further members of the legislatures in all circumpolar states**

United Nations

- **By using a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, ask for a UN Study on an NWFZs, with emphasis on potential new zones.**
- **Develop a draft framework of an Arctic NWFZ Treaty**
- **Understand the different frameworks of already-established NWFZs, and seek a relationship with the representative organizations, particularly OPANAL⁶**
- **Support reaching agreement, through IMO⁷ on a mandatory Polar Code**

NATO –related issues

- **Explore ideas that would support NATO members that could be part of a NWFZ**
- **Propose a debate on the subject in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly**

Arctic Council

- **Strengthen the Arctic Council to potentially become a managing authority**
- **Develop more effective methods for cleaning up oil spills**
- **Extend funding sources so that there is more funding for indigenous participants**
- **Approach the Arctic Council to encourage inclusion of broad themes of human security, which should fall under its mandate**

General

- **Work with others (the InterAction Council, Physicians for Global Survival, etc.) to jointly advance proposals for an Arctic NWFZ**
- **Consider lessons learned from the 3 + 3 Proposal by Japan, on the potential formation of a Northeast Asia NWFZ**
- **Set short, medium and long term goals so as to measure progress and achievements toward establishing a NWFZ**

⁶ OPANAL - Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

⁷ IMO – Polar Code, an international code of safety for ships operating in polar waters

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