Latin America and the Quest for Nuclear Abolition: From the Treaty of Tlatelolco to the Ban Treaty

Posted on December 3, 2020Cesar Jaramillo

On February 14, 2014, as the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons came to an end, conference Chair Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo—then deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico—captured the sentiment in the room in the powerful last few words of his closing remarks: in global efforts toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, this conference marked a “point of no return.” His optimistic conclusion was met with a roar of applause.

Hosted by the Government of Mexico in the coastal state of Nayarit, this was the second of three conferences specifically focused on highlighting the catastrophic consequences of any nuclear weapons use—the first and third hosted, respectively, by the governments of Norway and Austria. A key recognition that emerged from this cycle was that a legal prohibition was necessary to remedy the anomaly under international law whereby every other category of weapons of mass destruction had been explicitly prohibited, except nuclear weapons, the most devastating of all.

As Mr. Gomez Robledo explained at the Nayarit conference, “we need to take into account that, in the past, weapons have been eliminated after they have been outlawed. We believe this is the path to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.” Against all odds, and despite the direct opposition of nuclear weapons states and their allies, that path was indeed followed. Nearly three and a half years after Nayarit, on July 7, 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by 122 nations at the United Nations in New York, with Latin American having influenced both process and outcome.

Not only had Mexico played a decisive role in laying the groundwork that led to the historic adoption of the TPNW, but every single state in Latin America participated in the negotiations and voted in favour of adopting the Treaty. Moreover, treaty negotiations were presided over by ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez of Costa Rica, a country that continues to be among the TPNW’s strongest advocates.

More recently, on October 24, 2020, Honduras secured a place in nuclear disarmament history by becoming the 50th state party to ratify the TPNW. When it deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations, Honduras triggered the process that will lead to the Treaty’s entry into force, set to take effect 90 days later. On January 22, 2021, the TPNW will officially become part of international law, and it will bear an indelible Latin American mark.

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Canadian Pugwash Group Submission to GAC Consultation on a Feminist Foreign Policy

Posted on November 26, 2020editor

Global Affairs Canada is conducting a consultation on what should be contained in the “Feminist Foreign Policy” that the Government has promised to produce. Here is the CPG submission to this consultation.

The Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG) is a civil society organization dedicated to responding to existential threats to humanity via harnessing science broadly understood. We welcome the opportunity to provide input into this consultation and our brief will address issues which we believe merit particular attention in formulating a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP): i) conceptual understanding; ii) conflict prevention; iii) disarmament; and iv) peacekeeping.

Conceptual Understanding:

It is important that a FFP is situated in a broader context of an approach to peace and security defined by the concepts of sustainability and commonality. This in turn is rooted in active commitments to a rules-based international system, the peaceful settlement of disputes, global cooperation, respect for human rights and a security concept that places the security of humans at its core. A FFP should progress beyond the focus on increasing the participation of women in conflict resolution and peace operations, to devise policies that promote sustainable peace and common security. In this way the threats to women and girls as well as humans generally can be mitigated or eliminated.

Conflict Prevention:

The prevention of conflict should be prioritized in a FFP over the management of conflict. Government funding should prioritize support for diplomatic and civil society conflict prevention over military expenditure. Greater investment needs to be made in developing effective responses to indicators of imminent violence. Canada in concert with like-minded countries and partners in civil society should work on a variety of tools for early intervention into situations that threaten organized violence. Support for monitoring mechanisms that can warn of impeding crises could be one dimension of a conflict prevention strategy. A FFP should provide for robust mediation capacities which can be deployed to seek peaceful settlements of disputes before they boil over.

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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: NATO’s Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the NPT and the TPNW

Posted on November 26, 2020Paul Meyer

Toda Peace Institute | 26 Nov 2020

For many of the Alliance’s members, the last few years have been difficult ones with respect to nuclear policy. The source of the dilemma has been the advent of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which has presented NATO members with something of a Hobson’s choice. The treaty, which was adopted in July 2017, will enter into force on January 22, 2021 (after reaching its entry into force threshold of 50 ratifications on October 24th). For the first time in global nuclear governance, the TPNW outlaws the possession of nuclear weapons in addition to prohibiting their use or threat of use. It also specifically bans the hosting of any nuclear weapons or related infrastructure on the territory of a state party or the rendering of any “assistance” in contravention of the treaty.

These provisions of the new treaty go significantly beyond the primordial multilateral nuclear governance agreement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force in 1970 and, with 190 states parties, is one of the most widely-supported international security agreements extant. The NPT enshrines a tripartite “grand bargain” whereby the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) of the US, Russia, UK, France and China commit to negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament; the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) foreswear building or acquiring nuclear weapons; and all support peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The nuclear disarmament commitment set out in Article VI of the NPT is rendered in rather general terms (“pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the cessation of the arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament,…) which has enabled the NWS to claim that they are respecting this obligation; at the same time, many NNWS see scant evidence of serious progress on this front. In addition, the NPT allows for the possession of nuclear weapons (en route to their elimination although at times NWS suggest the treaty legitimises their possession of these weapons in perpetuity) and is silent on the use of nuclear weapons. It is these lacunae in the NPT that prompted supporters of the ban treaty to speak of filling the “legal gap” that distinguished the status of nuclear weapons under international law from that applied to the other weapons of mass destruction which were subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties (e.g. the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention).

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Nuclear weapons are a disgrace to humanity. Banning them is the only way forward

Posted on November 24, 2020John Polanyi

Published in The Globe and Mail, Nov. 24, 2020

We know that the danger of nuclear war is real, and we should know that it is increasing. The increase stems from reciprocal threats which inch us closer to the brink. No nation wants war, but fearing that they may be disarmed by an opponent’s nuclear strike, they are under pressure to strike first.

The evidence is to be found in the fact that the U.S. and Russia, with 90 per cent of the existing 13,000 weapons, keep them always ready for firing. Their plans for nuclear “launch on warning” leave minutes for a leader to authorize attack. To ensure prompt action, each leader has the awesome power of decision. Once that action is initiated, it is irrevocable; missiles cannot be recalled. But the evidence of impending attack may turn out to be faulty, and the attack, therefore, a crime against humanity.

It is this predicament that led U.S. President Barack Obama to declare, in the first foreign-policy speech of his presidency in April, 2009, that the United States – the only country to have ever actually employed nuclear weapons – accepted the responsibility of launching an era of nuclear disarmament. He assured the world of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of the world without nuclear weapons.” He spoke hours after North Korea test-launched a long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which could reportedly reach across 8,000 kilometres to the U.S. mainland.

North Korea is only the most recent entry into the supposedly exclusive club of nine nuclear-armed nations. The membership of that club has steadily increased, despite the restraining hand of the 50-year-old UN Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty nonetheless constitutes a vital bargain, committing the original five nuclear-weapons states “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures” for elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

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The nuclear ban treaty is entering into force. What now for Canada?

Posted on November 23, 2020Paul Meyer

Canada needs to be bolder about joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and press NATO by disavowing support for nuclear deterrence.

Policy Options / Options politiques, 23 Nov 2020

On Oct. 24, UN Day, the Central American state Honduras made history. It did so by being the 50th state to ratify the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, thereby triggering the treaty’s formal entry into force, which will occur 90 days hence, on Jan. 22, 2021. On that date, the treaty (aka “the ban treaty”), which was adopted by 122 states when negotiated in 2017, will become a legally binding accord on all of its parties.

Set alongside the existing 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been the key underpinning of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the ban treaty sets out a clear route to achieving the nuclear disarmament goal specified in the NPT’s Article VI.

The ban treaty complements the NPT by providing a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons akin to that applied in the past to the other categories of weapons of mass destruction (namely chemical weapons and biological weapons). By so doing, proponents see the treaty as filling the legal gap that has allowed nuclear weapons to be treated differently than other weapons of mass destruction.

The ban treaty’s prohibitions extend to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which would negate a policy of nuclear deterrence such as that maintained by NATO, which threatens the use of nuclear weapons under certain unspecified contingencies. And herein lies the rub. The nuclear-weapon-possessing states and their allies, including Canada, shelter under their “nuclear umbrella” (the extension of security commitments by nuclear weapon states). These states are committed to policies of nuclear deterrence, and as a result they have rejected the ban treaty from the beginning. They boycotted the negotiations that produced it and have sworn that they will never sign on to it.

Despite its self-identity as a good “multilateralist,” Canada did not participate in the UN General Assembly-mandated negotiation to produce a treaty. Once adopted, the Canadian government was quick to condemn it, stating that “the ban treaty has contributed to a further divide in the international community.” Fundamentally, the government has been unable to resolve the conflict between its support for nuclear disarmament (and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which by the way is also an explicit goal of NATO) and its reliance on an alliance that is still wedded to the policy of nuclear deterrence.

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Global Markets, Inequality, and the Future of Democracy

Posted on October 25, 2020Peter Venton

Highlights of My Reflections on the G78 Policy Conference

This is the title of the Group of 78 Conference held at the University of Ottawa in September 2019. The conference engaged some 16 Canadian economists, political scientists, sociologists and other expert presenters who were joined by key-note speaker, American political economist, Robert Kuttner. The purpose of the conference was to explore the roots of hyper-inequality, economic insecurity, higher unemployment, and the erosion of democracy over the last four decades.

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